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ABSTRACT
The Eurotunnel project was initiated in November 1987 to connect the U.K. and
continental Europe by a 30 mile undersea tunnel. Unlike other megaprojects, this
project is privately financed by equity issue and bank loans. The project is
primarily carried out by two parties: Eurotunnel, an Anglo-French consortium
which manages the project totally from planning to operation, and TML, also an
Anglo-French joint venture, which constructs the "Channel Tunnel" under a
contract with Eurotunnel.
Among a lot of recognized problems that have arisen since the project commenced,
cost overrun, which has surpassed the initial estimates by 40%, is one of the
most crucial. In September of 1990, Eurotunnel decided to refinance the project
by a new equity issue and additional bank loans.
The primary objective of this thesis is to evaluate the refinancing of the
Eurotunnel project from the Eurotunnel equity holders' perspective. VC (Valuation
by Components) based on CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model) is applied for the
evaluation, since this approach provides the best analytic results, especially for
international projects. Compared with previous studies of the financial evaluation
of a project, this thesis has two unique points. One is to calculate the project 1
from the actual stock price data; the other is to evaluate the project at an
intermediate phase. In addition, I calculated VC as it applied to the Japanese
banks, which are the largest financial supporter in the Eurotunnel Project.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. James L. Paddock
Title: Senior Lecturer of Civil Engineering
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Eurotunnel, sometimes called the Channel Tunnel, is one of the largest and the
most visible international projects of this century. Since the first planning was made
by the French emperor, Napoleon Bonaparte, in 1801, many attempts to construct the
Channel Tunnel have been made, but all have failed. The project will realize a 200-
year-old dream to connect Britain and continental Europe.
Eurotunnel has a competitive advantage in the cross-channel traffic system
because of its high speed and its independence from weather conditions. Eurotunnel
will play a significant role in the economic growth of European countries, especially
after the unification of the European Community in 1992. Considerations of the
planning and building of the tunnel itself, including the tunnel structure and the
transport system, are explained in Chapter 2.
The Eurotunnel project was opened to public by the governments of the UK and
France as a privately funded project in 1985. The intention was for the contractors
to carry out the entire project, including planning, financing, construction and
operation during the 55-year concession period from 1987 to 2042 and then, at the
end of the period, they were expected to sell the whole system to the two
governments. This project delivery system is called BOT (Build-Operate-transfer),
which has often been utilized in recent years in the Middle East and LDC (Low
Developing Countries). The Eurotunnel project is a forerunner of BOT, and has
inspired these countries to adopt its method.
As a result of competitive bidding, an Anglo-French consortium composed of
five UK and five French general contractors made a successful bid under the name of
Eurotunnel. After getting the project, Eurotunnel contracted the construction and
procurement portions to TML, which is also a joint venture composed of five UK and
five French construction companies.
Since 1987, when the project was commenced with many expectations from
the European countries, a lot of problems, such as organizational conflicts,
construction delays, cost overruns, and badly applied construction technologies, have
occurred. Among the problems, cost overrun is one of the most crucial ones. In
1990, forecast of the project's cost rose to 140% of the initial estimates, and
additional financing was strongly needed. Eurotunnel raised £566 million of new
equity in late 1990 and then entered into a Revised Credit Agreement with the
syndicated banks, in which they promised to provide additional £1.8 million in loans.
Currently, the project is making significant progress and is expected to meet the
planned completion date within the revised budget. The organization of the Eurotunnel
project, its progress so far, its planned schedule, and its refinancing requirements
are explained in Chapter 3.
The primary purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the refinancing of the
Eurotunnel project. In regard to the financial evaluation method, I use VC (Valuation
by Components) method based on CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model), since this
method gives us the best analytic result. Mr. Okano, a 1986 M.S. graduate at MIT,
wrote his Master's thesis on the financial evaluation of the Eurotunnel project before
the project began. My evaluation method is basically the same as his, but the
circumstances of my approach differ slightly, as follows;
1. My evaluation applies to at the intermediate phase of the project rather than to
a period prior to its commencement. Therefore, the resultant VC should be
compared with the market value of Eurotunnel assets existing on the evaluation
date, whereas the VC in the thesis of Mr. Okano was compared with zero.
2. Real interest rates in my thesis are based on the inflation rates and reference
interest rates of Credit Facilities that have been assumed by Eurotunnel,
whereas those in the Mr. Okano thesis are derived from the forward rate
structure of UK treasury bills.
3. Unleverd B of Eurotunnel in my thesis is derived from the actual Eurotunnel
stock price movement against the All-Shares index in the London Stock
Exchange, whereas that in the Mr. Okano thesis is from industry B assumed to
be 0.61.
No.3 above is one of the most unique points in this thesis. I calculated the
unlevered B of Eurotunnel from the actual data of Eurotunnel stock prices and market
indexes rather than using the historical industry B, which seems to reflect the
project's systematic risk. The financial evaluation analysis is explained in Chapter 5,
and the VC of the Eurotunnel project, as it applies to the equity holders, is shown in
Chapter 6. In Chapter 7, the results of some sensitivity analyses for the resultant VC
are described.
The syndicated banks are another participant in this project with a major
investment interest, because they are providing nearly 80% of the total financing
resources. Furthermore, most of the the syndicated banks' loans are denominated in
£; therefore, they have to consider the foreign exchange risks of the loan repayments
as well as scrutinize the Eurotunnel operation to determine whether it will be able to
make the loan repayments or not. In Chapter 8, I discuss this issue taking as an
example the Japanese banks, the largest contributors of all the syndicated banks, and
I will explain why they were reluctant to provide the additional financial support, as
reported in the press.
THE EUROTUNNEL SYSTEM
In this chapter, I will describe the Eurotunnel system, including its traffic
route, its tunnel structure, its terminal design, and its geographical condition.
Primary sources of this chapter are Eurotunnel Rights Issue. November. 1991, which
is called Prospectus in this thesis. Several articles in ENR and Tunnels & Tunnelling
are also used to supplement them.
2.1. The system description
1) Tunnels and Truck
The Channel Tunnel consists of two running tunnels and one service tunnel.
They are planned to connect the two sites, Folkestone in the U.K. and Calais in France,
under the Dover Channel. Each tunnel is 49.4km long, 38.4km of which is under sea
bed, 8.4km of which is under British land, and 3km of which is under French land. The
service tunnel is running just between the two running tunnels for maintenance and
emergency service. The diameter of the running tunnels is 7.6m, and that of the
service tunnel is 4.8m. These three tunnels are connected by 3.3m diameter cross-
passages at 375m intervals, and the two running tunnels are connected by 2m
diameter piston relief ducts at 250m intervals. Also, there are two crossover
chambers along the running tunnels so that the system operations may not be
interrupted by the maintenance work. The traffic route and the tunnel structure are
described in Figure 2.1 and 2.2.
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2) Terminals
The UK terminal near Folkestone and the French terminal near Calais will be
connected directly to their respective national road and motorway networks as
follows;
Figure 2.3. The terminal design (upper: UK, lower: France)
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Both terminals have been designed so that vehicles can transfer efficiently
between road and shuttle. They will provide the same types of services as airports:
passenger handling, catering, administration, customs and immigration. Also, each
will have main facilities to manage the activities associated with operating and
maintaining its shuttle train service.
The UK and French terminals have identical functions, but the local conditions
have required distinct construction techniques. The 900-acre UK construction site
has been constrained by hills, roads, rail tracks and a village, and the loop (3,000-
feet-long, 66-feet-wide, 30-feet-high) has been forced to be cut-and-cover
underground tunnels. The 1700-acre French construction site, on the other hand, is
completely flat and close to coast and tunnel works, and the loop has been built on the
surface.
3) Rolling stock
Road vehicles will be carried on shuttles between the UK and French terminals,
whereas passengers and freight will be carried between various locations in the UK
and continental Europe through rail services
Eurotunnel shuttles will be significantly larger than the rolling stock used for
through rail services. There will be three main types of wagon: double-deck wagons
for cars, single-deck wagons for vehicles, including coaches, over six feet high, and
semi-open wagons for freight vehicles. Shuttles will be powered by a Eurotunnel
locomotive at each end. Nine passenger vehicle shuttles, eight freight vehicle shuttles
and thirty eight locomotives have been ordered.
Through passenger trains running direct between London, Paris and Brussels
will be high speed trains specially designed for use on services between those cities.
Thirty of these trains have already been ordered by British Rail, SNCF and SNCB.
British rail has indicated that further orders for trains to run beyond London are due
to be placed.
The Railways are also planning significant investment in new freight rolling
stock. British Rail already placed an initial order for twenty dual voltage electric
locomotives as part of its planned £100 million investment in freight rolling stock for
Tunnels services. Intercontainer, which provides rail-based container freight
services throughout Europe, is planning to purchase one thousand and five hundred
special wagons for international services through the Tunnel.
2.2. Shuttle services
1) Passenger vehicle shuttles
Passenger vehicles and their occupants will be transported through the Tunnel
in enclosed wagons which will be brightly lit and air-conditioned. Vehicles will enter
and leave the shuttles using specially-designed loading and unloading wagons. At the
end of the journey, vehicles will be able to drive off the shuttle and directly out of the
terminal as both British and French frontier formalities will have been carried out at
the departure terminal. The overall transit time for passenger vehicles through the
System from entrance to exit of the terminals is expected to be generally between 50
and 80 minutes.
It is intended that passenger vehicle shuttles will initially run every 15
minutes during peak periods, although this frequency will be increased later as traffic
and the number of shuttles increases. The minimum planned frequency for passenger
vehicle shuttles is one departure every 20 minutes during the day and one departure
every hour during the night throughout the year. There will be no reservation system
for private cars although it will be possible to purchase shuttle tickets in advance.
The IGC (Intergovernmental Commission) is satisfied that the development of
the System should continue the basis of car and coach passengers remaining with their
vehicles with coaches being carried individually in single-deck shuttle wagons,
although it requires a number of further studies and tests. The IGC has advised
Eurotunnel that drivers and passengers should not be allowed to remain with light
commercial vehicles, vehicles carrying liquefied petroleum gas, vehicles with
caravans or trailers and vehicles of mixed type such as campers. The detailed
arrangements for carrying these categories of vehicle have not been finalised, but
Eurotunnel is considering a number of options.
2) Freight vehicles shuttles
Freight vehicles will be carried in separate shuttles which, subject to IGC
approval, will have semi-open side walls. Drivers and passengers will leave their
vehicles and will be carried separately in an air-conditioned rail coach at the front of
each shuttle. As with passenger vehicles, freight vehicles and their occupants will
pass through both exit and entry frontier control procedures at the departure
terminal. The overall transit time for freight vehicles through the System from
entrance to exit of the terminals is expected to be generally one hour 20 minutes.
It is intended that, at opening, freight vehicle shuttles will run every 20
minutes at peak time and, within two years of opening, every 15 minutes. The
minimum planned frequency for freight shuttles is two departures per hour during the
night throughout the year.
2.3. Through rail services
The Usage Contract entitles the Railways to use up to half of the capacity of
the Tunnel to provide passenger and freight services between the UK and France and
other places in continental Europe. The Railways will pay to Eurotunnel usage charges
depending upon the volume of the passenger and freight carried and will also bear the
proportion of the System's operating and renewal expenses attribute to the passing of
their trains.
1) Passenger trains
The Railways are planning to run between one and four direct train services
per hour during the day between London and Paris and between London and Brussels,
as well as night time services between these cities. The Railways are also planning
day and night time train services to and from cities other than London, Paris and
Brussels. When the tunnel opens, through trains are expected to travel between
London and Paris in just over 3 hours and between London and Brussels in about 3
hours 10 minutes. With the introduction of the high speed link between Lille and
Brussels (planned for 1995), the travel time between London and Brussels is expected
to be reduced about 2 hours and forty minutes. A high-speed rail link between the
Tunnel and London would further reduce the times between London and Paris and
London and Brussels to approximately 2 hours and 30 minutes and 2 hours and 10
minutes, respectively; such a link is under consideration and could open by the year
2000.
2) Freight trains
The railways are planning two main types of freight service: direct services
to private sidings and distribution terminals, and intermodal services which will
connect a number of regional depots in the UK on a daily basis with major commercial
and industrial centres in continental Europe.
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The system is expected to lead to an increased amount of fright being
transported between the UK and continental Europe by rail, with over fifty freight
trains per day initially expected to pass through the Tunnel.
The linking of the railway networks will enable the Railways to exploit the
natural advantage rail has over road by offering fast, secure movement of goods in
large volumes over long distances. The change in freight transport patterns from
road to rail is expected to give rise to widespread indirect economic and environment
benefits.
2.4. Geological condition
The marine geotechnical investigations undertaken since 19581 has revealed
that there are four seams under the Channel. They are Gray chalk, Chalk marl, Gault
clay, and Green sand as shown in Figure 2.42.
Most of the three tunnels will be lined within a seam of Chalk marl, called blue
chalk. The Chalk marl is thought to be ideal tunnelling material, because chalk is an
almost impermeable, weak, homogeneous rock, which allows excavation to be carried
out at high speed, with minimum water inflow3
1 Before the marine geotechnical investigations were undertaken in 1986-87, three
investigations had been taken place in 1958-59, 64-65, and 72-74.
2 Source of this figure is ENR, November 3, 1988, p. 36
3 "An initial review of the tunnel design", Tunnels & Tunnelling, September, 1987, p.
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CHAPTER 3. THE EUROTUNNEL PROJECT
The Eurotunnel project is a privately funded project in spite of its large scale
and its public feature. Since the commencement in November, 1987, the project has
produced a lot of problems, such as cost overruns, construction delays, misguided
construction technologies, and organizational conflicts. Recently, the delays have
been recovered by remarkable construction progress, but the total costs have
increased to 140% of the initial estimates. Eurotunnel is planning to refinance the
project by new rights issue and additional bank loans. In this chapter, I will describe
the organization of the Eurotunnel project, its progress so far, its planned schedule,
and its refinancing requirements. Primary sources of this chapter are "Prospectus".
3.1. Project structure
A client of the project, Eurotunnel, is a partnership between Channel Tunnel
Group (CTG) and Franche Manche (FM) established in August 1986 to construct and
operate the tunnel under a 55-year concession from the UK and French governments.
This partnership is a subsidiary of Eurotunnel PLC (EPLC) in the U.K. and Eurotunnel
SA (ESA) in France. Eurotunnel Finance SA and Eurotunnel Finance Ltd. are the finance
subsidiaries through which the loan finance is drawn from the Syndicate Banks, EIB
and Credit National under the terms of the Revised Credit Agreement and the EIB and
CN agreements. Eurotunnel Developments Ltd. and Eurotunnel Developments SA are
the subsidiaries with responsibility for property development.
TML (Transmanche Link) is an Anglo-French consortium which is designing and
building the project under the construction contract with Eurotunnel. TML is a joint-
venture between Translink in the UK and Transmanche Construction in France, each of
which comprises of five domestic construction companies. The members of Translink
are Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd., Costain Civil Engineering Ltd., Tarmac
Construction Ltd., Taylor Woodrow Construction Ltd., and Wimpey Major Projects
Ltd; and those of Tramanche Construction are Bouyges SA, Dumez SA, Societe
Generale d'Enterprises SA, Societe Auxiliaire d'Enterprises SA, and Spie Batignolles
SA. The TML role is to design, construct and commission the complete project from
tunnel boring right through to railway locomotives and rolling stock and signalling.
1) Construction contract
The construction contract is a "design and build" contract under which TML has
a general obligation to design, construct, test, and commission the tunnel ready for
operation by the target completion date of June 15, 1993. If TML is not entitled to
any extensions of time, certain bonuses will be lost from June 15, 1993. Also, if the
tunnel is not completed by August 15, 1993, liquidated damages will be payable by
TML from that date. The tunnel must satisfy the performance criteria set out in the
contract. The contract also provides that Eurotunnel may require TML to make
changes in the design or construction of the tunnel; if Eurotunnel does so, TML is
entitled to an appropriately increased or reduced payment. In addition, the allowed
for TML to complete the construction may be extended beyond June 15, 1993 in
certain circumstances.
Eurotunnel pays TML for the actual costs of the Target Works. To the extent
that the actual costs of the Target Works (recalculated to 1985 prices) exceed the
Target Cost (currently £1,580 million), TML bears 30% of all costs of the Target
Works above this level with the balance being borne by Eurotunnel. TML shares
equally with Eurotunnel the benefit of any saving if the adjusted actual cost falls short
of the Target Cost. TML is also entitled to a fee calculated as a percentage of the
Target Cost. The Lump Sum Works are paid for by Eurotunnel on the basis of fixed
prices without adjustment for the actual cost incurred by TML. TML awards sub-
contracts for the Procurement Items, which are subject to Eurotunnel's approval and
for which Eurotunnel pays the actual cost plus a percentage fee subject to a limit.
The Target Cost and the Lump Sum Price are subject to adjustment to reflect
changes to performance criteria which are requested by Eurotunnel. In addition,
Eurotunnel and TML have agreed a number of Project "milestones" which, if met by
TML, give rise to the payment of bonuses and, if not met, may in certain
circumstances lead to TML being required to pay liquidated damages. The Lump Sum
Price and the fee for the Target Works are subject to adjustment for inflation.
An independent organization, Maitre d'Oeuvre, was appointed in 1986 to
monitor the design, development and construction of the System, and to advise the IGC
(Intergovernmental Commission) and the Safety Authority. The MdO is a joint venture
between W.S. Atkins Consultants Limited and Societe d'Etudes Techniques et
Economiques with, as subconsultants, Sir William Halcrow and Partners Ltd and
Tractebel.
Monitoring by the MdO includes detailed scrutiny of the actions of TML and
verification that the works are being carried out by TML according to budget and
programme as well as to the standards of safety, quality and performance required by
Eurotunnel.
2) Financing contract
The Eurotunnel project costs have been financed by equity issue and bank
loans, Credit Facilities, provided by the syndicated banks. In 1987, £1,023 million of
equity and £5,000 million of Credit Facilities were arranged to meet the financing
requirements of the project. However, the project costs have surpassed the initial
estimates by 40%, and additional financial sources have been required. As a result of
long negotiation with equity holders and the syndicated banks, in November 1990,
Eurotunnel succeeded in arranging £566 million of new equity issue and additional
£1,800 million in Credit Facilities.
In regard to the Credit Facilities, there are three underlying agreements with
the relating banks as follows;
Revised Credit Agreement
The Revised Credit Agreement in 1990, which is an amended version of the
Credit Agreement in 1986, regulates several treaties for Credit Facilities between
Eurotunnel and the syndicated banks. Under the Revised Credit Agreement, Credit
Facilities are increased from £5,000 million to £6,800 million due to the project cost
overruns. The syndicated banks independently prepare expected cash flows, called
Banking case, based on the various assumptions as to construction costs, corporate
costs, operating revenues and expenditure, opening date of the system, taxation,
inflation, future interest rates and other economic factors. The Banking cases are
used to calculate several debt coverage ratios, based on which the syndicated banks
prohibit Eurotunnel from making additional drawings or regard it an event of default.
The bench-marks for the ratios set out by the syndicated banks are shown in Chapter
7.
EIB (European Investment Bank) Agreement
The loans from EIB are secured by letters of credit issued by the banks;
therefore, the £1,000 million available from EIB is not added to the amounts available
under the Revised Credit Agreement. The requirements for the release of letters of
credit are: 1) completion has occurred, 2) the 2020 debt coverage ratio shall exceed
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1.40, 3) the debt service coverage ratio in respect of dates following the commitment
expiry date shall exceed 1.10, 4) no event of default or potential event of default
shall have occurred and be continuing, and 5) the conditions to initial refinancing
contained in the Revised Credit Agreement have been met. Interest rates for
drawings will be fixed at the time of drawdown in accordance with EIB's standard
practice.
In addition to the £1,000 million of loans available against security of letters
of credit, EIB is also providing parallel line in an amount of £300 million. These will
not be secured by letters of credit but will join in the security granted by Eurotunnel
to the banks. They provide long-term financing for the project expenditure and can be
drawn in four equal amounts upon the achievement of certain milestones. The loans
can be drawn at fixed, variable or adjustable interest rates, or combinations thereof,
based on EIB's prevailing lending terms. The parallel line loans are conditional upon
the project expenditure having exceeded £5,000 million, the most recent banking case
showing a minimum 2020 debt coverage ratio of not less than 1.40, and no event of
default or the potential event of default under the Revised Credit Agreement being
occurred.
Credit National Agreement
In December 1987, Eurotunnel entered into an agreement with Credit National
to provide a loan facility of FRF4,000 million. The loans from Credit National will be
secured by letters of credit issued by the banks. Therefore, the FRF4,000 million
available from Credit National is not added to the amounts available under the Credit
Agreement and the Revised Credit Agreement. Credit National has agreed to amend
the CN Agreement in order to reduce the cost of floating rate loans and to decrease
the total use of letters of credit by Eurotunnel. The amendment extended the maturity
of the facility to 2012 or, if the conditions for the release of letters of credit by
Credit National are not satisfied, to a date which is the same as the maturity date of
the Revised Credit Agreement.
Interest rates applicable to drawings under the CN Agreement will be
determined by reference to the market rates of interest applicable at the time. The
margins paid under the CN Agreement will be between 0.3 and 0.6% per annum.
EIB Agreement and Credit National Agreement play an important role in
supporting the Revised Credit Agreement. Although both agreements require stricter
conditions than the Revised Credit Agreement in the release of letters of credit, they
secure Eurotunnel to get additional financial sources in case of unexpected cost
overruns in the operation phase. The cash flow projections estimated by Eurotunnel,
however, assume that Eurotunnel will produce enough profits not to use these two
credit lines. In this thesis, I follow this assumption, and I will concern only the
Revised Credit Agreement as to Credit Facilities .
The project structure is summarized in Figure 3.1
Figure 3.1. Eurotunnel project structure
Operator/Client
3.2. Project progress
3.2.1. Time schedule
The design and construction of the System comprises of tunnelling and
manufacture of tunnel ("Target works"), construction of terminals, procurement and
installation of mechanical and electrical fixed equipment in the tunnels and terminals
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("Lump Sum works"), and procurement of rolling stock, which are locomotives and
shuttle wagons to be operated by Eurotunnel ("Procurement Items").
1) Tunnels
The eleven TBMs have been used for the twelve tunnelling works as follows 1;
Figure 3.2. The twelve tunnelling works for Eurotunnel
ver Chan
T1 T7
T3 T9
T2 T8
ndersea Tur
T
T
1 Sources of this figure and table are ", Tunnels & Tunnelling, March 1988, December
1988, and June 1989."
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Table 3.1 The eleven TBMs applied for Eurotunnel
Tunnel type TBM designer and supplier
Undersea
Undersea
Undersea
running
running
service
(North)
(South)
Landward running (North)
Landward running (South)
Landward service
Undersea
Undersea
Undersea
Landward
Landward
Landward
running
running
service
running
running
service
Robbins/Markham jv (T1)
Robbins/Markham jv (T2)
James Howden with Decon
James Howden with
James Howden with
James Howden with
(North)
(South)
(North)
(South)
Decon
Decon
Decon
Robbins/Kawasaki jv (T7)
Robbins/Kawasaki jv (T8)
Robbins with Komatsu (T9)
Mitsubishi (T10)
Mitsubishi (T10)
Mitsubishi (T11)
The excavation progress of each tunnel is described in Figure 3.3
(T3)
(T4)
(T5)
(T6)
Figure 3.3 Excavation progress for each tunnel (ý;eptember, 1990)
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Figure 3.3 shows that the tunnelling works did not make much progress in the
initial phase. The UK seaward service tunnel had covered about 1.8km against the
3.5km, amount of which should have been finished in mid August, 1988. At this time,
the weekly boring rate had improved to average 100-120 meters a week but that rate
should have been nearer to 200 meters a week. On the French side, on the other hand,
only some 200 meters had been covered, whereas the boring rate should have been
some 50 meters a week 1.
Since the beginning of 1989, each tunnelling work has caught up with the
planned schedule. Recently, record-breaking tunnelling length has been commonly
achieved according to the report. Both of the marine running tunnels are expected to
meet between June and September, 1991.
2) Terminals
Construction of the terminals has advanced well. The earthworks at the 420-
acre UK terminal and the 1,235-acre French terminal are virtually complete. The
major structures, such as access bridges, platforms and overbridges, are at an
advanced stage of construction. The structure of loop tunnel for the shuttles at the UK
terminal is substantially complete. Work on the foundations for buildings has started
at both terminals and the maintenance building in France is well underway.
Since the terminal work started, Eurotunnel has often changed the terminal
design, including the number of trains, length of the platforms, and the number and
makeup of the buildings. This design change has been proposed in order to satisfy the
severe running schedule of locomotives under the site condition, and to save the
terminal costs to cover the enormous rise in the tunnelling construction cost.
1 "Schedule slipping," Transport, September 1988, p. 39
3) Fixed equipment
The specification of the fixed equipment for the System is essentially complete
and thirty eight of the forty two major sub-contract packages have been awarded.
Certain key items, including the central control system, are behind schedule, but the
Directors consider that these delays are capable of being recovered. Discussions are
continuing with the IGC (Intergovernmental Commission) on a number of subjections
which may have an impact on the design of certain elements of the fixed equipment.
The installation in the tunnels of mechanical systems, such as fire mains and
drainage pipes, has begun.
4) Rolling stock
Subcontracts to build the locomotives and wagons comprising the shuttles were
awarded in 1989 and their detailed design is progressing. Mock-ups and scale models
for test purposes have been built and production has begun. However, due to
additional incorporation with the IGC decision on non-segregation of passengers from
vehicles, delivery of two passenger vehicle shuttles is expected to be delayed by six
and twelve weeks, respectively, to July and August, 1993. Certain aspects of the
detailed design of the passenger shuttles, including the design of the doors through the
barriers are still subject to discussions with the IGC. The design of the freight
vehicle wagons is still to be submitted to the IGC for approval. Until the issues
relating both types of shuttle are resolved, there remains the risk of additional costs
and delays to the shuttle delivery programme.
5) Commissioning
Although full System commissioning is scheduled to begin in December 1992, it
will be preceded by more than a year of equipment and sub-system testing. Early use
will be made of a test track in the north land running tunnels on the UK side to test
rolling stock and fixed equipment. The full System commissioning period will involve
demonstrating and testing all of the System's capabilities, including compatibility with
through trains and trial running of Eurotunnel shuttles, and will conclude with
contractual performance tests.
During the commissioning phase, it can be expected that difficulties arise
requiring additions or minor modification to the System. Eurotunnel, TML and other
parties are currently discussing the definition of their respective roles in the
commissioning process to ensure effective utilization of the full System
commissioning period. This six-month period will be essential to accomplish full
completion of the works and to satisfy the IGC that the System is ready for
commercial operation.
3.2.2. Costs
Eurotunnel project costs are decomposed into construction costs, corporate
costs, and financing costs. These costs incurred to August 1990 are as follows;
(£ million)
Construction costs 2,132
Target Works 1,439
Terminals 283
Fixed Equipment 93
Procurement Items 57
Bonuses 7
Effect of Inflation 253
Corporate costs 411
Net financing cost 244
Total costs to August 1990 2,787
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The total costs incurred to August 1990 are significantly larger than their
initial estimates. These increases are mainly due to the construction cost overruns.
The forecast of the construction costs have been changed since November 1987 as
follows (in September 1985 prices);
Forecast at Current
November 1987 Forecast
(£ million) (£ million)
Target Works 1,329 2,009
Terminals 448 491
Fixed Equipment 688 814
Procurement Items 245 583
Bonuses 72
Project contingency 132 239
Total Construction costs 2,842 4,208
3.3. Reasons for the construction delays and the cost overruns
3.3.1. Reasons for the construction delays
There are several reasons for the construction delays in the early stages.
First, Eurotunnel and TML had problems in their organizational structure. Initially,
each party had its own project's promoter, although each party had a completely
different interest in its project. Eurotunnel's interest was, and continues to be, to
operate the system during the concession period and to reduce the construction costs
in order to obtain high NPV of the project; whereas TML's interest was, and is, to
construct and sell the project to Eurotunnel and to pursue the profits only in the
construction phase. They had frequently discussed ways to solve their problems, but
in vain. Frangois Jolivet, the former TML's French director general, made the
following comment, "Both TML and Eurotunnel have executives making decisions about
decisions about design and construction, leading to duplication of effort, conflicting
priorities and wasted time. It would have been better to integrate TML's and
Eurotunnel's project teams more thoroughly or, conversely, to separate them by
giving each side its own clearly-defined responsibilities. More than 15,000 letters
have been exchanged, more than 5000 meetings have been held, and two-thirds of
them were useless. Most of them were just for the sake of this bloody
organization." 1
Second, the bad geological difficulties in the UK side of the tunnel, and the
mechanical problems in French side caused delays. The tunnelling in the UK side was
expected to stay within the blue dry chalk, which is one of the most appropriate
layers for tunnelling, but once excavated, the blue chalk was recognized to be in
poorer condition than expected, and included a lot of water infusion. Tunnelling often
stopped for investigation of the ground condition ahead, and the schedule fell behind
day by day. The French TBMs, by contrast, were designed to operate under high
water-pressure, and had extremely advanced and complex designs in their grouting
system, lining erectors, and in spoil removal systems. However, one of the TBMs did
not perform well, and it took a lot of time to exchange the equipment. This caused the
significant delay in French side of the tunnel.
The final problem was that Eurotunnel was late in acquiring financing. At the
end of November, 1987, Eurotunnel succeeded in procuring for underwriting a share
issue to raise £770 million for the project, the support was required by the
syndicated banks before they would invest their share, £5,000 million. This date was
only one month before the tunnel excavation began, and as a result, TML had
corresponding delays in ordering equipment.
1 "Management turmoil has dogged project from the start," ENR, December 10 1990,
p.56
3.3.2. Reasons for the cost overruns
1) Construction costs
Construction costs are divided into those of three different construction
works. Each work has its own reason for the cost overruns as follows;
Target Works --- The most important cause of the increase in the forecast cost of the
Target Works was the poor tunnelling progress in the early stages. Because of
problems with both the performance of and the logistical support for the tunnel boring
machines, during 1988 on both sides and in 1989 on the UK side, it took longer than
had been expected for acceptable tunnelling rates to be achieved in both the UK and
France. In addition, on the UK side, significant cost increases were suffered as a
result of inadequate cost controls by TML in 1988 and 1989 and of higher than
expected labour costs.
Lump Sum Works ---A number of changes in the design of the System increased the
forecast costs. Eurotunnel's forecast cost of the Lump Sum Works reflects its
changes and TML's claims for additional payments.
Procurement Items --- The 1987 forecast was based on the prevailing market prices
and on the status of the project design at that time. The procurement conducted by
TML took longer than expected because of its long approval process of the
governments, and as a result, the submission of bids were significantly higher than in
the original provision of the construction contract.
2) Corporate costs
The increase in corporate costs is, in particular, due to additional financing
expenses, enlargement of the Project Implementation Division in 1988, strengthening
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of Eurotunnel's administrative resources and information systems, and costs relating
to security measures. Also, Eurotunnel has employed experienced project managers
from Bechtel Group, one of the largest US construction companies. Bechtel's
agreement was to provide experienced management personnel for the team and not to
participate in contract management in the official sensel. These costs were not
included in the initial estimates and have increased the corporate costs.
3.3.3. Considerations for the reasons
Based on the reasons for the construction delays and the cost overruns, one
ultimate reason seems that Eurotunnel was too unsophisticated to carry out the
project. In other words, Eurotunnel should have thought much more about the project
characteristics: one of the largest international construction projects which both
countries have never experienced, and a privately financed project unlike other large
public projects financed by government.
On schedule side, Eurotunnel underestimated the construction delays in the
initial phase. Even if the tunnelling work is expected to be within ideal layers,
Eurotunnel should have planned more spatial schedule so as to cope with the future
unexpected difficulties. Also, Eurotunnel should have recognized the structure of
construction progress. Construction delays are often occurred in the initial and final
phase. The initial delays are caused by learning curve effect and various arrangement
works to start the construction smoothly; whereas the delays in the final phase are
caused by various adjustment works to finish the construction. The relationship
between construction volume and time is described as S shaped curve in Figure 3.4.
1 "Eurotunnel employs US project managers," Tunnels & Tunnelling, March, 1988,
p.14
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Figure 3.4 Relationship between construction volume and time
Construction
Time
The current remarkable progress in construction is on the steep slope of the S-
curve. Recognizing this relationship, Eurotunnel should have allocated the tunnelling
and terminal works more efficiently, and negotiated with the syndicated banks to get
more appropriately scheduled financial supports. Eurotunnel seemed to distract the
syndicated banks to provide additional financial support by its poor construction
management.
On cost side, the 40% cost overruns, are too large, even if significant
construction delays were occurred in the initial phase. It is nothing but that
Eurotunnel underestimated the project costs. Seikan Tunnel, the same size undersea
tunnel in Japan, was completed within the budget, aside from the hyper-inflation
effect caused by oil crisis in 1972. The project cost was partly influenced by high
inflation rate in the UK, but it was not the primary reasons. Eurotunnel should have
thought much more about contingencies in construction itself which are often realized
in such a large project.
In summary, less experience of the UK and France in this kind of project is to a
large extent attributable to the delays and cost overruns.
Time
3.4. Conflicts between Eurotunnel and TML
Because of the huge cost overruns and construction delays, there have been
stringent conflicts between Eurotunnel and TML since the project was commenced.
After the difficulties encountered with TML in 1988 and 1989, when the relations
were very strained against a background of cost overruns, Eurotunnel faced one of the
most crucial situations in February, 1990 2 . Eurotunnel was accused of suspending
the payment of the completed works to TML until TML signed a new and stricter work
contract. Since the syndicated banks had not promised to provide the next withdrawal
until the two parties were brought into agreement, Eurotunnel lost its financial
resources.
After the arguments between three parties, the syndicated banks agreed to
provide the next loan, and TML agreed to pay the increasing costs within their
responsibilities under the conditions that Eurotunnel would move several top
Eurotunnel management personnel out of the position and strengthen the Project
Implementation Division by employing a new chief executive to manage the contract on
a day-to-day basis. The new structure of the Project Implementation Division was
very close to that of TML, which was reorganized in 1989. This division places
greater emphasis on the development of the transportation system and on the detailed
requirements of Eurotunnel's operations division.
Since the construction began, TML has submitted a lot of claims to Eurotunnel.
The claims are decomposed into two categories: those for additional payments over
and above the amounts provided for in the contract and those for extensions of time.
Under the construction contract, TML must notify Eurotunnel of every claim
concerning additional payments or an extension of time. TML has notified Eurotunnel
of two hundred one claims for additional payments, of which eighty seven have been
2 "Bank governor settles dispute," Tunnels & Tunnelling, March, 1990, p.15
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settled by agreement or withdrawn by TML. In the revised contract in January 1990,
the completion date was postponed from May 15, 1993 to June 15, 1993.
3.5. Current progress
After Eurotunnel and TML changed their organizations, the tunnel construction
has remarkably progressed, and the conflicts between both parties have been reduced.
Especially, the organizational change in TML is now playing a significant role in the
current progress.
In May 1989, TML hired Jack K, Lemley as the first CEO, and unified the
leadership of TML. Before that time, TML had two director generals in the UK and
France, who led the consortium composed of five construction companies in each
country. This structure helped to manage different realized problems such as
geological conditions, but lacked the central direction1 . Although engineers and
managers in both groups shared the conflicts with Eurotunnel, the workers in each site
or each side of the tunnel had completely different working manners, had no
communications, and had rivalries in bad sense with each other. Mr. Lemley unified a
work force of the two sites, and moved TML headquarters from suburban London to
the site of the English terminal at Folkstone to improve relations between the
transportation organization and the site team. When he was inaugurated as the CEO,
the situation in tunnelling was quite bad, and the workers tended to be distracted by
the press reporting that the Channel Tunnel would be almost impossible to be
completed. Mr. Lemley has made the workers pride themselves on constructing one
of the longest undersea tunnels in the world and has inspired them to complete it on
1 "Handshake under the Channel," ENR, December 10 1990, p.30
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time. Also, Mr. Lemley negotiated with Eurotunnel and the syndicated banks to
reshape the contract, and succeeded in solving some of the claims and conflicts.
The organizational amendment in TML has reduced the future construction risks
and made it possible to complete the construction in time within the budget. The lower
relative profitability of the project, which is noted in later chapters, might be
covered by the current progress.
3.6. Project planning
3.6.1. Time schedule
The planned timetable to the opening of the System is as follows:
1991
June to September
October
1992
December
1993
June
September
Breakthrough of the marine running tunnels
Test track ready in UK north land running tunnel
Full System commissioning begins, including a
period of operational trials
System opens for cars, freight vehicles and
through trains
System opens for coaches and caravans
3.6.2. Financing requirements
The financing requirements for the project include all the construction and
corporate costs estimated to be incurred through to the end of the construction
period, together with associated financing costs and a provision for inflation to
convert the forecast costs into the value of the evaluation date. In addition, the
financing requirement has to cover net financing costs to completion, which represent
interest cost plus equity and loan fees paid less interest received, and net cash
outflow in initial period, which is caused by lower operating revenues than capital
expenditure and debt services requirements. The table below summarizes the total
financing requirements as of August 1990 and the sources of finance;
- Costs forecast to be incurred as of August 1990 (£ million)
Construction costs (September 1985 prices) 2,329
Corporate costs (June 1990 prices) 376
Provision for inflation on construction and
corporate costs to August, 1990 778
Net nominal financing cost to June 1993 1,142
Net cash outflow in initial period 196
Total financing requirements 4,821
- Sources of finance ( £ million )
Equity
Rights Issue 566
Bank loans
Credit Facilities 4,255
Total sources 4,821
Sources of finance consist of new rights issue and bank loans named Credit
Facilities. The incurred total cost to August 1990 is £2,787 million, and old equity
and a part of Credit Facilities have already applied for its source. According to
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Prospectus, a total of £1,023 million of equity has already been subscribed and paid
in; therefore, £1,764 million of Credit Facilities has already been drawn.
The costs forecast to completion as of August 1990 is £4,821 million. Since
£566 million of equity is planned to be raised, £4,255 million of Credit Facilities will
be applied to its source. Under the Revised Credit Agreement, the syndicated banks
agreed to provide a total of £6,800 million for Credit Facilities, and Eurotunnel has
already drawn £1,764 million out of this amount; therefore, Eurotunnel can draw up
to £5,036 million, if the debt coverage ratio and debt service ratio at the specified
years meet the requirements of the syndicated banks. The reference interest rate for
Credit Facilities is determined by LIBOR (London Interbank Offer Rate) plus margins
which will vary with time and amount of drawings. The applied rate of the margins
per annum are as follows;
Table 3.2. Margins over LIBOR for Credit Facilities
To Completion After Completion
Credit Facilities utilized Date Date
Up to the equivalent of 1.50% 1.25%
£4,000 million
Between the equivalent
of £4,000 and £6,300 1.75% 1.50%
million
Last £500 million 2.50% 2.25%
If, after the completion date, repayments by Eurotunnel fall short of the
regular repayment schedule, the applicable margins on the shortfall shall be increased
by 0.125%.
The margins over LIBOR represent the profitability of Credit Facilities for the
syndicated banks. LIBOR is a floating interest rate which reflects inflation rate in the
UK; therefore, the syndicated banks can mitigate the inflation risks of the project in
this loans. However, the syndicated banks cannot avoid the other risks, such as the
project's country risks, its operating risks, and its foreign exchange risks. These
unavoidable risks should be reflected on the margins, but the arranged margin rates
are relatively small, considering that the Eurotunnel project has a lot of contingencies
due to its long concession period. The syndicated banks have been reported to be
reluctant to this loans. In Chapter 7, I will discuss these issues in more detail.
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FINANCIAL EVALUATION METHODS
Modern finance theory has provided useful financial evaluation methods for
feasibility studies of new projects. It is quite important for a project manager to
select a reasonable evaluation method and to apply it in the right way. In this chapter,
I introduce a newly developed financial evaluation method, VC (Valuation by
components), and explain its superiority over several traditional methods. Primary
sources of this chapter are LFP 1, BM2, and several articles.
4.1. Traditional approach
1) NPV based on WACC
Among a large selection of financial evaluation methods, NPV (Net Present
Value) based on WACC (Weighted Average Cost of Capital) has been widely used. NPV
is formulated as follows;
NPV = - (Inv)o + NOI(1-T)t (4.1)
t=O (1+rw)t
where (Inv)o is initial investment at time 0, NOI(1-T)t is expected after tax
net operating income at time t, and rw is a weighted average cost of capital (WACC)
given by;
1 Donald Lessard, Eugene Flood Jr., James Paddock, International Corporate Finance.
draft
2 Brealey and Myers, Principle of Corporate Finance, 3rd ed., New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1988
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CHAPTER 4.
E D
rw = D E re + (D 1 - T)rd (4.2)D+E D+E
where E is the value of equity of a firm, D is the value of debt of a firm, re is
the expected return on the levered equity, rd is the interest rate on the debt, and T is
a corporate income tax rate. Since the value of a firm (V) is given by sum of the
value of equity and debt, Equation (4.2) is rewritten as follows;
E D
rw = re + rd( 1 -T) V (4.3)
E D
,where V = D + E, and V V represent the financial structure of a
firm.
NPV based on WACC has been widely used because of its simplicity, but is only
applicable if the following conditions are hold.
1. Perpetual and constant net operating cash flows
2. Perpetual and constant debt principal and interest rate
3. Perpetual and constant financial structure
4. Perpetual and constant corporate tax rate
5. Perpetual and constant cost of levered and unlevered equity capital
Equation (4.3) is derived from a viewpoint of return to investors.1 Suppose
that all the above five conditions are hold, return to equity holders is given by
Equation (4.4), because the equity holders have junior claims to the debt holders
against the cash flow of a firm.
re E = NOI - rd D - T (NOI - rd D) (4.4)
1 Taggart Jr., Robert A. "Capital Budgeting and the Financing Decision: An
Exposition". Financial Management. Summer, 1977. pp. 59-64
,where NOI is expected net operating income before interest and tax
payments. Equation (4.4) can be rewritten as follows;
re E + rd ( 1 - T) D = NOI ( 1 - T) (4.5)
E DV( re + rd ( 1 - T) )= NOI( 1 - T ) (4.6)
NOI (1-T)V= E D
re + rd (1-T) DV V
NOI (1-T)
-=x E] (4.7)
t=0 1 + { re + rd (1-T) D tV V
Therefore,
E D
rw = re + rd ( 1 -T) (4.8)V V
In addition to the the five conditions, WACC also requires that the risk class of
a new project is exactly same as that of a firm. For these reasons, NPV based on
WACC is not appropriate for financial evaluation of a project.
2) MM formula
Modigliani and Miller developed an alternative overall cost of capital as
follows;
DT
rmm = ra ( 1 - V ) (4.9)
,where ra is the expected return of unlevered equity.
Equation (4.9) is derived from a viewpoint of return to firms. Since generated
cash flows are divided into return to equity and return to debt. Therefore,
CF = rd D + (NOI - rd D)(1 - T) (4.10)
In Equation (4.10), the first term is return to debt and the second term is
return to equity. Debt holders receive the return before equity holders do. Equation
(4.10) can be rewritten as follows;
CF = NOI(1 - T) + T rd D (4.11)
In Equation (4.11), the first term is after tax net operating income in case that
the firm is all-equity financed, and the second term is the interest tax shields caused
by the firm's borrowing capacity. Since both terms are in different risk classes, they
should be discounted by different discount rates. The after tax net operating income
is reflecting the unlevered firm's own risk, and interest tax shields are reflecting the
firm's borrowing risk determined by the interest rate. Therefore, the first term
should be discounted by unlevered cost of capital, and the second term should be
discounted by the interest rate of debt. Therefore,
n NOI(1-T) m+ rd DTV = 1 + 1 (4.12)
t=o (1+ra)t t=o (1+rd) t
If n and m is perpetual, the right-hand side of Equation (4.12) becomes
NOI(1-T) rd DTV= + (4.13)ra rd
Equation (4.13) can be rewritten as follows;
V-DT =NOI(1-T) (4.14)
ra
DT NOI(1-T) (4.15)
V ( 1 - ) = (4.15)V ra
V NOI(1-T) (4.16)
DT
ra ( 1 -
V
= [ NOI (1-T)
t=o 1 + { ra ( 1 - DT
Therefore, the overall cost of capital is given by;
DT
rmm = ra ( 1 - DT (4.17)
As is the same in Equation (4.8), Equation (4.17) is valid only if the five
conditions mentioned earlier are hold. Therefore, this is not appropriate for financial
evaluation of a project.
In 1980, Miles and Ezzell developed the adjusted rate accounting for the change
of financial structure. This formula is applicable for the changing financial structure,
where the debt principal changes as a constant proportion of the changing value of the
project. The discount rate is given by;
D 1+ ra
r = ra - d ( D ) + T ( ) (4.18)D+E 1+rd
4.2. APV (Adjusted Net Present Value)
Myers generalized the MM approach in 1974 and 1981, and suggested APV
approach formulated as Equation (4.19).
APV = n NOI(1-T)t + rdt Dt Tt
t=O ( 1 + rat )t t=0 ( 1 + rdt )t
where NOI(1-T)t is expected after tax net operating income, rat is unlevered
cost of equity, rdt is cost of debt, Dt is value of debt, Tt is corporate tax rate at time
t, and m is the debt maturity. If n and m are perpetual, and NOI(1-T)t, rdt Dt, Tt, and
rat are constant in Equation (4.19), (4.19) equals Equation (4.13), and MM formula
(4.9) is obtained in consequence.
The basic concept of APV is to separate the NPV of projected cash flows into
two parts as follows;
APV = Base-case (All-equity financed) NPV
+ PV of side effects caused by the firm's financial decisions
The first term in this formula, which is called base-case of NPV, is the present
value of the expected after tax net operating cash flow. This cash flow is discounted
by unlevered cost of equity, which reflects business risk of a firm. The second term
is the present value of the side effects which include tax shields and all possible costs
due to the firm's financial transactions. In Equation (4.19), Myers assumes that the
side effects contain only tax shields.
4.3. VC (Valuation by Components)
The concept of APV is to divide the expected cash flows into after tax net
operating cash flow and other side effects caused by financing transactions. In VC, on
the other hand, after tax net operating income is also decomposed into several cash
flow components in more detail, the present value of each component is calculated
separately and then summed up. Each cash flow component is discounted by different
discount rate reflecting its own risk. VC is, in that sense, called "divide and conquer"
approach.
VC is effective for a financial evaluation especially of international projects,
because they include a lot of complicated financing transactions, various international
tax systems, and different business risks. These issues are regarded as the side
effects of VC. It is difficult to estimate each different discount rate; however, once it
is determined, VC gives the best analytical result for a financial evaluation of a
project.
Suppose various financial transactions are ignored for simplicity, after tax
cash flow is given by;
ATCF = Revenue - Cost - Debt principal payments - Interest payment
- Tax rate * ( Revenue - Cost - Interest payment - Depreciation
expense )
= Revenue - Cost - Tax rate*(Revenue - Cost)
+ Interest tax shields + Depreciation tax shields
- Debt Principal repayment - Interest repayment
Therefore, VC is given by;
VC = - PV of Initial investment
+ PV of Revenues - PV of Costs - PV of [Tax rate*(Revenues-Costs)]
+ PV of Interest tax shields + PV of Depreciation tax shields
+ PV of Debt principal inflow - PV of Debt principal repayment
- PV of Interest payment
Sum of the last three terms becomes zero; therefore, VC is;
VC = - PV of Initial investment
+ PV of Revenues - PV of Cost
- PV of Tax rate*(Revenues-Costs)
+ PV of Interest tax shields + PV of Depreciation tax shields
T- (Initial investment)t
t=O (r1+1)t
T2 T3S(Revenues)t 7+ (Costs)t
t=o (r2+1)t t=o (r3+1)t
T4
+ (Tax rate)t* {(Revenues)t - (Costs)t}
t=O (r4+1 )t
T5 T6
+ (Interest tax shields)t + (Depreciation tax shields)t (4.20)
t=0 (r5s+)t t=O (r6+1 )t
where ri, r2, r3, r4, r5, and r6 are risk adjusted discount rate, and T1, T2,
T3, T4, T5, and T6 are the maturity for each cash flow component.
Because of the superiority of VC over the other traditional approaches
discussed above, I will use this method for evaluating the Eurotunnel project. The
procedures will be explained in Chapter 5.
4.4. CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model)
4.4.1 The basic concept
CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model) determines expected return of a security
based on its risk premium over riskfree interest rate. CAPM is given by;.
e.e = rf + 1*( [a. - rf ) (4.21)
where g.ea is equilibrium expected return of a security, rf is expected return of a
riskfree asset, .m is expected riturn on the market portfolio, B is beta coefficient of
the security given by the ratio of the covariance between return on the market
'em
portfolio and the security to the variance of the security (B = )
aom
CAPM is used to get the cost of unlevered equity in the APV or VC formula.
The past records of the security return and riskless interest rate give the B of a firm.
If the firm is all-equity financed, we can get unlevered B. However, if the firm
financed by debt and equity, we get levered B, and should translate it into unlevered B
by the formula (4.22).
B leveredB unlevered = D (4.22)
1 + (1-T) E
D
, where T is corporate tax rate, and E is a debt-equity ratio of a company.
4.4.2. Disequilibrium of CAPM
1) a (alpha)
Based on the CAPM theory, a diversified portfolio reduces the unsystematic
risk, and expected return of a security is obtained by riskfree interest rate plus risk
premium of the security reflecting only systematic risk. However, the expected
return in the real world is different from the equilibrium expected return, and the
security price is often mispriced against its real value in the stock market.
The mispricing of a security is measured by a (alpha), which is given by the
difference between the expected return and the equilibrium expected return. The
CAPM formula, (4.21) is rewritten as follows;
a Ltre.eq
.= a + re.eq = a + rf + 8*( am. - rf )
. - rf = a + 8*( La. - rf ) (4.23)
, where Le. is expected rate of return of a security.
If a is positive in Equation (4.23), the expected return is greater than the
equilibrium expected return, which means that the security is overpriced. In this
case, investors overestimate the expected return by a compared with the equilibrium
expected return. By contrast, if a is negative, the expected return is less than the
equilibrium expected return, which means that the security is underpriced. In this
case, investors underestimate the expected return by a compared with the
equilibrium expected return.
2) Unsystematic risk
The actual return of a security is deviated from its security market line
(SML). This is because of the random error term of a security price, called
unsystematic risk. Adding this term to Equation (4.23), we can get the following
CAPM equation.
ret - rft = a + 8*( rmt - rft ) + eet (4.24)
, where ret is an actual return of a security at time t, rmt is an actual return
on the market portfolio at time t, rft is riskless interest rate at time t, and eet is a
random error term of a security at time t.
Linear regression for excess return of a security, ret - rft, and excess return
on the market portfolio, rmt - rft, gives a linear relationship between these values.
The resultant line is called SML (Security Market Line). As shown in Figure 4.1, slope
of the line represents security 8, intercept on Y axis represents security a, and
deviation from SML, eet, represents unsystematic risk of a security.
Figure 4.1 SML and unsystematic risk of security
ret-rft
0•
rf=B(rm-rf)
rmt-rft
In Chapter 5, I will apply this concept for Eurotunnel project, and calculate its
a and B based on the past records of Eurotunnel stock price. This approach is
different from several past studies of financial evaluation of a project, in which the
industry 1 relating to the project has been used. I will explain this issue in Chapter 5.
58
CHAPTER 5. FINANCIAL EVALUATION OF THE EUROTUNNEL PROJECT
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the refinancing of the Eurotunnel
project which is planned to cover the cost overruns and to provide enough financing to
finish the project. Different from a financial evaluation of a new project, evaluation
of refinancing is performed at an intermediate phase of the project. Therefore, the
resultant VC of the Eurotunnel project should be compared with the market value of
the existing assets on the evaluation date. If the VC is lower than the market value of
the existing assets less the prior debt obligation, the refinancing has no effects, and it
would be better even to sell the assets and pay off the prior debt rather than
continuing the project. These issues are discussed in this chapter.
5.1. VC formula to the Eurotunnel equity holders
VC to the Eurotunnel equity holders is calculated as of August, 1990, when the
refinancing is planned to be performed. Timetable of the Eurotunnel project is
described in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1 Timetable of Eurotunnel project
11/1987 8/1990 6/1992 1993 2042
I I I I I
Project Refinance Construction Concession
began t finish Period
VC (NPV)
calculated here
In Chapter 4, I explained that VC is one of the most appropriate financial
evaluation methods particularly for international projects. Since the Eurotunnel
project is one of the largest international projects, the VC's superiority over the
other financial evaluation methods will show the best analytic results. VC to
Eurotunnel equity holders as of August 1990 is given by
VC = - PV of investment during the construction period (from August 1990)
+ PV of Operating revenues - PV of Operating costs
- PV of Corporate tax rate * (Operating revenues-Operating costs)
- PV of Future capital expenditure
- PV of old Credit Facilities repayments (Interest and Principal)
+ PV of Depreciation tax shields
+ PV of Interest tax shields of Credit Facilities
+ PV of Interest tax shields of Debt Instruments
The first five components show the base case of VC, and the next four components
show the side effects of VC. Each component is discounted by different discount rate
reflecting its own risk.
5.2. Riskfree interest rate
The cash flow projection given in Prospectus is shown in nominal terms which
is multiplied by the inflation rate assumed by Eurotunnel. The assumed inflation rate
is as follows;
Table 5.1 Inflation rate estimated by Eurotunnel
Year Inflation rate(%)
1990 6.5
1991 5.0
1992-99 4.5
2000-41 5.0
Also, Eurotunnel is assuming nominal reference interest rates, which are
applied for the interest rates of Credit Facilities, as follows;
Table 5.2 Nominal reference interest rate
Year Reference interest rate (%)
1990 11.85
1991 10.5
1992 9.5
1993-99 8.5
2000-41 8.0
The reference interest rates consist of LIBOR, which is assumed to be nominal
riskfree interest rate in this thesis, and margins over LIBOR set out under the Revised
Credit Agreement. The margins are shown in Table 3.2 in Chapter 3.
The interest rates on Debt Instruments require additional margins over the
reference interest rates on Credit Facilities. Eurotunnel assumes that these margins
will be 1.0% until 2001 declining to 0.25% in 2007. The margins are independent of
the amount of drawings and are only depending upon the year of drawings. The
margins over the reference interest rates on Debt Instruments are as follows;
Table 5.3 Margins over reference interest rate for Debt Instruments
Year Margins over reference interest rate (%)
To 2001 1.00
2002 0.875
2003 0.75
2004 0.625
2005 0.5
2006 0.375
2007 and thereafter 0.25
The debt instruments will be issued from 1998 to 2005, and will be repaid
from 2015 to 2042. Therefore, the interest rates applied for Debt Instruments are
derived by adding the above margins to the reference interest rate. They are as
follows;
Table 5.4 Interest rates for Debt Instruments
Year Interest rates for Debt Instruments(%)
1998-99 9.5
2000-01 9.0
2002 8.875
2003 8.75
2004 8.625
2005 8.5
2006 8.375
2007-41 8.25
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The cost forecast to be incurred is £4,821 million in August 1990 according to
Prospectus. Since the debt inflow is occurred in 1993 (906) and 1994 (196)
according to the cash flow projections in Prospectus, I assumed that the rest of
inflows are distributed monthly. Also, I assumed that the inflows from the rights
issue come in before those from Credit Facilities, because Credit Facilities set several
conditions under which the drawings are possible after certain amount of equity has
been subscribed. Cash inflows from September 1990 to 1994 are as follows;
Table 5.5 Cash inflow by Rights issue and Credit Facilities (£ million)
Year Total Inflow Rights issue Credit Facilities
1990 531 531
1991 1,594 35 1,559
1992 1,594 1,594
1993 906 906
1994 196 196
According to Prospectus, the costs incurred to August 1990 are £2,787
million and the already raised equity is £1,023 million. Since there is no information
about drawing of Credit Facilities, I assumed that £1,764 million, the difference
between £2,787 million and £1,023 million, was already withdrawn. Therefore,
drawing schedule of Credit Facilities and the applicable margins over LIBOR are as
follows;
Table 5.6 Drawing schedule of Credit Facilities and margin (£ million)
Year Drawing Cumulative Margin (%)
To 1990 (8) 1,764
1990 (9-12)
1991 1,559 3,323 1.50
1992 1,594 4,917 1.501
1993 906 5,823 1.50
1994 196 6,019 1.50
Since the reference interest rate is a combination of interest rates which
require different margins depending upon the time and amount of outstanding Credit
Facilities, the weighted average of margins should be calculated to get LIBOR, nominal
riskless interest rates (Rnf). However, the applicable margins are all the same
(1.50%), and the weighted average of margins simply
riskless interest rates (Rnf), and real riskless interest
follows;
Table 5.7 Nominal and Real riskfree interest rate
results in 1.50%. The nominal
rates (Ref) are derived as
Reference Weighted
Year Interest average of Rnf(%) Inflation Ref(%)
rate(%) margins(%) rate(%)
1990 11.85 1.50 10.35 6.5 3.85
1991 10.5 1.50 9.0 5.0 4.0
1992 9.5 1.50 8.0 4.5 3.5
1993 8.5 1.50 7.0 4.5 2.5
1994-99 8.5 1.50 7.0 4.5 2.5
2000-41 8.0 1.50 6.5 5.0 1.5
1 For simplicity, I assumed that the first 677 among 1,594 is withdrawn before
completion, and the rest 917 is withdrawn after completion. Since the both margins
are 1.50%, the applicable margin is 1.50%
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5.3. Cash flow components of VC
Eurotunnel is estimating annual cash flow from 1993 to 2003 but only every
ten years after 1994. Therefore, I calculate the lacking portions by interpolation.
Among the cash flow components, operating revenues, operating costs, depreciation
expense, and future capital expenditures are from the Eurotunnel cash flow
projections shown on pp. 44-45 in Prospectus.
1) Investment
Since the VC is calculated as of August, 1990, investment amount as to
refinancing of the project equals the costs to be incurred from August, 1990 to the
end of the construction The costs incurred to August, 1990 are regarded as sunk
costs.
As shown in Chapter 3, the total costs to be incurred from August, 1990 to
the end of the construction are estimated £4,821 million. They are decomposed into
construction costs, corporate costs, provision for inflation on construction and
corporate costs, net financing costs, net cash outflow in initial period as follows;
(£ million)
Construction costs (September 1985 prices) 2,329
Corporate costs (June 1990 prices) 411
Provision for inflation on construction
and corporate costs to August 1990 778
Net financing cost 1,142
Net cash outflow in
initial period 196
Total costs to be incurred 4,821
2) Operating revenues
Operating revenues mainly consist of the toll of shuttles and railways. Other
than these revenues, ancillary revenues are added to, and the cost of sales, which are
marketing costs, are subtracted from the operating revenues. The projected
operating revenues are as follows;
Table 5.8 Projected operating revenues (£ million)
Year Shuttle Rai'way Ancillary Cost of Sales Total
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
233
460
504
547
592
649
711
770
834
903
978
1,087
1,195
1,304
1,412
1,512
1,629
1,738
1,846
1,955
2,063
2,256
2,450
2,643
2,837
3,030
3,223
3,417
3,610
3,804
3,997
160
300
325
353
380
413
446
479
514
551
588
631
674
717
760
803
845
888
931
974
1,017
1,082
1,146
1,211
1,276
1,341
1,405
1,470
1,535
1,599
1,644
10
23
25
27
29
32
34
37
40
43
46
51
55
60
65
70
74
79
84
88
93
101
110
118
127
135
143
152
160
169
177
10
19
21
23
21
24
26
28
30
33
30
33
37
40
44
47
50
54
57
61
64
70
76
82
88
94
100
106
112
118
124
393
764
833
904
980
1,070
1,165
1,258
1,358
1,464
1,582
1,736
1,887
2,040
2,193
2,346
2,498
2,651
2,804
2,956
3,109
3,368
3,626
3,885
4,143
4,402
4,660
4,919
5,177
5,436
5,694
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2024 4,308 1,740 190 134 6,105
2025 4,619 1,836 204 144 6,515
2026 4,930 1,933 217 153 6,926
2027 5,241 2,029 230 163 7,336
2028 5,552 2,125 244 173 7,747
2029 5,862 2,221 257 183 8,158
2030 6,173 2,317 270 193 8,568
2031 6,484 2,414 283 202 8,979
2032 6,795 2,510 297 212 9,389
2033 7,106 2,606 310 222 9,800
2034 7,530 2,740 329 235 10,363
2035 7,954 2,874 347 248 10,927
2036 8,378 3,008 366 261 11,490
2037 8,803 3,142 384 275 12,054
2038 9,227 3,275 403 288 12,617
2039 9,651 3,409 421 301 13,180
2040 10,075 3,543 440 314 13,744
2041 10,499 3,677 458 327 14,307
3) Operating costs
Eurotunnel's operating costs after opening of the System will comprise
corporate costs and the costs of operating the System, which will include operational
staffing, energy and maintenance costs.
Projected operating costs are based on the latest state of the design of the
System and Eurotunnel's evolving plans for operating the System. Where possible,
cost comparisons have been made with comparable organizations in order to
corroborate Eurotunnel's own estimates. Maintenance costs have been estimated
using ratios obtained from European railway operators and energy costs have been
estimated after initial discussions with potential suppliers.
Eurotunnel's operating costs are projected to be average of 25% of forecast
net revenues in the first ten years of operation. Sales commissions and the Railways'
contribution to operating costs have been taken into account in arriving at forecast net
revenues.
It is expected that the System will have low marginal operating costs
associated with handling additional traffic. Its unit operating costs are likely to be
lower than those of its competitors, enabling Eurotunnel to improve profitability as
traffic increases and giving it greater flexibility in its pricing policy.
Eurotunnel's operating costs are projected to be average of 25% of forecast
net revenues in the first ten years of operation, which was 19% in 1987.
Operating costs consist of operating expenses, corporate expenses, and start-
up expenses. The projected cash flows are as follows;
Table 5.9 Projected operating costs (£ million)
Year Operating Corporate Start-up Total
1993 57 39 28 124
1994 118 72 37 227
1995 136 75 22 233
1996 149 83 17 249
1997 163 87 9 259
1998 180 91 6 277
1999 201 96 5 302
2000 220 103 3 326
2001 239 110 2 351
2002 260 115 2 377
2003 282 122 1 405
2004 308 131 441
2005 335 141 476
2006 361 150 512
2007 388 159 547
2008 414 169 583
2009 440 178 619
2010 467 187 654
2011 493 196 690
2012 520 206 725
2013 546 215 761
2014 592 230 822
2015 638 245 884
2016 685 260 945
2017 731 275 1,006
2018 777 231 1,068
2019 823 306 1,129
2020 869 321 1,190
2021 916 336 1,251
2022 962 351 1,313
2023 1,008 366 1,374
2024 1,083 390 1,473
2025 1,158 414 1,572
2026 1,233 438 1,671
2027 1,308 462 1,770
2028 1,384 486 1,870
2029 1,459 510 1,969
2030 1,534 534 2,068
2031 1,609 558 2,167
2032 1,684 582 2,266
2033 1,759 606 2,365
2034 1,866 641 2,507
2035 1,972 676 2,648
2036 2,079 711 2,790
2037 2,185 747 2,932
2038 2,292 782 3,073
2039 2,398 817 3,215
2040 2,505 852 3,356
2041 2,611 887 3,498
4) Future capital expenditure
Capital expenditure will be incurred after the start of operations for the
replacement of assets and the purchase of new equipment to meet increases in traffic
demands. The major item of new equipment to increase capacity will be further
shuttles. The size of the shuttle fleet is planned to increase from seventeen in 1993
to forty three before the end of the Concession. Other planned capital expenditure
includes additional platforms at each terminal and upgrading the cooling and signalling
systems.
The cost of new items of equipment, as well as costs associated with
replacement or refurbishment, have been included in Eurotunnel's financial projections
based on assets lives, estimated, where appropriate, on the basis of usage implied by
the traffic forecasts.
In order to meet the future traffic demand increases, some of the assets
should be replaced, or new equipment should be purchased during the operation period.
The main requirements are to increase the number of shuttles, to construct additional
platforms, and to upgrade the cooling and signalling system. The future capital
expenditure is forecasted as follows;
Table 5.10 Future capital expenditure (£ million)
Year Expenditure Year Expenditure
1993 618 2018 529
1994 41 2019 581
1995 36 2020 634
1996 6 2021 687
1997 88 2022 739
1998 135 2023 792
1999 57 2024 774
2000 18 2025 755
2001 20 2026 737
2002 154 2027 718
2003 119 2028 700
2004 134 2029 682
2005 148 2030 663
2006 163 2031 645
2007 177 2032 626
2008 192 2033 608
2009 207 2034 568
2010 221 2035 527
2011 236 2036 487
2012 250 2037 446
2013 265 2038 406
2014 318 2039 365
2015 370 2040 325
2016 423 2041 284
2017 476
5) Debt Service repayments
5)-1 Credit Facilities
The principal repayments of Credit Facilities is planned to commence in 1998
according to the cash flow statements in Prospectus. The repayments schedule shown
in Prospectus are for both of old and new loans. Under the revised credit agreement,
the debt repayments will be matured in 2012. Since no information about the
repayments from 2004 to 2012 are in Prospectus, I assumed that the principal
repayments are equally distributed during this period. The repayment schedule of
Credit Facilities is as follows:
Table 5.11 Cash flows on Credit Facilities (£ million)
Year Reference Debt Principal Outstanding Interest
interest principal repayments principal payments
rate inflow balance
1990 0.1185 1,764 70
1991 0.105 1,559 3,323 349
1992 0.095 1,594 4,917 467
1993 0.085 906 5,823 495
1994 0.085 196 6,019 512
1995 0.085 6,019 512
1996 0.085 6,019 512
1997 0.085 6,019 512
1998 0.085 963 5,056 430
1999 0.085 740 4,316 367
2000 0.08 720 3,596 288
2001 0.08 461 3,135 251
2002 0.08 475 2,660 213
2003 0.08 480 2,180 174
2004 0.08 243 1,937 155
2005 0.08 243 1,694 136
2006 0.08 242 1,452 116
2007 0.08 242 1,210 97
2008 0.08 242 968 77
2009 0.08 242 726 58
2010 0.08 242 484 39
2011 0.08 242 242 19
2012 0.08 242 0 0
The Credit Facilities repayments are decomposed into the old loans which have
already been withdrawn, and the new loans which is planned to be withdrawn after
August 1993. The amount of the old loans is £1,764 million in Table 5.11. Since
there is no information of repayment schedule of each loan, I assumed that each will
be repaid in the same schedule in proportion to the loan amounts. The each schedule is
as follows;
Table 5.12 Repayment schedule of old Credit Facilities (£ million)
Year Interest Principal Outstanding Interest
rate repayments principal payments
balance
1990 0.1185 1,764 70
1991 0.105 1,764 185
1992 0.095 1,764 168
1993 0.085 1,764 150
1994 0.085 1,764 150
1995 0.085 1,764 150
1996 0.085 1,764 150
1997 0.085 1,764 150
1998 0.085 282 1,482 126
1999 0.085 217 1,265 108
2000 0.08 211 1,054 84
2001 0.08 135 919 74
2002 0.08 139 780 62
2003 0.08 141 639 51
2004 0.08 71 568 45
2005 0.08 71 496 40
2006 0.08 71 426 34
2007 0.08 71 355 28
2008 0.08 71 284 23
2009 0.08 71 213 17
2010 0.08 71 142 11
2011 0.08 71 71 6
2012 0.08 71 0 0
2012 0.08 242 0 0
Table 5.13 Repayment schedule of new Credit Facilities (£ million)
Year Interest Debt Principal Outstanding Interest
rate principal repayments principal payments
inflow balance
1990 0.1185 0 0
1991 0.105 1,559 1,559 164
1992 0.095 1,594 3,153 300
1993 0.085 906 4,059 345
1994 0.085 196 4,255 362
1995 0.085 4,255 362
1996 0.085 4,255 362
1997 0.085 4,255 362
1998 0.085 681 3,574 304
1999 0.085 523 3,051 259
2000 0.08 509 2,542 203
2001 0.08 326 2,216 177
2002 0.08 336 1,880 150
2003 0.08 339 1,541 123
2004 0.08 172 1,369 110
2005 0.08 172 1,198 96
2006 0.08 171 1,026 82
2007 0.08 171 855 68
2008 0.08 171 684 55
2009 0.08 171 513 41
2010 0.08 171 342 27
2011 0.08 171 171 14
2012 0.08 171 0 0
5)-2 Debt instruments
Debt instruments are issued in order to cover the repayments of Credit
Facilities. The repayments of debt instruments commence in 2015, and mature at the
end of the concession period. Since the repayments schedule is not mentioned in
Prospectus, I assumed that the principal repayments are equally distributed from
2015 to 2041. Cash flows on Debt Instruments are as follows;
Table 5.14 Cash flows on Debt Instruments (£ million)
Year Interest Debt Principal Outstanding Interest
rate principal repayments principal payments
inflow balance
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
0.095
0.095
0.09
0.09
0.08875
0.0875
0.08625
0.085
0.08375
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
1,000
804
515
422
422
422
422
147
154
154
154
154
154
154
154
154
154
154
154
154
154
154
154
154
154
154
154
154
154
154
154
153
1,000
1,804
2,319
2,741
3,163
3,585
4,007
4,154
4,154
4,154
4,154
4,154
4,154
4,154
4,154
4,154
4,154
4,000
3,846
3,692
3,538
3,384
3,230
3,076
2,922
2,768
2,614
2,460
2,306
2,152
1,998
1,844
1,690
1,536
1,382
1,228
1,074
920
766
612
459
95
171
209
247
281
314
346
343
343
343
343
343
343
343
343
343
343
330
317
305
292
279
266
254
241
228
216
203
190
178
165
152
139
127
114
101
89
76
63
50
38
2039 0.0825 153 306 25
2040 0.0825 153 153 13
2041 0.0825 153 0 0
6) Tax shields
6)-1 Depreciation expenses
According to the November 1990 prospectus, the depreciation policy disclosed
in the November 1987 prospectus has been modified and harmonised between UK and
France. The cost of fixed assets will be depreciated from the beginning of the
operations, and will be fully depreciated by the end of concession period. The
depreciating methods differ between the kind of fixed assets.
a) Concession fixed assets
Assets such as the tunnels and terminal buildings, which are not expected to
require renewal or replacement during the Concession period, will be depreciated
using a unit of production method, adjusted for inflation. The annual depreciation
amount is calculated based on the following ratio;
Actual traffic for year
R=
Total forecast residual traffic over the
Concession period, adjusted for inflation
The assets which are not expected to be require renewal or replacement during
the Concession period will be depreciated using the straight-line method.
b) Other fixed assets
Other fixed assets will be depreciated using the straight-line method.
Eurotunnel estimates the depreciation expenses as follows. The amounts
between 2003 and 2041 are calculated by interpolation.
Table 5.15 Depreciation expenses schedule (£ million)
Year Depreciation expense Year Depreciation expense
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
73
138
141
142
148
155
159
161
164
174
175
179
184
188
193
197
201
206
210
215
219
232
244
257
269
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
282
295
307
320
332
345
388
431
475
518
561
604
647
691
734
777
862
948
1,033
1,118
1,203
1,289
1,374
1,459
6)-2 Interest expenses
Using the data in 5) Debt service repayments, interest expenses applicable to
Credit Facilities (both old and new) and Debt Instruments are derived as follows;
------------- ~--
Interest expenses schedule for Credit Facilities and Debt Instruments
(£ million)
Year Credit Facilities Debt Instruments Total Interest
expense
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
70
349
467
495
512
512
512
512
430
367
288
251
213
174
155
136
116
97
77
58
39
19
70
349
467
495
512
512
512
512
525
538
496
497
494
488
501
489
464
440
420
401
381
362
343
343
343
330
317
305
292
279
266
254
241
228
216
203
190
178
165
152
139
95
171
209
247
281
314
346
353
348
343
343
343
343
343
343
343
343
330
317
305
292
279
266
254
241
228
216
203
190
178
165
152
139
Table 5.16
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
127
114
101
89
76
63
50
38
25
13
127
114
101
89
76
63
50
38
25
13
0
6)-3 Marginal tax rate
The marginal tax rate which is used in Eurotunnel's cash flow projection in
Prospectus is as follows;
Table 5.17 Marginal tax rate assumed by Eurotunnel
Year Taxable income Taxation Tax rate(%)
(£ million) (£ million)
2000 299 40 13.38
2001 384 82 21.35
2002 462 99 21.43
2003 558 118 21.15
2013 1,810 707 39.06
2023 3,717 1,447 38.93
2033 6,483 2,521 38.87
2041 9,660 3,716 38.47
In Table 5.17, marginal tax rate varies for the different taxable income;
however, marginal corporate tax rate is usually fixed because of its high taxable
income. Therefore, the varying tax rate seems to be caused by the various taxable
income for which the different tax rate is applied. For simplicity, the marginal
corporate tax rate is assumed 40% in this thesis.
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6)-4 Tax shields
Basically, tax shields is the amount which are exempted from tax payments.
In order for tax shields to be applied, a project should generate sufficient operating
income so that tax deductible cash flow component, i.e. interest payments and
depreciation expenses, can be subtracted. As shown in Table 5.17, net operating
income between 1993 and 1995 does not cover the whole interest payments and
depreciation expenses. Suppose tax shields can not be carried over, the interest
payments and depreciation expenses during this period are not fully tax deductible.
Since the interest payments are made prior to the depreciation expenses, the tax
deductible amounts between this period can be derived as follows;
Table 5.18 Tax deductible interest payments and depreciation expenses
(£ million)
Tax deductible Tax deductible
Year Net operating Interest Depreciation
income payments expenses
1993 269 269 (495) 0 (73)
1994 537 512 (512) 25 (138)
1995 600 512 (512) 88 (141)
( ) shows the amounts in case that the payments
and expenses are fully tax deductible from income
other than that of this project as shown in first
column
The amount of tax shields can be calculated by multiplying tax deductible
amount by the marginal tax rate. Depreciation tax shields per annum are derived
using the marginal tax rates, 40%.
Table 5.19 Depreciation tax shields
Year Depreciation Depreciation
Expenses Tax Shields
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
0
25
88
142
148
155
159
161
164
174
175
179
184
188
193
197
201
206
210
215
219
232
244
257
269
282
295
307
320
332
345
388
431
475
518
561
604
647
691
734
0
10
35
56
56
62
64
64
66
70
70
72
74
75
77
79
80
82
84
86
88
93
98
103
108
113
118
123
128
133
138
155
172
190
207
224
242
259
276
294
(£ million)
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
777
862
948
,033
,118
,203
,289
,374
,459
311
345
379
413
447
481
516
550
584
Interest tax shields per annum for Credit Facilities and Debt Instruments are
also derived using the marginal tax rates, 40%.
Table 5.20 Interest tax shields for Credit Facilities and Debt Instruments (£ million)
Credit Facilities Debt Instruments
Year Interest Interest Interest Interest
Expenses Tax Shields Expenses Tax Shields
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
269
512
512
512
512
430
367
288
251
213
174
155
136
116
97
77
58
39
19
198
205
205
205
205
172
147
115
100
85
70
62
54
46
39
31
23
16
8
95
171
209
247
281
314
346
343
343
343
343
343
343
343
343
343
343
330
38
68
84
99
112
126
138
137
137
137
137
137
137
137
137
137
137
132
~ _~
2016 317 127
2017 305 122
2018 292 117
2019 279 112
2020 266 106
2021 254 102
2022 241 96
2023 228 91
2024 216 86
2025 203 81
2026 190 76
2027 178 71
2028 165 66
2029 152 61
2030 139 56
2031 127 51
2032 114 46
2033 101 40
2034 89 36
2035 76 30
2036 63 25
2037 50 20
2038 38 15
2039 25 10
2040 13 5
2041 0 0
5.4. 8 calculation
Some of the previous studies in financial evaluation of a project have used the
industry 11 assuming that it reflects the systematic risk of the project. This
assumption is somewhat bold, because the industry B is not always reflecting the
systematic risk of a specific project. The difficulty of estimating an accurate B, or
unreliability of a resultant B, even if it is calculated, has made it hard to adopt
another approach.
1 Mr. Onozaki and Mr. Okano used the industry B (=0.61) in their M.S. theses for the
financial evaluation of transportation project.
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In this thesis, I introduced econometrics issues, and calculated unlevered B of
Eurotunnel, using the Eurotunnel stock price data, return of the UK treasury bill for
nominal riskless interest rates, since it is the least risky asset in the UK, and the
Financial Times All Share Index for the return on the market portfolio. All of these
data are from Financial Times, London.
CAPM for actual return of a security is given by equation (4.24) in Chapter 4.
This is,
ret - rft = a + 3( rmt - rft ) + eet
, where a is the alpha of a security reflecting the tendency to mispricing, 8 is
a security beta coefficient, rmt - rft is the actual excess return on the market
portfolio at time t, and eet is a random error term of a security at time t.
When a and B is derived by the least-square method using the past records of
ret, rmt, and rft, the following underlying assumptions are required about the random
error term eet.
1) Average, or expected value of eet is 0
2) Variance of eet is Y'e2
3) eet is distributed independently of one another
4) eet is in normal distribution
These four assumptions are combined into the following single term;
eet- NID (0, 0e2)
where NID stands for "normally and independently distributed". 1
1 Johnston, J. Econometric Methods, 3rd ed, p.15. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1984
According to Financial Times, London, monthly data on the beginning date of
each month of the Eurotunnel stock price, the annual return of the UK treasury bill,
the Financial Times All Share Index have moved since February 1988, as follows;
Table 5.21 Eurotunnel stock price and the All Shares Index
Levered Annualized
Month Eurotunnel All Shares Nominal
Stock Price Index Return of
(pence) UK T-Bill
1988-2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
1989-1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
1990-1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
240
279
325
328
315
323
332
285
313
350
431
495
638
818
827
826
1,076
1,100
863
738
650
550
598
633
618
558
545
563
543
485
529
910.31
914.24
893.16
930.45
932.77
963.88
969.89
898.42
935.09
968.72
925.65
921.22
1,050.20
1,051.42
1,076.51
1,083.99
1,085.59
1,108.83
1,170.46
1,216.78
1,163.75
1,088.76
1,152.98
1,210.92
1,170.77
1,114.18
1,103.10
1,049.21
1,165.28
1,170.25
1,052.48
0.0875
0.0831
0.0788
0.0725
0.0938
0.1013
0.1163
0.1159
0.1175
0.1275
0.1272
0.1266
0.1278
0.1253
0.1275
0.1384
0.1359
0.1363
0.1375
0.1403
0.1488
0.1475
0.1475
0.1475
0.1475
0.1472
0.1469
0.1469
0.1466
0.1459
0.1466
84
----- I---
The monthly return of the Eurotunnel stock (re) and the Financial Times All
Share Index (rm) is the percentage change of these data from one month to the next.
The monthly return of the UK treasury bill (rf) is approximately derived by dividing
its annual return by twelve. The excess return means the difference between monthly
return of the Eurotunnel stock and the UK treasury bill, re - rf, and the difference
between monthly return of the All Shares Index and the UK treasury bill, rm - rf.
These data are shown in Table 5.22.
Table 5.22 Monthly return of the Eurotunnel stock and the All Share Index, and their
excess return over UK Treasury bill
Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly
Month Return of Return of Return of Excess return Excess return
Eurotunnel All Shares UK T-Bill of Eurotunnel of All Shares
(re) (rm) (rf) (re - rf) (rm - rf)
1988-2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
1989-1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
1990-1
2
0.1625
0.1649
0.0092
-0.0396
0.0254
0.0279
-0.1416
0.0982
0.1182
0.2314
0.1485
0.2889
0.2821
0.0110
-0.0012
0.3027
0.0223
-0.2155
-0.1488
-0.1192
-0.1538
0.0873
0.0585
-0.0237
-0.0971
0.0043
-0.0231
0.0418
0.0025
0.0334
0.0062
-0.0737
0.0408
0.0360
-0.0445
-0.0048
0.1400
0.0012
0.0239
0.0069
0.0015
0.0214
0.0556
0.0396
-0.0436
-0.0644
0.0590
0.0503
-0.0332
-0.0483
0.0073
0.0069
0.0066
0.0060
0.0078
0.0084
0.0097
0.0097
0.0098
0.0106
0.0106
0.0105
0.0107
0.0104
0.0106
0.0115
0.0113
0.0114
0.0115
0.0117
0.0124
0.0123
0.0123
0.0123
0.0123
0.1552
0.1579
0.0027
-0.0457
0.0176
0.0194
-0.1513
0.0886
0.1084
0.2208
0.1379
0.2783
0.2715
0.0006
-0.0118
0.2911
0.0110
-0.2268
-0.1563
-0.1309
-0.1662
0.0750
0.0462
-0.0360
-0.1094
-0.0030
-0.0300
0.0352
-0.0035
0.0255
-0.0022
-0.0834
0.0312
0.0262
-0.0551
-0.0154
0.1295
-0.0095
0.0134
-0.0037
-0.0101
0.0101
0.0442
0.0281
-0.0553
-0.0768
0.0467
0.0380
-0.0454
-0.0606
3 -0.0233 -0.0099 0.0122 -0.0355 -0.0222
4 0.0330 -0.0489 0.0122 0.0208 -0.0611
5 -0.0355 0.1106 0.0122 -0.0477 0.0984
6 -0.1068 0.0043 0.0122 -0.1190 -0.0079
7 0.0907 -0.0159 0.0122 0.0785 -0.0281
8 -0.1531 -0.0861 0.0122 -0.1653 -0.0983
Note: re = (ESt+I - ESt) / ESt, where ESt is the Eurotunnel stock price at month t
rm = (Alt+1 - Alt) / Alt, where Alt is the All Share Index at month t
rt = (Annualized nominal return of the UK T-Bill) / 12
SML (Security market line) gives us a security x and B as explained at the end
of Chapter 4. Using the monthly data in Table 5.22, SML of the Eurotunnel stock is
derived by linear regression based on the least-square method. The resultant SML is
described in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2 Security market line of the Eurotunnel stock
0.3
0.2
0.1
S 0.0
-0.1
-0.2
-0.3
Ox R2 = 0.085
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The intersection of the security market line on the y axis represents a
security (, and the slope of this line represents a levered 3 of the Eurotunnel stock.
a, 8, and some statistical values are derived as follows;1
Table 5.23 Regression results of the Eurotunnel stock
a (alpha) 0.02246
levered 13 (beta) 0.80396
S.D. of random error 0.13533
Standard error of a 0.02441
Standard error of 1 0.48847
Correlation coefficient 0.29229
Correlation determination 0.08543
Here, I introduce standard t-tests concepts in order to examine a reliability of
the resultant a, and 8. The t-value of a and 1 is given by:
t-value of a = = 0.9201Standard Erroe of a
t-value of 8 = - 1.6459Standard Erroe of 1
Since the total sample numbers 31, the degrees of freedom is 29. From the t-
distribution with 29 degrees of freedom, t-value with 80%, 90%, and 95%
confidence is as follows;
80% --- to.io = 1.311
90% --- to.o5 = 1.699
95% --- to.025 = 2.045
1 S.D. of random error = 4((I(re-rf) 2-al(re-rf)-B1(rm-rf)(re-rf))/(32-2))
Standard error of a = S.D of random error/4(32-(I(rm-rf)) 2/,(rm-rf) 2
Standard error of 1 = S.D of random error/qI(,(rm-rf) 2-(X(rm-rf)) 2/32)
Coefficient of determination = (Correlation coefficient)2
Therefore, we can conclude that a is not significantly different from zero, since
t-value of a < 1.311
and that B is significantly different from zero with 80% confidence, since
t-value of B > 1.311
Also, 80%, 90%, and 95% confidence interval for a and B are given by:
80%
a - to.lo * S.E.(a) 5 a _ a +to.lo * S.E.(a) --- -0.0095 < a x 0.05446
8 - to.io * S.E.(B) < 8 B +to.io * S.E.(B) --- 0.16358 _ B _ 1.44434
90%
a - to.o5 * S.E.(a) < a s a + to.o5 * S.E.(a) --- -0.01901 < a • 0.06393
B - to.o5 * S.E.(B) 5 B 5 8 + to.o5 * S.E.(1) --- -0.02595 < B • 1.63387
95%
a - to.025 * S.E.(a) s a < a +to.025 * S.E.(o) --- -0.02746 5 a 5 0.07238
B - to.o25 * S.E.(B) < 8 5 B + to.025 * S.E.(B) --- 0.19496 _ B < 1.80288
These results indicate that B is surely different from zero, but the confidence interval
of B is quite large. The sensitivity analysis for this issue is discussed in Chapter 6.
The resultant B (= 0.80396) is a levered B, and should be recalculated to
unlevered B as follows;
Levered 1Unlevered B = D1 + (1-T) E
0.80396
17641 + (1-0.4) 1023
= 0.39514
, where D and E are the already spent debt and raised equity respectively.
5.5. Discount rate of cash flow components
1) After-Tax Net operating Income
The cash flow components of the VC: operating revenues, operating costs, tax
payments, depreciation tax shields, and interest tax shields, should be discounted by
different discount rates, since each component has a different risk class. The first
three components are fully affected by the project's own risk and can be called non-
contractual cash flow. Strictly speaking, operating revenues and operating costs have
different risks, since they are differently affected by the number of passengers,
energy costs, economic conditions of the surrounding countries. Also, tax payments
are affected by the tax rate change as well as the operating revenues and operating
costs. However, these differences are really hard to be measured, and the marginal
tax rate is assumed to be unchanged; therefore, I decided to discount the first three
components by the same discount rates reflecting the project's own risk. Therefore,
these components are combined to a single component, after tax net operating income,
as follows;
Revenues - Costs - Tax rate*(Revenues - Costs)
= (1 - Tax rate)*(Revenues - Costs)
= (1 - Tax rate)*(Net Operating Income)
The discount rate for after tax net operating income is given by CAPM
discussed in Chapter 4. This is
ra = rf + 8( rm - rf )
, where ra is expected cost of unlevered equity of Eurotunnel, rf is expected
return of nominal riskfree interest rate, rm is expected return on the market
portfolio, and 1 is unlevered beta of the Eurotunnel security.
The nominal riskless interest rate assumed by Eurotunnel has been calculated
in this chapter. Under the following assumptions, the discount rate of after-tax net
operating income is given as in Table 5.24
- Market risk premium, (rm -rf ), is 8.0%1
- 6 (=0.395) does not change during the entire concession period
Table 5.24 Discount rate of After tax net operating income
Year rf (%) rf + B(rm-r) (%)
1990 10.35 13.511
1991 9.00 12.161
1992 8.00 11.161
1993-99 7.00 10.161
2000-41 6.50 9.661
2) Future capital expenditure
Future capital expenditure depends on the future traffic demand of Eurotunnel,
which will produce projected operating revenues and costs. Therefore, the risk class
of the expenditure is considered the same as that of the operating revenues and costs,
and as a result, the discount rates are exactly the same as those of after-tax net
operating income.
1 See Mr. Shinichi Okano, "A Financial evaluation of the Eurotunnel project", S.M.
thesis, Civil Engineering, MIT, May 1988, p. 74
3) Repayments of old Credit Facilities
Repayments of old Credit Facilities are contractual cash flow; therefore, the
discount rate is determined by the reference interest rate as follows;
Table 5.25 Discount rate of old Credit Facilities
Year rcredit facilities(%)
1990 11.85
1991 10.50
1992 9.50
1993-99 8.50
2000-12 8.00
4) Interest tax shields
Interest payments for Credit Facilities and Debt Instruments are also
contractual cash flows, since the interest rates including some margins are
determined by the agreement. These interest rates represent the loans' risk class,
and can be used for the discount rates for the interest tax shields. Discount rate of
interest tax shields is as follows;
Table 5.26 Discount rate of Interest tax shields
Year rcredit facilities(%) rdebt instruments(%)
1990
1991
1992
1993-99
2000-01
2002
2003
2004
1.85
0.50
9.50
8.50
8.00
8.00
8.00
8.00
9.50
9.00
8.875
8.75
8.625
2005 8.00 8.50
2006 8.00 8.375
2007-41 8.00 8.25
4) Depreciation tax shields
The annual depreciation of the fixed assets is calculated based on the principal
accounting policies mentioned earlier. In that sense, cash flow of depreciation tax
shields is a contractual cash flow, and can be discounted by fixed discount rate,
assuming that the accounting policy and tax rate will not be changed.
However, depreciation expenses have junior claims to interest payments for
net operating income. Depreciation expenses are only applicable if net operating
income is strictly greater than interest payments and is enough for depreciation
expenses to be subtracted from the residual amount. On the other hand, interest
payments should be made regardless of the amount of net operating income.
For this reason, depreciation tax shields are considered more risky than
interest tax shields, and the risk class of the depreciation tax shields are somewhere
between those of net operating income and interest tax shields. Based on these
discussions, I took an average of the discount rate of net operating income and
interest tax shields for the discount rate of depreciation tax shields in the Eurotunnel
project. The discount rate of depreciation tax shields is as follows;
Table 5.27 Discount rate of Depreciation tax shields
Year r NOI(%) r CF(%) r DI(%) r depreciation(%)
1990 13.511 11.85 12.85 13.181
1991 12.161 10.50 11.50 11.831
1992 11.161 9.50 10.50 10.831
1993-99 10.161 8.50 9.50 9.831
2000-01 9.661 8.00 9.00 9.331
2002 9.661 8.00 8.875 9.268
2003 9.661 8.00 8.75 9.206
2004 9.661 8.00 8.625 9.143
2005 9.661 8.00 8.50 9.081
2006 9.661 8.00 8.375 9.018
2007-41 9.661 8.00 8.25 8.956
5.6. Calculation of VC to equity holders
As I mentioned earlier, the VC of Eurotunnel project to equity holders as of
August, 1990 is given by the formula below;
VC = - PV of Investment after August, 1990
+ PV of After-tax net operating income
- PV of Future capital expenditure
- PV of old debt repayment of Credit Facilities
+ PV of Interest tax shields for Credit Facilities (both old and new)
+ PV of Interest tax shields for Debt Instruments
+ PV of Depreciation tax shields
The discount rate of each cash flow component at time t is a compounded
discount rate. The compounded discount rate at time t (t > 1990) is represented by;
Rt = (1 + r'1990)(1 + r1991)......... (1 + rt-1)(1 + rt) - 1
t
=(1 +r'1990)[ 171 (1 +rs)] -1
s=1991
,where r'1990 represents a cube root of r1990. This is because the evaluation
is taken in August, 1990, and the discount rate is only applicable to four months from
September to December, 1990.
The present value of each cash flow component is shown in Table 5.28 - 33 as
follows;
1) After-tax net operating income
Table 5.28 Present value of After-tax net operating income (£ million)
Year (1-T)NOI 1+rNOI,t H- (1+rNOI,t) PV of (1-T)NOI
1990 1.13511 1.043151
1991 1.12161 1.17001
1992 1.11161 1.30059
1993 161 1.10161 1.43274 113
1994 322 1.10161 1.57832 204
1995 360 1.10161 1.73870 207
1996 393 1.10161 1.91537 205
1997 433 1.10161 2.10999 205
1998 476 1.10161 2.32438 205
1999 518 1.10161 2.56056 202
2000 559 1.09661 2.80794 199
2001 604 1.09661 3.07921 196
2002 652 1.09661 3.37670 193
2003 706 1.09661 3.70292 191
2004 776 1.09661 4.06066 191
2005 847 1.09661 4.45296 190
2006 917 1.09661 4.88316 188
2007 987 1.09661 5.35492 184
2008 1,058 1.09661 5.87226 180
2009 1,128 1.09661 6.43958 175
2010 1,198 1.09661 7.06171 170
2011 1,268 1.09661 7.74394 164
2012 1,339 1.09661 8.49208 158
2013 1,409 1.09661 9.31250 151
2014 1,527 1.09661 10.21218 150
2015 1,645 1.09661 11.19878 147
2016 1,764 1.09661 12.28069 144
2017 1,882 1.09661 13.6713 140
2018 2,000 1.09661 14.76819 135
2019 2,119 1.09661 16.19494 131
2020 2,237 1.09661 17.75954 126
2021 2,355 1.09661 19.47529 121
2022 2,474 1.09661 21.35679 116
1.04315=1.13511 (1/3)
94
2023 2,592 1.09661 23.42007 111
2024 2,779 1.09661 25.68269 108
2025 2,966 1.09661 28.16389 105
2026 3,153 1.09661 30.88480 102
2027 3,340 1.09661 33.86858 99
2028 3,527 1.09661 37.14063 95
2029 3,713 1.09661 40.72878 91
2030 3,900 1.09661 44.66359 87
2031 4,087 1.09661 48.97854 83
2032 4,274 1.09661 53.71036 80
2033 4,461 1.09661 58.89932 76
2034 4,731 1.09661 64.58958 73
2035 5,001 1.09661 70.82958 71
2036 5,271 1.09661 77.67242 68
2037 5,541 1.09661 85.17636 65
2038 5,811 1.09661 93.40524 62
2039 6,081 1.09661 102.42913 59
2040 6,351 1.09661 112.32480 57
2041 6,485 1.09661 123.17650 53
,= 6,625
Future capital expenditure
Table 5.29 Present value of Future capital expenditure (£ million)
Future PV of
Year Capital 1+rCE,t H (1+rCE,t) Capital
Expenditure Expenditure
1990 1.13511 1.043151
1991 1.12161 1.17001
1992 1.11161 1.30059
1993 618 1.10161 1.43274 431
1994 41 1.10161 1.57832 26
1995 36 1.10161 1.73870 21
1996 6 1.10161 1.91537 3
1997 88 1.10161 2.10999 42
1998 135 1.10161 2.32438 58
1999 57 1.10161 2.56056 22
2000 18 1.09661 2.80794 6
1.04315=1.13511 ^(1/3)
2001 20 1.09661 3.07921 6
2002 154 1.09661 3.37670 46
2003 119 1.09661 3.70292 32
2004 134 1.09661 4.06066 33
2005 148 1.09661 4.45296 33
2006 163 1.09661 4.88316 33
2007 177 1.09661 5.35492 33
2008 192 1.09661 5.87226 33
2009 207 1.09661 6.43958 32
2010 221 1.09661 7.06171 31
2011 236 1.09661 7.74394 31
2012 250 1.09661 8.49208 30
2013 265 1.09661 9.31250 29
2014 318 1.09661 10.21218 31
2015 370 1.09661 11.19878 33
2016 423 1.09661 12.28069 35
2017 476 1.09661 13.46713 35
2018 529 1.09661 14.76819 36
2019 581 1.09661 16.19494 36
2020 634 1.09661 17.75954 36
2021 687 1.09661 19.47529 35
2022 739 1.09661 21.35679 35
2023 792 1.09661 23.42007 34
2024 774 1.09661 25.68269 30
2025 755 1.09661 28.16389 27
2026 737 1.09661 30.88480 24
2027 718 1.09661 33.86858 21
2028 700 1.09661 37.14063 19
2029 682 1.09661 40.72878 17
2030 663 1.09661 44.66359 15
2031 645 1.09661 48.97854 13
2032 626 1.09661 53.71036 12
2033 608 1.09661 58.89932 10
2034 568 1.09661 64.58958 9
2035 527 1.09661 70.82958 7
2036 487 1.09661 77.67242 6
2037 446 1.09661 85.17636 5
2038 406 1.09661 93.40524 4
2039 365 1.09661 102.42913 4
2040 325 1.09661 112.32480 3
2041 284 1.09661 123.17650 2
.= 1,584
3) Old debt repayments of Credit Facilities
Table 5.30 Present value of old Credit Facilities
PV of
Year Old Debt 1+rCF,t n (1+rCF,t) Old Debt
Repayments Repayments
1990 1.1185 1.038041
1991 1.105 1.14703
1992 1.095 1.25600
1993 150 1.085 1.36276 110
1994 150 1.085 1.47859 101
1995 150 1.085 1.60427 93
1996 150 1.085 1.74063 86
1997 150 1.085 1.88859 79
1998 408 1.085 2.04912 199
1999 324 1.085 2.22329 146
2000 295 1.08 2.40116 123
2001 209 1.08 2.59325 80
2002 202 1.08 2.80071 72
2003 192 1.08 3.02476 63
2004 117 1.08 3.26675 36
2005 111 1.08 3.52809 31
2006 105 1.08 3.81033 28
2007 99 1.08 4.11516 24
2008 94 1.08 4.44437 21
2009 88 1.08 4.79992 18
2010 82 1.08 5.18391 16
2011 77 1.08 5.59863 14
2012 71 1.08 6.04652 12
1=1,354
1 1.03804=1.1185A(1/3)
4) Depreciation tax shields
Table 5.31 Present value of Depreciation tax shields (£ million)
PV of
Year Depreciation 1 +rdep,t H- (1+rdep,t) Depreciation
Tax Shields Tax Shields
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
0
10
35
57
59
62
64
64
66
70
70
72
74
75
77
79
80
82
84
86
88
93
98
103
108
113
118
123
128
133
138
155
172
190
1.13181
1.11831
1.10831
1.09831
1.09831
1.09831
1.09831
1.09831
1.09831
1.09831
1.09331
1.09331
1.09268
1.09206
1.09143
1.09081
1.09018
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.04213
1.16542
1.29165
1.41862
1.55808
1.71125
1.87947
2.06423
2.26715
2.49003
2.72236
2.97637
3.25222
3.55160
3.87633
4.22832
4.60962
5.02244
5.47222
5.96229
6.49624
7.07801
7.71188
8.40252
9.15501
9.97489
10.86819
11.84149
12.90195
14.05739
15.31630
16.68795
18.18244
19.81076
21.58492
23.51795
25.62411
0
6
21
30
29
27
26
24
22
21
20
18
17
16
15
14
13
13
12
11
10
10
10
9
9
9
8
8
8
7
7
7
7
7
98
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
207
224
242
259
276
294
311
345
379
413
447
481
516
550
584
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
1.08956
27.91887
30.41915
33.14333
36.11148
39.34545
42.86903
46.70817
50.89112
55.44867
60.41437
65.82478
71.71972
78.14258
85.14064
92.76541
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
6
_ 6=5781=578
5) Interest Tax Shields
5)-1 Interest tax shields for Credit Facilities
Table 5.32 Present value of Interest tax shields for Credit Facilities (£ million)
PV of
Year Interest 1+rCF,t H (1+rCF,t) Interest
Tax Shields Tax Shields
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
108
205
205
205
205
172
147
115
100
1.1185
1.105
1.095
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.08
1.08
1.038041
1.14703
1.25600
1.36276
1.47859
1.60427
1.74063
1.88859
2.04912
2.22329
2.40116
2.59325
79
139
128
118
108
84
66
48
39
1 1.03804=1.1185A(1/3)
___ _~_~_
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
2.80071
3.02476
3.26675
3.52809
3.81033
4.11516
4.44437
4.79992
5.18391
5.59863
30
23
19
15
12
9
7
5
3
1
,=933
5)-2 Interest tax shields for Debt Instruments
Table 5.33 Present value of Interest tax shields for Debt Instruments (£ million)
PV of
Year Interest 1+rDIl,t - (1+rDI,t) Interest
Tax Shields Tax Shields
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
38
68
84
99
112
125
138
137
137
137
137
1.1285
1.115
1.105
1.095
1.095
1.095
1.095
1.095
1.095
1.095
1.09
1.09
1.08875
1.0875
1.08625
1.085
1.08375
1.0825
1.0825
1.041121
1.16085
1.28274
1.40460
1.53803
1.68415
1.84414
2.01933
2.21117
2.42123
2.63914
2.87667
3.13197
3.40602
3.69979
4.01427
4.35046
4.70938
5.09790
17
28
32
34
36
37
37
34
32
29
27
100
1 1.04112=1.1285^(1/3)
~ __ ~~
2009 137 1.0825 5.51848 25
2010 137 1.0825 5.97375 23
2011 137 1.0825 6.46659 21
2012 137 1.0825 7.00008 20
2013 137 1.0825 7.57759 18
2014 137 1.0825 8.20274 17
2015 132 1.0825 8.87946 15
2016 127 1.0825 9.61202 13
2017 122 1.0825 10.40501 12
2018 117 1.0825 11.26342 10
2019 112 1.0825 12.19266 9
2020 106 1.0825 13.19855 8
2021 102 1.0825 14.28743 7
2022 96 1.0825 15.46614 6
2023 91 1.0825 16.74210 5
2024 86 1.0825 18.12332 5
2025 81 1.0825 19.61850 4
2026 76 1.0825 21.23702 4
2027 71 1.0825 22.98908 3
2028 66 1.0825 24.88568 3
2029 61 1.0825 26.93875 2
2030 56 1.0825 29.16119 2
2031 51 1.0825 31.56699 2
2032 46 1.0825 34.17127 1
2033 40 1.0825 36.99040 1
2034 36 1.0825 40.04211 1
2035 30 1.0825 43.34558 1
2036 25 1.0825 46.92159 1
2037 20 1.0825 50.79262 0
2038 15 1.0825 54.98301 0
2039 10 1.0825 59.51911 0
2040 5 1.0825 64.42944 O
T=583
6) VC to equity holders
From the results of 1), 2), 3), 4), 5)-1, and 5)-2, VC, as it applies to the
equity holders of Eurotunnel, is given by;
VC = - PV of Investment in after August, 1990
+ PV of After-tax net operating income
- PV of Future capital expenditure
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- PV of old debt repayment of Credit Facilities
+ PV of Interest tax shields for Credit Facilities (both old and new)
+ PV of Interest tax shields for Debt Instruments
+ PV of Depreciation tax shields
= -4,821 + 6,625 - 1,584 - 1,354 + 576 + 933 + 583
= £ 960 million
5.7. Comparison with asset value in place to equity holders
The resultant VC is a value of the continuation of the Eurotunnel project to the
equity holders, and the VC should be compared with the market value of Eurotunnel
equity in August 1990 but not including this continuation value. Since the value of
assets are decomposed into the value of equity and the value of debt, the market value
of the Eurotunnel equity may be derived by subtracting the outstanding debt amounts
from the market value of the Eurotunnel assets.
There are several ways to estimate the market value of existing assets. In
real estate properties, for instance, the following three ways are commonly used to
calculate the market value of the properties1 . They are; 1) Cost approach:
estimating the replacement cost of existing properties and adjusting downward for
depreciation such as physical depreciation, functional or structural obsolescence and
economic depreciation, 2) Market approach: estimating the value based on data
provided from recent sales of the same kind of properties, and 3) Income
capitalization approach: estimating present value of the future cash flows generated
by the properties.
Judging from the characteristics of the Eurotunnel project, these three ways
are not applicable to the Eurotunnel assets. The reason for each approach is that 1) it
1 Brueggeman, Fisher, and Stone, Real Estate Finance, 8th ed.,IRWIN, Boston, 1989
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is too hard to estimate the depreciation caused by physical depreciation, functional or
structural obsolescence, and economic depreciation, 2) the highly comparable project
cannot be found in the world, 3) the resultant VC is based on this approach, but the
present project is in an incompleted, not operating condition.
The arguments above show the difficulty of estimating the market value of
Eurotunnel assets. Since a final objective is to estimate the market value of
Eurotunnel equity rather than assets, this value can be calculated in such a direct way
as multiplying the Eurotunnel stock price by the number of the outstanding shares.
Here, we have to notice that the needed market value of Eurotunnel equity is the value
in case that Eurotunnel does not adopt refinancing. In other words, the market value
we need for comparison purposes is that before the announcement of the refinancing
and should not include the value of refinancing.
There are two ways of estimating the pre-refinancing market value of the
equity: 1) multiplying the stock price and the number of shares just before
refinancing announcement, assuming that the stock price before announcement does
not reflect the "continuation" value, 2) subtracting the value of refinancing from the
market value of equity on the evaluation date, assuming that the "continuation" value
is in the stock price.
Theoretically speaking, if a positive NPV project is taken by issuing new
equity, the value of equity will increase, and then the stock price will rise. If a new
project has a negative NPV, the value of equity will decrease, and then the stock price
will fall if the project is taken anyway. If a negative NPV project is not taken, the
stock price should not change. However, these facts are not necessarily occurred in
the real world. Actually, Eurotunnel stock price has fallen regardless of the
refinancing announcement as shown in Table 5.21 in Chapter 5. Therefore, it is hard
to use the way of 1), and I use the way of 2) to estimate the pre-refinancing market
value of the Eurotunnel equity.
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Since £1,023 million of Eurotunnel equity was raised at 350 pence per share in
1987, the market value of the equity as of August, 31 1990 is approximately
estimated at £1,309.44 million using the stock price, 448 pence at this time. The
increased equity value by refinancing is assumed to be the resultant VC, which has
been calculated in this chapter, £960 million, and as a result, the estimated market
value of equity in place before refinancing becomes £ 349.44 million.
Consequently, the VC, £960 million, is greater than the pre-refinancing
market value of the Eurotunnel equity in place, £349.44 million; therefore, the
refinancing is effective for the Eurotunnel project's present equity holders. However,
we have to remember that this result includes a lot of contingencies, such as the
projected revenues changes, interest rates changes, cost overruns, and so forth.
Therefore, we cannot necessarily conclude that the refinancing is acceptable. Theses
issues will be discussed in Chapter 6, particularly regarding sensitivity analysis for
the future contingencies.
104
RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS
In Chapter 5, VC, as it applies to the Eurotunnel equity holders as of August
1990, was obtained. The result shows that the refinancing is effective for the
project, since the VC is greater than the market value of Eurotunnel equity in place
before refinancing. However, a number of unrealistic assumptions are included in this
result, and further considerations are required. In this chapter, I will change some of
the assumptions and examine how these changes will affect the resultant VC.
6.1. Considerations for the resultant VC
The result of VC calculation shows that Eurotunnel project after refinancing
has a sufficient value compared with the pre-refinancing market value of Eurotunnel
equity in place. This seems to indicate that the refinancing is effective for the
project; however, there are some disputable issues in the procedure of calculating the
VC. These issues have significant influences on the resultant VC. They are:
1) The VC is based on the Eurotunnel's assumptions, such as the future GDP
growth rate in the UK, the UK inflation rate, reference interest rate for Credit
Facilities and Debt Instruments, and competitive advantage of Eurotunnel among the
traffic systems across the Channel. 1
2) Unlevered 8, which has been calculated from the monthly stock prices of
Eurotunnel and the All-shares stock index in the London Stock Exchange, will vary
throughout the concession period. Also, the unlevered 1 is reflecting the risk in the
1 There are a large number of assumptions made by Eurotunnel. Refer to pp. 41-42 in
Prospectus. 1990.
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CHAPTER 6.
construction period of Eurotunnel, although it should reflect the risk in its operation
period. Generally, risk class in operation is lower than that in construction.
Furthermore, the Eurotunnel stock has also been raised in the Paris Stock Exchange;
therefore, these stock prices should be considered.
3) All the projected cash flows are denominated in £ determined by the fixed
exchange rate, £1=FRF10. In fact, exchange rate will fluctuate, and the future cash
flows will face to some extent foreign exchange exposure.
4) Eurotunnel has to pay corporate income tax to the governments of the UK
and France. Each government requires different tax rate based on its own taxation
system; therefore, the assumed tax rate, 40%, is not valid in the real case.
5) The construction is assumed to be finished by the planned completion date,
June 1993, within the forecasted costs, £4,821 million.
6.2. Sensitivity Analysis
Although there will be more issues to be taken into account, I will focus on the
following issues in this section.
1. Different real GDP growth rates in the UK
2. An alternative unlevered B
3. Different real riskfree interest rates
4. Further cost overruns during the construction period
5. Foreign exchange exposure
6.2.1. Different real GDP growth rates in the UK
Cross-Channel traffic market is significantly influenced by growth rate in
gross domestic product (GDP) and consumer expenditure (C.E.) in European countries,
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particularly in the UK. Survey says that the UK residents occupied 70% of the total
users of the cross-channel traffic system in 1988.
Eurotunnel's Traffic and Revenue Consultants, SETECE-WSA, set three
different growth rates of the UK GDP and the UK C.E., and they forecast the changes in
the Eurotunnel operating revenue projections under the UK GDP lower growth and the
UK GDP higher growth as follows;
Table 6.1 Three growth rates of real GDP and Consumer expenditure in the UK (%)
SETECE-WSA UK GDP UK GDP
(base case) Lower growth Higher growth
1988-1993
GDP 2.00 1.20 2.50
C.E 1.90 1.10 2.40
1993-2003
GDP 2.40 1.50 2.90
C.E. 2.20 1.50 2.70
2003-2013
GCP 2.00 1.40 2.40
C.E 2.00 1.40 2.20
Table 6.2 Changes in revenue projections in both UK GDP growth rates (1) (%)
UK GDP UK GDP
Year Lower growth Higher growth
1993 -6.0 +4.0
2003 -13.0 +9.0
2013 -19.0 +13.0
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After 2013, the growth rate in traffic volumes is assumed to be decreasing
and declining to zero by 2042. Suppose that the changes in revenue projections
between 1993 and 2003, and between 2003 and 2013 can be derived by interpolation,
and that those after 2013 will not change, we can get Table 6.3 as follows;
Table 6.3 Changes in revenue projections in both UK GDP growth rates (2) (%)
UK GDP UK GDP
Year Lower growth Higher growth
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013-42
-6.0
-6.7
-7.4
-8.1
-8.8
-9.5
-10.2
-10.9
-11.6
-12.3
-13.0
-14.2
-14.8
-15.4
-16.0
-16.6
-17.2
-17.8
-18.4
-19.0
+4.0
+4.5
+5.0
+5.5
+6.0
+6.5
+7.0
+7.5
+8.0
+8.5
+9.4
+9.8
+10.2
+10.6
+11.0
+11.4
+11.8
+12.2
+12.6
+13.0
In macroeconomics theory, real GDP is given by nominal GDP minus inflation
rate, and real GDP is independent of inflation rate. Also, real GDP is independent of
interest rate, because interest rate is determined by the government fiscal and
monetary policy. For this reason, I assumed that the projected Eurotunnel operating
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revenues are only affected by the changes in the UK real GDP growth rate, and that
the other cash flow components and all the discount rates are not affected.1
As a result of cash flow simulation (See Appendix 1.1. and 1.2), VC in higher
UK real GDP growth is £1,885 million, and VC in lower growth rate is - £398 million.
Market value of the Eurotunnel equity in place before refinancing is - £575.56 million
in the higher case and £1,707.44 million in the lower case. Consequently, VC in the
higher UK GDP growth case, £1,885 million, is greater than the pre-refinancing
market value of the Eurotunnel equity, - £575.56 million, and VC in the lower growth
case, - £398 million, is lower than its pre-refinancing market value, £1,707.44
million.
6.2.2. An alternative unlevered 1
In contrast to the previous studies in financial evaluation of a project, I
calculated unlevered 8 of Eurotunnel from the past records of its stock prices and
applied it for the VC calculation. This is one of the most unique points in this thesis,
but this approach include the following disputable issues.
1) The resultant VC is based on the assumption that unlevered 1 will not change
throughout the concession period. Since stock 1 is determined by the past records of
the stock price and the return on the market portfolio, it varies with time
2) The resultant 1 is only reflecting the systematic risk in the construction stage,
although it should reflect that in the operation stage for the purpose of the financial
1 Empirical macroeconomic results show that real GDP growth rate has some
relations with interest rate and inflation rate, but this includes quite complicated
issues, and is beyond the scope of my research.
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evaluation in this thesis. Generally, risk ;lass in operation is lower than that in
construction.
3) The resultant B seems not reliable, because its standard error is too large. This is
partly because of the substantial fluctuation of its stock price in 1989. Additional
statistical analyses are needed such as omitting exceptional data.
4) Although the market portfolio should include all risky investments according to
CAPM theory, such market index cannot be found in the UK stock market.
Since No.4 above is quite difficult to be solved, the other three issues are
discussed in this section. Figure 6.1 shows the monthly return of the Eurotunnel stock
and the All-Shares index in the London Stock Exchange. The source of these data is
Table 5.22 in Chapter 5.
Figure 6.1 Monthly return of the Eurotunnel stock and the All-Shares Index (1)
Monthly return of Eurotunnel and All-Shares
U.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
-0.1
-0.2
-n ':i
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V.,
Figure 6.1 shows that the return of the Eurotunnel stock made exceptional
movements against that of the All-Shares index in the initial phase, during 1989, and
at the middle of 1990. The primary reasons are as follows;
1) Since the project's performance was not stable in the initial phase, the Eurotunnel
stock price fluctuated reflecting the instability.
2) The stock price in 1989 was highly volatile because of the lower reliability of the
Eurotunnel stock by the accumulated critical problems, including construction delays,
cost overruns, and organizational conflicts.
3) At the middle of 1990, Eurotunnel announced the refinancing of the project by new
equity issue and additional bank loans. The announcement and arguments between
Eurotunnel and the syndicated banks affected the stock price.
These three cases do not reflect the project's systematic risk appropriately,
and none of the cases will be realized in the operation stage. Therefore, I omit the
following exceptional data and recalculate ox, 1, and several statistical values.
Omitted data
February, March, November, December, 1988
January, February, March, July, August, 1989
May, 1990
After omitting the data above, monthly return of Eurotunnel stock and that of
the All-Shares index are described in Figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.2 Monthly return of The Eurotunnel stock and the All-Shares Index (2)
Monthly return of Eurotunnel and All-Shares
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As a result of linear regression for the above "useful" data, the security
market line of the Eurotunnel stock and statistical values are given as follows;
Figure 6.3 New security market line of the Eurotunnel stock
0.2
0.1
0.0
-0.1
-0.2
-0.1 0.0
Rm-Rf
0.1
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Table 6.4 Regression results of Eurotunnel stock
a (alpha) -0.00051
levered 8 (beta) 1.52530
S.D. of random error 0.05530
Standard error of a 0.01281
Standard error of 8 0.28034
Correlation coefficient 0.78044
Correlation determination 0.60909
The t-value of a and 8 is given by:
t-value of a = = - 0.03981Standard error of a
t-value of B = = 5.4409Standard error of 8
Since the total sample numbers 21, the degrees of freedom is 19. From the t-
distribution with 19 degrees of freedom, t-value with 80%, 90%, and 95%
confidence is as follows;
80% --- to.io = 1.328
90% --- to.o5 = 1.729
95% --- to.025 = 2.093
Therefore, we can conclude that a is not significantly different from zero, since
t-value of a < 1.328
and that B is significantly different from zero with 95% confidence, since
t-value of 8 > 2.093
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Also, 80%, 90%, and 95% confidence interval for a and 1 are given by:
80%
a - to.io * S.E.(a) _ a 5 a + to.io * S.E.(a) -0.01752 < a
1 - to.1o * S.E.(8) 5 13 138 + to.io * S.E.(B) 1.15302 < 13 < 1
90%
a - to.o5 * S.E.(a) 5 a < a + to.o5 * S.E.(a) -0.02266 5 a <
1 - to.o5 * S.E.(8) 5 13 ! 13 + to.o5 * S.E.(B) --- 1.04059 • 13 5 2
95%
a - to.025 * S.E.(a) : a ! +to.o25 * S.E.(a) --- -0.02731 _ ax
13 - to.025 * S.E.(B) 5 13 13 + to.025 * S.E.(B) --- 0.93855 <5 13
After omitting the exceptional data,
and the t-test interval has become smaller.
in the base case.
the correlation coefficient has increased,
The results are more reliable than those
Unlevered 1 is
Levered 13
Unlevered 8 = D
1 + (1-T) EE
1.52530
1764
1 + (1-0.4) 1023
= 0.74968
In reality, unlevered 1 will vary with the project progress, and the 1 seems to
decrease reflecting the lower systematic risk in the operation stage than in the
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0.01651
.89759
0.02164
.01001
_ 0.02630
2.11205
construction stage. However, it is really difficult to estimate the fluctuation of B.
Also, it cannot be necessarily concluded that operation has lower systematic risk than
construction, because it is possible that new superior traffic system to Eurotunnel
will be developed in its long concession period, 50 years. The competitive advantage
of Eurotunnel in Cross-Channel traffic system would not be maintained throughout the
concession period. In usual cases, operation is less risky than construction, but this
is not necessarily applied for such a long concessional project as Eurotunnel. For this
reason, I assumed that the resultant B is applicable to the operation stage, and its
value will not change throughout the concession. Also, I assumed that the market risk
premium is always 8.0%, which is the same assumption as in the base case.
Consequently, discount rates applied for after tax net operating income and future
capital expenditure are as follows;
Table 6.5 Discount rates of After tax net operating income
and Future capital expenditure
Year rt (%) rf+ B(rm-rf) (%)
1990 10.35 16.347
1991 9.00 14.997
1992 8.00 13.997
1993-99 7.00 12.997
2000-42 6.50 12.497
As a result of cash flow simulation (see Appendix 2.1), VC decreases to a
negative value, - £1,319 million, and pre-refinancing market value of the Eurotunnel
equity in place becomes £2,628.44 million. Therefore, if the alternative unlevered 8
(=0.74968) is applied for the VC calculation, the resultant VC is much lower than the
pre-refinancing market value of the existing Eurotunnel equity.
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6.2.3. Different real riskless interest rates
Since there is no information about real riskless interest rate in Prospectus, I
calculated it from three values assumed by Eurotunnel: reference interest rates for
Credit Facilities, margins above nominal riskless interest rate (LIBOR), and inflation
rates. The procedure has been described in Chapter 5 and real riskless interest rate
for base case is shown in Table 5.7.
Discount rates of each cash flow component are composed of nominal riskless
interest rate and risk premium. The nominal riskless interest rate consists of real
riskless interest rate and inflation rate. For example, the risk premium is 13(rm-rf) in
case of net operating income, and margins over LIBOR in case of bank loans. Suppose
real riskless interest rate is independent of inflation rate, the change of real riskless
interest rate only affects the discount rate of each cash flow component.
In this section, two different real riskless interest rates are considered for
the purpose of sensitivity analysis. They are 1) 1% higher real riskless interest
rate, 2) 1% lower real riskless interest rate.
1) 1% higher real riskless interest rate
Real riskfree interest rate, which is higher by 1% than in the base case, is as
follows;
Table 6.6 Real riskfree interest rate (1% higher case)
Year Real riskfree interest rate(%)
1990 4.85
1991 5.0
1992 4.5
1993-99 3.5
2000-42 2.5
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As a result, discount rates of each cash flow component will increase by 1%
as follows1 ;
Table 6.7 Discount rates of each cash flow component (1% higher case)
Year rNOI (%) rCF (%) rDI (%) rdepreciation (%)
1990 14.511 12.85 13.85 14.181
1991 13.161 11.50 12.50 12.831
1992 12.161 10.50 11.50 11.831
1993-99 11.161 9.50 10.50 10.831
2000-01 10.661 9.00 10.00 10.331
2002 10.661 9.00 9.875 10.268
2003 10.661 9.00 9.75 10.206
2004 10.661 9.00 9.625 10.143
2005 10.661 9.00 9.50 10.081
2006 10.661 9.00 9.375 10.018
2007-42 10.661 9.00 9.25 9.956
2) 1% lower real riskless interest rate
Real riskless interest rate, which is lower by 1% than in the base case, is as
follows;
Table 6.8 Real riskfree interest rate (1% lower case)
Year Real riskfree interest rate(%)
1990 2.85
1991 3.0
1992 2.5
1993-99 1.5
2000-42 0.5
1 (rm-rf) is assumed to be 8.0% regardless of the change of rf
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The discount rates of each cash flow component will decrease by 1% as
follows;
Table 6.9 Discount rate of each cash flow components (1% lower case)
Year rNOI (%) rCF (%) rDI (%) rdepreciation (%)
1990 12.511 10.85 11.85 12.181
1991 11.161 9.50 10.50 10.831
1992 10.161 8.50 9.50 9.831
1993-99 9.161 7.50 8.50 8.831
2000-01 8.661 7.00 8.00 8.331
2002 8.661 7.00 7.875 8.268
2003 8.661 7.00 7.75 8.206
2004 8.661 7.00 7.625 8.143
2005 8.661 7.00 7.50 8.081
2006 8.661 7.00 7.375 8.018
2007-42 8.661 7.00 7.25 7.956
As a result of cash flow simulations (See Appendix 3.1. and 3.2), VC decreases
to - £65 million in 1% higher real riskfree interest rate, and increases to £2,307
million in 1% lower real riskfree interest rate. Market value of the Eurotunnel equity
in place before refinancing is £1,374.44 million in 1% higher case, and - £997.56
million in 1% lower case. Therefore, the VC in 1% higher case, - £65 million, is
much lower than the pre-refinancing market value of the Eurotunnel equity,
£1,374.44 million, whereas the VC in 1% lower case, £2,307 million, is much higher
than its pre-refinancing market value, - £997.56 million.
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6.2.4. Construction delays and cost overruns
Although substantial construction delays and cost overruns have been
recognized since 1987, the current significant tunnelling progress is recovering the
initial delays. The construction is expected to be finished by the planned completion
date within the budget, judging from its recent progress. For this reason, the risks as
to delays and cost overruns are now substantially reduced, and a wide range of
sensitivity analysis is not needed. I assumed that the possibility of delays is much
lower than that of cost overruns, and I did sensitivity analyses for 10% and 20% cost
overrun.
1) 10% cost overrun
Since the forecasted cost is £4,821 million as of August 1990, the costs might
be increased to £5,303 million if a 10% cost overrun is occurred. Suppose the
additional costs are distributed in each year and Credit Facilities can be drawn as
needed up to its limit, the total cash inflows and the margins for Credit Facilities are
as follows;
Table 6.10 Contents of cash inflow in 10% cost overrun (£ million)
Year Total Inflow Rights Credit Facilities
1990 585 566 19
1991 1,701 1,701
1992 1,701 1,701
1993 1,013 1,013
1994 303 303
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Table 6.11 Credit Facilities and margins over LIBOR in 10% cost overrun
(£ million)
Year Credit Facilities Cumulative margin (%)
To 1990 (8) 1,764 1.50
1990 (9-12) 19 1,783 1.50
1991 1,701 3,484 1.50
1992 1,701 5,185 1.551
1993 1,013 6,098 1.50
1994 303 6,401 1.752
Cost overrun only affects the margins over LIBOR, and as a result, the
discount rate of Interest tax shields for Credit Facilities (rcF) and Debt Instruments
(rDI), old Credit Facilities repayment (rcF), and Depreciation tax shields (rdepreciation)
are changed. Discount rates of each cash flow component are as follows;
Reference interest rate for Credit Facilities (10% cost overrun)
Reference Weighted
Year interest average of Rnf(%) Inflation Ref(%)
rate (%) margins(%) rate(%)
1990 11.85 1.50 10.35 6.5 3.85
1991 10.5 1.50 9.0 5.0 4.0
1992 9.516 1.516 8.0 4.5 3.5
1993 8.514 1.514 7.0 4.5 2.5
1994-99 8.525 1.525 7.0 4.5 2.5
2000-42 8.025 1.525 6.5 5.0 1.5
1,2 This value is a weighted average of different margin rates depending on the
amount and year of drawings.
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Table 6.12
Table 6.13 Discount rate of each cash flow component (10% cost overrun)
Year rNOI (%) rCF (%) rDI (%) rdepreciation (%)
1990 13.511 11.85 12.85 13.181
1991 12.161 10.50 11.50 11.831
1992 11.161 9.516 10.516 10.839
1993 10.161 8.514 9.514 9.838
1994-99 10.161 8.525 9.525 9.843
2000-01 9.661 8.025 9.025 9.343
2002 9.661 8.025 8.90 9.281
2003 9.661 8.025 8.775 9.218
2004 9.661 8.025 8.65 9.156
2005 9.661 8.025 8.525 9.093
2006 9.661 8.025 8.40 9.031
2007-41 9.661 8.025 8.275 8.968
2) 20% cost overrun
The procedure is the same as in the case of 10% cost overrun. The costs will
increase to £5,785 million by 20% cost overrun. The contents of cash inflows, the
margins above LIBOR for Credit Facilities, and the discount rates of each cash flow
component are described as follows;
Table 6.14 Contents of cash inflow in 20% cost overrun (£ million)
Year Total Inflow Rights Credit Facilities
1990 638 566 72
1991 1,808 1,808
1992 1,808 1,808
1993 1,120 1,120
1994 410 410
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Credit Facilities and margins over LIBOR in 20% cost overrun (£
million)
Year Credit Facilities Cumulative margin (%)
To 1990 (8) 1,764 1.50
1990 (9-12) 72 1,836 1.50
1991 1,808 3,644 1.50
1992 1,808 5,452 1.5761
1993 1,120 6,572 1.6822
1994 410 6,982 2.25
Reference interest rate for Credit Facilities (20% cost overrun)
Reference Weighted
Year interest average of Rnf(%) Inflation Ref(%)
rate (%) margins(%) rate(%)
1990 11.85 1.50 10.35 6.5 3.85
1991 10.5 1.50 9.0 5.0 4.0
1992 9.525 1.525 8.0 4.5 3.5
1993 8.552 1.552 7.0 4.5 2.5
1994-99 8.593 1.593 7.0 4.5 2.5
2000-42 8.093 1.593 6.5 5.0 1.5
Table 6.17 Discount rate of each cash flow component (20% cost overrun)
Year rNOI (%) rCF (%) roI (%) rdepreciation (%)
1990
1991
1992
13.511
12.161
11.161
11.85
10.50
9.525
12.85
11.50
10.525
13.181
11.831
10.843
1,2 This value is a weighted average of different margin rates depending on the
amount and year of drawings.
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Table 6.16
Table 6.15
1993 10.161 8.552 9.552 9.857
1994-99 10.161 8.593 9.593 9.877
2000-01 9.661 8.093 9.093 9.377
2002 9.661 8.093 8.968 9.315
2003 9.661 8.093 8.843 9.252
2004 9.661 8.093 8.718 9.190
2005 9.661 8.093 8.593 9.127
2006 9.661 8.093 8.468 9.065
2007-42 9.661 8.093 8.118 8.890
As a result of cash flow simulations (See Appendix 4.1 and 4.2), VC decreases
in both cases. The VC in 10% cost overrun is £484 million, and the VC in 20% cost
overrun is £2 million. Market value of Eurotunnel equity in place before refinancing is
£825.44 million in 10% cost overrun and is £1,307.44 million in 20% cost overrun.
The VC in both cases are much lower than the pre-refinancing market value of the
Eurotunnel equity in place.
6.2.5. Foreign exchange exposure
Under the current floating exchange rate system, the Eurotunnel's assumption,
£1=FRF10 throughout the concession period, is unrealistic.
One of the most influential exchange rate for the Eurotunnel operation is
thought to be an exchange rate of the UK pound to the other European currencies. This
is because that the UK people have more opportunities to use the Eurotunnel than the
other Europeans. The UK people can go to any countries in continental Europe through
the tunnel, but the other Europeans only go to the UK. Speaking of trade, if the UK
pound appreciates against the other European currencies, the UK people will be
encouraged to import foreign goods or visit other countries through the tunnel. If the
UK pound depreciates, by contrast, the other European people are not sure to use the
tunnel, because they can import goods from the other European countries. The other
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Europeans do not have to use the tunnel. Consequently, the traffic revenues will
increase when the UK pound appreciate to the other European currencies, and decrease
when the UK pound depreciate to them.
The cross-channel traffic market only consists of air freight, ship, and tunnel.
In this imperfectly competitive market, Eurotunnel system has a high competitive
advantage in its speed, costs, and connection to the other traffic system. The UK
passengers to go outside the UK through the tunnel and the foreign goods inflow to the
UK are considered imports from the UK's point of view. From the importers'
perspective, the relationship between exchange rate and profits in imperfectly
competitive market is described in Figure 6.4.1
Figure 6.4 Importer and a devaluation in an imperfectly competitive market
Price,
Cost in £
=AC2
=AC1
MZ M1Imports per period of time
The £ appreciation shifts the cost curve downward (MC2 to MC1), and as a
result, the profits will increase from plZVR to p2TWS. The depreciation of £, by
contrast, shifts the cost curve upward (MC1 to MC2), and profits will decrease from
1 See, Maurice D. Levi, International Finance, 2nd ed., p.456, New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1990
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p2TWS to pl1ZVR. This is a rough estimate of foreign exchange exposure of the
Eurotunnel system.
There is another method to measure the foreign exchange exposure of
Eurotunnel. Theoretically, foreign exchange exposure is measured as the value of B in
Equation (6.1)1
AV = a + 1*AE + la (6.1)
, where AV is change of the Eurotunnel asset value, AE is change of an
exchange rate , a and B are regression coefficients, and g is a random error term.
In Equation (6.1), B describes the systematic relation between AV and AE, and
measures how much the Eurotunnel asset value is changed by the change of an
exchange rate. This is called foreign exchange exposure. If the Eurotunnel asset
value is exposed to the exchange rate of the UK pound to multinational currencies,
Equation (6.1) is rewritten as follows;
AV = a+B1*AE(£/$)+82*AE(£/$)+ ....... +Bn*AE(£/Y)+p. (6.2)
Once the Eurotunnel operation begins, its foreign exchange exposure can be
measured by calculating each B (B1, B2,. ....... , Bn) by multiple regression
It is important for Eurotunnel to measure foreign exchange exposure of its
operation. Currently, foreign investors are spending a lot of time in managing foreign
exchange risks in their portfolio. Their final objective is to make their portfolio
1 See, Maurice D. Levi, International Finance, 2nd ed., Chapter 9, New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1990
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become more efficient. If the foreign exchange exposure of the Eurotunnel operation,
whether large or small, makes their portfolio become more efficient, the foreign
investors will make investments in Eurotunnel, and as a result, Eurotunnel will get
further financial resources.
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EVALUATION FROM THE SYNDICATED BANKS' PERSPECTIVE
So far, I have focused on the financial evaluation from the Eurotunnel equity
holders' perspective. In the project structure noted in Chapter 3, the syndicated
banks are making a lot of contribution in the financial support and have large interests
or stakes in this project. Their interests are whether Eurotunnel will be able to make
the promised loan repayments, and these are quite different from the equity holders
interests. The Japanese banks are the most contributing lenders of all the syndicated
banks, but they have been reported to be reluctant in the financial support. I will
discuss these issues in this chapter.
7.1. Financial evaluation for the syndicated banks
From the syndicated banks' point of view, loan lending is a kind of investment.
They lend loan principal, and receive the principal and interest in the future. Their
interests are whether Eurotunnel has a capacity of making the future interest
payments and principal repayments. VC to the syndicated banks as of August, 1990 is
formulated as follows;
VC = - PV of [(Loan principal outflow in £)t * St]
+ PV of [(Interest and Principal inflow in £)t * St] (7.1)
,where St is a future expected spot exchange rate of lending currency and
domestic currency at time t.
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CHAPTER 7.
The cash flow schedule of Credit Facilities to the syndicated banks is described
in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1 Cash flows of Credit Facilities for the syndicated banks (£ million)
Year Interest loan principal Principal Interest Total
rate outflow inflow inflow inflow
1990 0.1185 70 70
1991 0.105 1,559 349 349
1992 0.095 1,594 467 467
1993 0.085 906 495 495
1994 0.085 196 512 512
1995 0.085 512 512
1996 0.085 512 512
1997 0.085 512 512
1998 0.085 963 430 1,393
1999 0.085 740 288 1,028
2001 0.08 461 251 712
2002 0.08 475 213 688
2003 0.08 480 174 654
2004 0.08 243 155 398
2005 0.08 243 136 379
2006 0.08 242 116 358
2007 0.08 242 97 339
2008 0.08 242 77 319
2009 0.08 242 58 300
2010 0.08 242 39 281
2011 0.08 242 19 261
2012 0.08 242 0 242
According to Revised Credit Agreement in Prospectus, the syndicated banks
set out some conditions that they can suspend or postpone the lending to Eurotunnel.
These conditions are based on their own estimates of Eurotunnel future cash flows,
which are independently forecasted of Eurotunnel and are not available to the public.
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They are protecting the syndicated banks from losing the loan repayments, when
Eurotunnel's operation is poorer than expected. The conditions are:
- 2012 debt coverage ratio
This is the present value, discounted at the weighted average interest rate of
all the debt, of forecast net operating cash flow to 2012 divided by present value of
all debt due for repayment up to 2012. Eurotunnel will not be entitled to make
drawings under the facilities if the debt coverage ratio is below 1.10. If the ratio
remains below 1.0 for 90 days or more and the Agent Banks so notify Eurotunnel this
will be an event of default.
- 2020 debt coverage ratio
This ratio is defined on the same date basis as the 2012 debt coverage ratio
based on forecast net cash flow and debt to 2020. A debt coverage ratio of 1.40 is
required for drawings to be made. If the ratio remains below 1.20 for 90 days or
more and the Agent Banks so notify Eurotunnel this will be an event of default.
- Debt service coverage ratio
This is the ratio of forecast net cash flow during any annual period to the
aggregate of the estimated interest on all Eurotunnel's debt during the same year, the
principal repayments necessary to be made to the Banks in order to meet the default
repayment schedule referred to below and those to be made to EIB and Credit National,
in each case in that same year. The required ratio is not mentioned in Prospectus.
- Dividend restrictions
The Credit Agreement and the Revised Credit Agreement impose certain
restrictions on dividend payments. Eurotunnel will not generally be permitted to pay
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dividends until after the last day upon which drawings may be made under these
facilities and unless certain conditions are satisfied at the time of the declaration of
the dividend. they are: (1) an interest reserve account is fully established in an
amount sufficient to cover expected interest payments for three months on
Eurotunnel's debt; (2) the aggregate repayments made up to that time are not less
than the aggregate amounts required by the repayment schedule; (3) the 2012 debt
coverage ratio is not less than 1.25.
7.2. VC to the Japanese banks
The syndicated banks are composed of 206 banks in the world, including major
international banks such as CitiBank in the U.S.A., National Westminster Bank in the
UK, Deutche Bank in Germany, Swiss Bank in Switzerland, and so on. Among the
syndicated banks which are well diversified all over the world, the Japanese banks
are the largest lenders, the amount of which was £1.16 billion at the time of initial
financing in 1987. This is 23.28% of the total loans, £5 billion, provided by the
syndicated banks. The second place is France, £900 million, and the third is the UK,
£460 million. Financial support from the Japanese banks is summarized in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2 Financial support from the Japanese banks to Eurotunnel (Y billion)
Banks Value Banks Value
Nihonkogyo 19.2 Chuo-shintaku 4.8
Sanwa 19.2 Hyakujushi 3.6
Taiyokobe-Mitsui 23.4 Yokohama 2.4
Taiyokobe 9.6 Ashikaga 2.4
Mitsui 13.8 Chiba 2.4
Tokyo 16.92 Hachijuni 2.4
Nihonchokishinyo 16.92 Hokkaido 2.4
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Tokai 16.92 Hokuriku 2.4
Daiichikangyo 14.4 Toyoshintaku 2.4
Fuji 14.4 Hukuoka 1.6
Daiwa 14.4 Hiroshima 1.6
Mitsubishi 14.4 Nihon-shintaku 1.6
Mitsubishi-shintaku 9.6 Chugoku 1.2
Saitama 9.6 Gunma 1.2
Nissaigin 9.6 lyo 1.2
Sumitomo 9.6 Joyo 1.2
Yasuda-shintaku 9.6 Kyoto 1.2
Kyowa 7.2 Shizuoka 1.2
Hokkaido-takushoku 7.2 Sumitomo-shintaku 1.2
Mitsui-shintaku 7.2 Shichijushichi 1.2
Note: £1=V240
Total -- V 27.94 billion (= £1.16401 billion)
23.28% of the total loans by syndicated banks (£5 billion)
Source: "Diamond Report", Shukan Diamond, pp.4-5, April 28/May 5, 1990
In September 1990, in response to the additional loan requirements from
Eurotunnel to support the tunnel refinancing, Japanese banks firstly agreed to provide
extra finance, the amount of which is £600 million. 1 Since the initial offering was
£1.164 billion, the total has become £1.764 billion.
In Chapter 5, I assumed that £1,764 million of Credit Facilities has already
been drawn from all the syndicated banks. The planned schedule of drawings and its
margins were shown in Table 5.6.
The Japanese banks agreed to provide £1,764 million, and this amount is
25.94% of £6,800 million, which is the total amount of Credit Facilities promised to
provide by all the syndicated banks. Suppose the Japanese banks provide the same
percentage, 25.94%, of £6,019 million, which is the total principal withdrawal in the
1 "Japanese banks support tunnel refinancing", Financial Times, London, September
27, 1990.
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base case, and provide the yearly withdrawal at this percentage, principal withdrawal
and its margins from the Japanese banks are scheduled as follows;
Table 7.3 Credit Facilities outflow and margins to the Japanese banks
(£ million)
Planned Cumulative
Year principal principal Margin (%)
withdrawal withdrawal
To 1990 (8/31) 458
1990 (9-12)
1991 404 862 1.50
1992 413 1,275 1.50
1993 235 1,510 1.50
1994 51 1,561 1.50
The interest and principal repayment schedule to the Japanese banks are also
derived by multiplying 0.2594 by the total loan repayments schedule to the syndicated
banks shown in Table 7.1. The cash flows for the Japanese banks are as follows;
Table 7.4 Cash flows for the Japanese banks (£ million)
Year Interest loan principal Principal Interest Total
rate outflow inflow inflow inflow
990
991
992
993
994
995
996
997
998
999
0.1185
0.105
0.095
0.085
0.085
0.085
0.085
0.085
0.085
0.085
404
413
235
51
250
192
17
91
121
128
133
133
133
133
111
95
17
91
121
133
133
133
133
133
361
287
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2000 0.08 187 75 261
2001 0.08 120 65 185
2002 0.08 123 55 178
2003 0.08 125 45 170
2004 0.08 63 40 103
2005 0.08 63 35 98
2006 0.08 63 30 93
2007 0.08 63 25 88
2008 0.08 63 20 83
2009 0.08 63 15 78
2010 0.08 63 10 73
2011 0.08 63 5 68
2012 0.08 63 0 63
I have explained that the syndicated banks are exposed to the operation risks
of which Eurotunnel will not produce sufficient profits to repay Credit Facilities, and
that the several conditions under Revised Credit Agreements are protecting the
syndicated banks from being to exposed these risks. However, even if Eurotunnel will
make enough profits to repay loans, the syndicated banks will still be exposed to
another risk. That is a foreign exchange risk. Since the loans from the Japanese
banks are denominated in £ terms 1 , they are fully exposed to this risk.
According to the Revised Credit Agreement, the reference interest rate for
Credit Facilities is a floating interest rate determined by LIBOR (London Interbank
Offer Rates) plus margin. LIBOR rates are calculated as the averages of the lending
rates in the respective currencies of six lending London Banks.2 Since the movement
of LIBOR is not perfectly correlated to that of £/V exchange rate, the Japanese banks
are fully exposed to the future £/E exchange rate, if they do not manage the foreign
exchange risks at all. They will lose money in case that V appreciates against £,
1 The loans might be offered in FRF terms, but not sure. I assumed it is in £ terms.
2 Maurice D. Levi, "International Finance", 2nd ed., p.267, New York: McGraw-Hill,
1990
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whereas they will gain in case that V depreciates against £. Nominal ¥/£ exchange
rate has moved from 1980 to 1990 as shown in Table 7.5.
Table 7.5 E/£ exchange rate movement for the past decades
Year V/£ Year V/
1980 527.42 1986 247.21
1982 435.99 1987 237.04
1983 360.30 1988 228.27
1984 317.41 1989 226.65
1985 309.23 1990 245.15
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, August 1990
Table 7.6 shows the expected future spot W/£ rate and forward ¥/£ rate
based on my assumption for simulation purposes. Judging from the forward rate
movement in this table, V is forecasted to appreciate against £ during the repayments
period. Spot rate (case 1) shows that V will appreciate against £ as expected,
whereas spot rate (case 2) shows that £ will depreciate against £ contrary to the
expectation. The table includes unrealistic assumptions such that future spot rate will
appreciate or depreciate linearly, and that the banks will make long-term forward
contract in exchange rate. However, the simulation purpose is to examine the effect
of buying forward contract, and the assumption is excused. The assumed forward
rate and two cases of expected spot rate in ¥/£ is as follows;
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Table 7.6 W/£ forward rate and spot rate
Year Forward Spot rate Spot rate
rate (Case 1) (Case 2)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
245
243
241
239
237
235
233
231
229
227
225
223
221
219
217
215
213
211
209
207
205
203
201
245
242
239
236
233
230
227
224
221
218
215
212
209
206
203
200
197
194
191
188
185
182
179
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
Supposing that Eurotunnel will earn sufficient profits to make loan repayments
as contracted, the projected cash flows to the Japanese banks under the assumed
future spot exchange rate above are as follows;
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Table 7.7 Cash flows to the Japanese banks in V terms
Year Assumed reference loan principal interest and principal
Spot rate interest rate outflow inflow
(Y/£) (£) (V million) (V million)
1990 245 0.1185 4,264
1991 242 0.105 97,866 21,903
1992 239 0.095 98,823 28,960
1993 236 0.085 55,464 30,300
1994 233 0.085 11,846 30,922
1995 230 0.085 30,524
1996 227 0.085 30,126
1997 224 0.085 29,728
1998 221 0.085 79,843
1999 218 0.085 62,592
2000 215 0.08 56,199
2001 212 0.08 39,144
2002 209 0.08 37,289
2003 206 0.08 34,969
2004 203 0.08 20,956
2005 200 0.08 19,638
2006 197 0.08 18,303
2007 194 0.08 17,050
2008 191 0.08 15,827
2009 188 0.08 14,634
2010 185 0.08 13,471
2011 182 0.08 12,339
2012 179 0.08 11,237
Table 7.8 Cash flows to the Japanese banks in v terms (Case 2)
Year Assumed reference loan principal interest and principal
Spot rate interest rate outflow inflow
(V/F£) (£) (V million) (V million)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
245
246
247
248
249
250
0.1185
0.105
0.095
0.085
0.085
0.085
99,484
102,130
58,284
12,660
4,264
22,265
29,929
31,841
33,046
33,178
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(Case 1)
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
0.085
0.085
0.085
0.085
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
33,311
33,444
91,404
72,928
66,655
47,268
45,853
43,796
26,737
25,529
24,249
23,026
21,793
20,550
19,297
18,034
16,761
As I noted earlier, VC to the Japanese banks under the future spot exchange
rate is calculated by the following formula;
1994 St*(Loan principal outflow)t
VC = 1991 (1+r1991)t=1991 (1 +rl991) ....... (1 + t)
2012 St*(Interest and principal inflow)t
+ (+99 (+t)
t=1990 (1 + ri 99o) ....... (1 + rt)
(7.2)
, where St is a future assumed spot rate of ¥/£ at time t, and rt is the
reference interest rate at time t.
The result of calculation is as follows;
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Table 7.9 Present value of Credit Facilities for the Japanese banks
Net PV of
Year cash flows1  1+rCF,t H(1+rCF,t) Loans
(V million) (y million)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
4,264
-75,963
-69,863
-25,164
19,076
30,524
30,126
29,728
79,843
62,592
56,199
39,144
37,289
34,969
20,956
19,638
18,303
17,050
15,827
14,634
13,471
12,339
11,237
1.1185
1.105
1.095
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.038042
1.14703
1.25600
1.36276
1.47859
1.60427
1.74063
1.88859
2.04912
2.22329
2.40116
2.59325
2.80071
3.02476
3.26675
3.52809
3.81033
4.11516
4.44437
4.79992
5.18391
5.59863
6.04652
4,108
-66,226
-55,624
-18,465
12,901
19,027
17,307
15,741
38,965
28,153
23,405
15,095
13,314
11,561
6,415
5,566
4,803
4,143
3,561
3,049
2,599
2,204
1.858
. = 93,460
1 Net cash flow equals principal outflow
2 1.03804=1.1185^(1/3) plus interest and principal inflow
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(Case 1)
Present value of Credit Facilities for the Japanese banks (Case 2)
Net PV of
Year cash flows 1+rCF,t H(1+rCF,t) Loans
(V million) (V million)
1990 4,264 1.1185 1.03804 4,108
1991 -77,218 1.105 1.14703 -67,320
1992 -72,202 1.095 1.25600 -57,485
1993 -26,443 1.085 1.36276 -19,404
1994 20,386 1.085 1.47859 13,787
1995 33,178 1.085 1.60427 20,681
1996 33,311 1.085 1.74063 19,137
1997 33,444 1.085 1.88859 17,708
1998 91,404 1.085 2.04912 44,607
1999 72,928 1.085 2.22329 32,802
2000 66,655 1.08 2.40116 27,760
2001 47,268 1.08 2.59325 18,227
2002 45,853 1.08 2.80071 16,372
2003 43,796 1.08 3.02476 14,479
2004 26,737 1.08 3.26675 8,185
2005 25,529 1.08 3.52809 7,236
2006 24,249 1.08 3.81033 6,364
2007 23,026 1.08 4.11516 5,595
2008 21,793 1.08 4.44437 4,903
2009 20,550 1.08 4.79992 4,281
2010 19,297 1.08 5.18391 3,722
2011 18,034 1.08 5.59863 3,221
2012 16,761 1.08 6.04652 2,772
S= 131,738
Since the cumulative drawings from the Japanese banks as of August 1990 is
supposed to be £458 million in Table 7.3, this amount is translated into V112,107
million by the exchange rate, V245/£, at that time. The VC in case 1, V93,460
million, is lower than 1 12,107 million, and the Japanese banks will lose money. The
VC in case 2, (131,738 million, on the other hand, is greater than Y112,107 million,
and the Japanese banks will get foreign exchange gains.
139
Table 7.10
7.3. Foreign exchange risk management
Because of their exposure to foreign exchange rates, these two cases indicate
that the Japanese banks will lose money in case of V appreciation against £, whereas
they will make profits in case of V depreciation against £. Japanese banks' profit
position will be changed due to the unexpected movement of future spot ¥/£ exchange
rate. In order to avoid the foreign exchange risk, the Japanese banks should manage it
through hedging policies such as forward contracts, futures contracts, currency or
interest swaps, and options. In this section, I focus on the hedging policies through
forward contracts.
Suppose the Japanese banks buy forward contracts at the forward rate shown
in Table 7.6, they will get the loan principal outflow, and interest and principal inflow
as follows;
Table 7.11 Cash flows for the Japanese banks through forward contracts
Year Assumed reference loan principal interest and principal
forward rate interest rate outflow inflow
(¥/£) (£) (V million) (Y million)
1990 245 0.1185 4,264
1991 243 0.105 98,270 21,994
1992 241 0.095 99,650 29,202
1993 239 0.085 56,169 30,686
1994 237 0.085 12,050 31,453
1995 235 0.085 31,188
1996 233 0.085 30,922
1997 231 0.085 30,657
1998 229 0.085 82,734
1999 227 0.085 65,176
2000 225 0.08 58,813
2001 223 0.08 41,175
2002 221 0.08 39,430
2003 219 0.08 37,176
2004 217 0.08 22,401
2005 215 0.08 21,110
2006 213 0.08 19,789
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2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
211
209
207
205
203
201
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
18,544
17,318
16,113
14,928
13,763
12.618
VC to the Japanese banks in this case is calculated by the following formula;
1994
VC = - Ft*(Loan principal outflow)t
t=1991 (1 + r 1991) ....... (1 + rt)
2012
+ 12 Ft*(Interest and principal inflow)t
t=1990 (1+r199o) ....... (1+rt) (7.3)
, where Ft is a forward rate of Y/£ at time t, and rt is a reference interest
rate at time t. The result of calculation is as follows;
Table 7.12 Present
through
value of Credit Facilities for the Japanese banks
forward contracts
Net PV of
Year cash flows 1+rCF,t fl(1+rCF,t) Loans
(Y million) (Y million)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
4,264
-76,277
-70,448
-25,483
19,403
31,188
30,922
30,657
82,734
65,176
58,813
41,175
39,430
37,176
22,401
21,110
19,789
1.1185
1.105
1.095
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.03804
1.14703
1.25600
1.36276
1.47859
1.60427
1.74063
1.88859
2.04912
2.22329
2.40116
2.59325
2.80071
3.02476
3.26675
3.52809
3.81033
4,108
-66,499
-56,089
-18,700
13,123
19,440
17,765
16,233
40,375
29,315
24,494
15,878
14,079
12,290
6,857
5,984
5,194
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2007 18,544 1.08 4.11516 4,506
2008 17,318 1.08 4.44437 3,897
2009 16,113 1.08 4.79992 3,357
2010 14,928 1.08 5.18391 2,880
2011 13,763 1.08 5.59863 2,458
2012 12,618 1.08 6.04652 2.087
S= 103,030
The VC, V103,030 million, is still lower than the outstanding debt amount,
£458 million (= V112,107 million), even if the Japanese banks buy forward
contracts. However, at the same time, the Japanese banks will use the cash inflow
for payments to their depositors. As a result, the money will only move from left to
right in front of the banks, and they will not take foreign exchange risks. This is the
concept of hedging policy through forward contracts. The mechanism is described in
Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1 Hedging mechanism through forward contracts
lend £1
(£1+lnt.£)
at rate
F1 (£/V)
buy £1
at rate
deposit ¥1
(VI+1nt.Y)
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In Figure 7.1, the Japanese banks buy £1 in financial market at spot rate
Sl(£/V), and lend £1 to Eurotunnel. Several years later, they receive £2
(=£1+interest) from Eurotunnel, and sell it at forward rate F1(£/V), which is
determined when they buy £1 at spot rate Sl(£/V). Suppose interest parity holds,
Equation (7.4) is met.
F1(Y/f)1 + r ¥ = (1 + re) (7.4)S 1 (¥/£)
where rv is interest rate in Japan, re is interest rate in the UK, F1(¥/£) is
forward exchange rate at time 1, and S1(Y/£) is spot exchange rate at time 1. Using
Equation (7.4), the repayment to the depositors in Japan becomes £2*F1. £2*F1
equals £1*(1+r£)*{S1*(1+rV)/(1+r£)} = V1*(1+rY) = V2. As a result, the
exchange rate difference is completely offset by the interest difference, and the
Japanese banks can completely hedge the exchange rate risks.
Due to the unexpected exchange rate movement, the cases sometimes happen in
which Japanese banks would have made profits, if they had not bought the forward
exchange rate contract. However, the objective of buying forward contract is not to
make profits, but to avoid losing money as much as possible. Therefore, even if the
results indicate that the Japanese banks need not have bought forward contract, the
costs should be regarded as insurance.
Consequently, as long as forward contract is not used as speculative purpose,
the buyers position is described in Figure 7.2.1 In this figure, Risk Profile line shows
that the value of the loan repayments to Japanese banks will decrease, if V
appreciates against £, and will increase, if V depreciates against £. Also, Payoff
Profile line shows that the Japanese banks will get the exactly equal amount of the
1 Smithson, "A Lego Approach To Financial Engineering: Forwards, Futures, Swaps,
and Options," Midland Corporate Finance Journal. Vol.4, No.4, Winter 1987, pp.16-
28.
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decrease in the value of loan, and lose that of the increase in its value, if they buy
forward contract at the rate of the origin. Consequently, the line of resulting
exposure will be exactly on the X-axis, and it is unexposed to the exchange rate.
Figure 7.2 Resulting exposure through forward contracts
AV
4
4
4
OIt
act
Risk Profile
Note: AV is the value of loan repayments to the Japanese banks
AP is the future spot exchange rate (Y/)
The forward contract will be effective in order for the Japanese banks to
mitigate the foreign exchange risks, although they will lose the possibility to make
profits by Y depreciation against £.
7.4. The Japanese banks' attitude toward Eurotunnel project
The Japanese banks are providing around a fourth of the total financial support
of the syndicated banks. Their contribution is quite important to the Eurotunnel
project. In response to the Eurotunnel's request in late 1990, they firstly agreed on
the additional financial support, but they were reported to be reluctant to this support
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One of the biggest reasons is that the Japanese banks are currently under pressure of
BIS (Bank for International Settlements) regulation, which requires them to maintain
the minimum capital ratio of at least 8% of the total assets. Because of the following
current market environment, the Japanese banks are in a difficult position to meet the
requirements.
- Since the sudden fall of the Japanese stock market last year, market value of the
stocks held by the banks has substantially decreased. Because the banks have
appropriated the capital gains in their capital portion, the capital ratio to the total
assets has become lower than the required ratio.
- Because of the recent decrease in real estate prices in Japan, a lot of small real
estate companies have been bankrupt. Since most of the Japanese banks have
offered substantial financial support to these companies, they have had a lot of
difficulties in collecting the loan repayments.
- Interest of bank loans, which has been determined by the Ministry of Finance in
Japan, will be deregulated in the near future. Under this condition, the Japanese
banks will have to spend more cost of supplying deposits, and their earnings will
decrease.
All of these issues shrink the capital portion of the total assets and prevent the
Japanese banks from meeting the BIS regulation. Under this situation, the Japanese
banks are now making much effort in increasing the earnings rather than increasing
the volume of deposits. The lower relative profitability of the Eurotunnel project
counteracts this current efforts; therefore, they are reluctant to provide the
financial support.
There is another reason for their reluctance relating to the contents of the BIS
regulation. Suppose the Japanese banks do not buy forward contracts, and get foreign
exchange gains in case of V depreciation against £, they can increase their capital and
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will be easy to meet the BIS regulation. However, under the BIS regulation, the
Japanese banks cannot appropriate the foreign exchange gains to their capital. As a
result, even if they get foreign exchange gains, their capital portion will not increase,
and it will not help to meet the BIS regulation.
Consequently, the Eurotunnel project has no merits to help the current
stringent environment of the Japanese banks to meet BIS regulation because of its
lower profitability and its no exchange rate effect. It is natural that they should be
reluctant to provide the financial support.
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION
Since the Eurotunnel project was initiated in 1987, a lot of crucial problems,
such as construction delays, cost overruns, organizational conflicts, and technological
difficulties, have been recognized. The currently planned refinancing of the project is
expected to cover the huge cost overruns since 1987, and to provide effective
financial sources to complete the project. In Chapter 5, I calculated the VC of base,
case as it applies to the Eurotunnel equity holders, and then, in Chapter 6, I calculated
several VCs by sensitivity analyses. In Chapter 7, I calculated the VC, as it applies to
the Japanese banks, the largest contributors of all the syndicated banks. In this
chapter, I will summarize the resultant VCs and make comments on which issues
should be of concern in order for the Eurotunnel project to have a positive value.
8.1. VC to the Eurotunnel equity holders
The table on the next page summarizes the resultant VCs by sensitivity
analyses, which have been calculated in Chapters 5 and 6.
The eight different conditions, under which the VC was calculated, are assumed
to have no relations with each other. It is quite important to investigate the relations
so as to get more accurate analytic results; however, it requires a tremendous
amount of works and is beyond the scope of this research. Therefore, I neglect the
relations between these conditions.
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higher growth lower growth 10% 20% 1% higer 1% lower
PV of After-tax
net operating income 6625 7545 5281 3948 6625 6625 5448 8182
Discount rate (%)
1990 13.511 13.511 13.511 16.347 13.511 13.511 14.511 12.511
1991 12.161 12.161 12.161 14.997 12.161 12.161 13.161 11.161
1992 11.161 11.161 11.161 13.997 11.161 11.161 12.161 10.161
1993-99 10.161 10.161 10.161 12.997 10.161 10.161 11.161 9.161
2000-41 9.661 9.661 9.661 12.497 9.661 9.661 10.661 8.661
PV of Purchase
of fixed assets -1584 -1584 -1584 -1053 -1584 -1584 -1354 -1883 3
Discount rate (%)
1990 13.511 13.511 13.511 16.347 13.511 13.511 14.511 12.511 (D
1991 12.161 12.161 12.161 14.997 12.161 12.161 13.161 11.161
1992 11.161 11.161 11.161 13.997 11.161 11.161 12.161 10.161 00
1993-99 10.161 10.161 10.161 12.997 10.161 10.161 11.161 9.161
2000-41 9.661 9.661 9.661 12.497 9.661 9.661 10.661 8.661
PV of Old loan payment -1354 -1354 -1354 -1354 -1354 -1354 -1324 -1385
Discount rate (%)
1990 11.85 11.85 11.85 11.85 11.85 11.85 12.85 10.85
1991 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 11.5 9.5
1992 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.516 9.525 10.5 8.5
1993 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 8.514 8.552 10.5 8.5
1994-99 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.525 8.593 9.5 7.5
2000-41 8 8 8 8 8.025 8.093 9 7
PV of Depreciation
tax shields 578 578 578 445 576 578 479 709
Discount rate (%)
1990 13.1805 13.1805 13.1805 14.5985 13.1805 13.1805 14.1805 12.1805
1991 11.8305 11.8305 11.8305 13.2485 11.8305 11.8305 12.8305 10.8305
1992 10.8305 10.8305 10.8305 12.2485 10.8385 10.843 11.8305 9.8305
1993 9.8305 9.8305 9.8305 11.2485 9.8375 9.8565 10.8305 8.8305
1994-99 9.8305 9.8305 9.8305 11.2485 9.843 9.877 10.8305 8.8305
2000-01 9.3305 9.3305 9.3305 10.7485 9.343 9.377 10.3305 8.3305
2002 9.268 9.268 9.268 10.686 9.2805 9.3145 10.268 8.268
2003 9.2055 9.2055 9.2055 10.6235 9.218 9.252 10.2055 8.2055
2004 9.143 9.143 9.143 10.561 9.1555 9.1895 10.143 8.143
Base case LK GDP Alternative B Cost overrun Real rlskless interest rate
2005 9.0805 9.0805 9.0805 10.4985 9.093 9.127 10.0805 8.0805
2006 9.018 9.018 9.018 10.436 9.0305 9.0645 10.018 8.018
2007-41 8.9555 8.9555 8.9555 10.3735 8.968 8.8895 9.9555 7.9555
PV of Interest tax shields
for Credit Facilities 933 938 919 933 941 944 956 892
Discount rate (%)
1990 11.85 11.85 11.85 11.85 11.85 11.85 12.85 10.85
1991 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 11.5 9.5
1992 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.516 9.525 10.5 8.5
1993 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 8.514 8.552 10.5 8.5
1994-99 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.525 8.593 9.5 7.5
2000-12 8 8 8 8 8.025 8.093 9 7
PV of Interest tax shields
for Debt Instruments 583 583 583 583 583 579 551 613
Discount rate (%)
1990 12.85 12.85 12.85 12.85 12.85 12.85 13.85 11.85
1991 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 12.5 10.5
1992 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.516 10.525 11.5 9.5
1993 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.514 9.552 10.5 8.5
1994-99 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.525 9.593 10.5 8.5
2000-01 9 9 9 9 9.025 9.093 10 8
2002 8.875 8.875 8.875 8.875 8.9 8.968 9.875 7.875
2003 8.75 8.75 8.75 8.75 8.775 8.843 9.75 7.75
2004 8.625 8.625 8.625 8.625 8.65 8.718 9.625 7.625
2005 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.525 8.59 9.5 7.5
2006 8.375 8.375 8.375 8.375 8.4 8.468 9.375 7.375
2007-41 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.275 8.118 9.25 7.25
Total 5781 6706 4423 3502 5787 5787 4756 7128
Investment 4821 4821 4821 4821 5303 5785 4821 4821
VC 960 1885 -398 -1319 484 2 -65 2307
Market value of equity
after refinancing 1309.44 1309.44 1309.44 1309.44 1309.44 1309.44 1309.44 1309.44
Market value of equity
before refinancing 349.44 -575.56 1707.44 2628.44 825.44 1307.44 1374.44 -997.56
( < 960) (< 1885) (> -398) ( >-1319) (>484) ( > 2 ) ( > -65 ) ( < 2307)
As has been discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, the resultant VCs should be
compared with the market value of Eurotunnel equity in place before the refinancing.
The market value of Eurotunnel equity as of August, 1990 is £ 1,309.44 million, but
this value includes the present value of the refinancing; therefore, the present value
should be subtracted from the market value of equity, £1,309.44 million. I
considered the resultant VC as the present value of the refinancing and subtracted it
from the market value of the equity.
According to Table 8.1, three cases: base case, UK GDP higher growth, and 1%
lower real riskless interest rate, provide greater VC than the pre-refinancing market
value of the Eurotunnel equity. The other five cases: UK GDP lower growth,
alternative 1, 10% and 20% cost overrun, and 1% higher real riskless interest rate,
on the other hand, provide lower VC than the pre-refinancing market value of the
Eurotunnel equity. The results indicate that the project might have a positive value,
but this value is very sensitive to changes of the conditions.
The applied unlevered 13 of Eurotunnel is 0.395 in base case, and 0.745 in
alternative case. These two Bs are not so different from the industry 6 (=0.61),
which has been used in the previous financial evaluations of transportation projects1 ,
but the resultant VCs are significantly different. The results of the statistic tests
performed in Chapters 5 and 6 show that 3 in the alternative case is more reliable
than that in the base case. This means that the Eurotunnel project is expected to have
lower VC than the pre-refinancing market value of the equity, and this fact partly
explains why the syndicated banks were really reluctant to support the refinancing of
the project in late 1990.
1 Mr. Onozaki used this value in his 1987 M.S.graduation thesis, "An Evaluation of
Financial Packages : New Bosporus Bridge Case". Also, Mr. Okano used this value in
his 1988 M.S.graduation thesis, "A Financial evaluation of the Eurotunnel project".
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The lower VC than the pre-refinancing market value of the Eurotunnel equity
means that the Eurotunnel stock price will drop after refinancing, and that the equity
holders should sell the equity at market price rather than holding it and refinancing.
Also, this means that Eurotunnel should sell the whole assets and pay off the
outstanding debt to the syndicated banks rather than continue to carry out the project.
This is probably impossible because of the project's scale and its public
characteristics. Even if the syndicated banks take over Eurotunnel, they have to sell
the project to some other organizations soon after the takeover, because they cannot
construct or operate the project. The syndicated banks will be in much trouble of not
finding the organizations to execute the project.
For these reasons, it is impossible to sell the project, and a concerned issue is
which strategy should be taken in order for the Eurotunnel project to have a positive
value.
Based on the results of VC calculations, the conditions under which Eurotunnel
can get a positive value are as follows;
- The projected operating revenues of Eurotunnel depends to a large extent upon the
UK economic growth which is determined by its real GDP growth rate. Unification
of the European Community in 1992 will eliminate trade barriers in continental
Europe, and it will contribute to the UK economic growth. Under these
circumstances, the UK government has to take appropriate monetary and fiscal
policy to stabilize the operating and interest expenses of Eurotunnel, when its
operating revenues increase by growth in the UK economy. It is important to
increase operating revenues while keeping the operating and corporate costs
stable.
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- Recognizing the lower profitability of the project, Eurotunnel and TML have to
absolutely avoid the further cost overruns. If both parties keep the construction
and corporate costs under the current estimates, the Eurotunnel project might
have a positive value. The Eurotunnel construction is making much progress
according to the current report, and the both parties have to make much effort in
saving the project costs up to the completion date.
8.2. VC to the syndicated banks (Japanese banks)
In Chapter 7, I calculated VC to the Japanese banks, the largest contributors of
all the syndicated banks, assuming that Eurotunnel will produce sufficient profits to
make repayments for Credit Facilities. The results indicate that their profit positions
will vary due to the unexpected future spot V/£ exchange rate. The Japanese banks
will get foreign exchange gains in case of V depreciation against £, whereas they will
lose in case of V appreciation against £. According to the recent Y/£ exchange rate
movement, V has appreciated against £ and the tendency will be continued. Therefore,
the Japanese banks have to manage the foreign exchange risks through hedging policies
such as forward contracts, futures contracts, options, and swaps.
I explained the foreign exchange risk management through forward contracts in
Chapter 7. Once the banks buy a forward contract, they can determine a forward
exchange rate on the date of the contract, and can completely hedge the foreign
exchange risks for the loan repayment from Eurotunnel. The mechanism is described
in Figure 7.1.
When Eurotunnel requested additional financial support to the syndicated banks,
the Japanese banks were really reluctant to the support. The reasons are summarized
as follows;
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The recent fall in the Japanese stock market and the movement toward
deregulation of interest rate have shrunk the earnings of the Japanese banks.
Currently, the Japanese banks are under a pressure of BIS regulation, which
requires them to keep minimum capital ratio to the total assets. To meet the
requirement, their recent strategies have been shifted from increasing the volume
of deposits to increasing their profits. Lower profitability of the Eurotunnel
project counteracts the strategies. Also, even if the Japanese banks get foreign
exchange gains in case of V depreciation against £, the gains cannot be
appropriated to their capital under the BIS regulation. Consequently, the
Eurotunnel project has no attractions to the Japanese banks under their current
stringent circumstances.
In spite of their reluctances, the Japanese banks firstly agreed to provide
additional loans to Eurotunnel. Probably, some political pressures were applied on the
Japanese government from the governments of the UK and France, and the Japanese
banks gave in to the agreement. The project is one of the largest international
projects, and both countries seem to rely largely on the Japanese strong economic
power. Also, as shown in Chapter 2, half of the working tunnel boring machines were
made in Japan, and a lot of the Japanese tunnelling technologies have been applied for
this project. The UK and France are expecting to get both technical and financial
supports from Japan.
The Japanese banks, as a result, agreed to provide the lower profitable and
less attractive loans. Recognizing their stringent circumstances, the Japanese banks
have to scrutinize the project progress and decrease their risks as much as possible.
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8.3. Evaluation of the refinancing
Usually, large construction projects such as Eurotunnel are planned by
government, and the government issue construction bonds or raise taxes to get their
financial sources. The Eurotunnel project, on the other hand, is carried out by BOT
(Build-Operate-Transfer), in which the project is privately financed and is expected
to be sold to the government at the end of concession period. In fact, the project has
inspired the Middle East and LDC to adopt this method in their public construction
projects.
Although the base case of VC to the Eurotunnel equity holders is greater than
the pre-refinancing market value of the Eurotunnel equity, the VC will fluctuate too
much, even to be negative, by changing conditions. Therefore, I personally do not
recommend the syndicated banks and the equity holders to refinance the project.
However, if we take a broad view, there are side effects of the Eurotunnel
project, which cannot be counted in the financial evaluation. For example, a lot of the
lessons, which have been and will be derived through the project, can be applied to
other same kind of projects. Currently, a lot of large construction projects are
planned in continental Europe toward the total unification of Europe in the future. The
experience in the Eurotunnel project will play an important role in these projects.
Whereas the Eurotunnel project is not necessarily evaluated in its financial terms, it
can be evaluated in the role to the future BOT projects in other countries.
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Appendix 0.0
Appendix 1.1
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Appendix 2.1
Appendix 3.1
Appendix 3.2
Appendix 4.1
Appendix 4.2
Base case
VC calculation
Interest and principal repayment schedule
UK real GDP higher growth
VC calculation
Interest and principal repayment schedule
UK real GDP lower growth
VC calculation
Interest and principal repayment schedule
An alternative 13
VC calculation
Interest and principal repayment schedule
1% higher real riskfree interest rate
VC calculation
Interest and principal repayment schedule
1% lower real riskfree interest rate
VC calculation
Interest and principal repayment schedule
10% cost overrun
VC calculation
Interest and principal repayment schedule
20% cost overrun
VC calculation
Interest and principal repayment schedule
Page
161
165
169
173
177
181
185
189
Notice: MV; Market value of the Eurotunnel equity before refinancing
160
Turnover Operating coal (1-T)*NOI Discount rate cumulative PV;(1-t)*NOI
Base case
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
Capital expen discount rate cumulative Old loan repay discount rate cumulative
393
764
833
904
980
1070
1165
1258
1358
1464
1582
1735
1887
2040
2193
2346
2498
2651
2804
2956
3109
3368
3626
3885
4143
4402
4660
4919
5177
5436
5694
6105
6515
6926
7336
7747
8158
8568
8979
9389
9800
10363
10927
11490
12054
12617
13180
13744
14307
6625
PV of cap
124
227
233
249
259
277
302
326
351
377
405
441
476
512
547
583
619
654
690
725
761
822
884
945
1006
1068
1129
1190
1251
1313
1374
1473
1572
1671
1770
1870
1969
2068
2167
2266
2365
2478
2592
2705
2818
2932
3045
3158
3498
161
322
360
393
433
476
518
559
604
652
706
776
847
917
987
1058
1128
1198
1268
1339
1409
1527
1645
1764
1882
2000
2119
2237
2355
2474
2592
2779
2966
3153
3340
3527
3713
3900
4087
4274
4461
4731
5001
5271
5541
5811
6081
6351
6485
1.1185
1.105
1.095
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.13511 1.04315
1.12161 1.17001
1.11161 1.30059
1.10161 1.43274
1.10161 1.57832
1.10161 1.73870
1.10161 1.91537
1.10161 2.10999
1.10161 2.32438
1.10161 2.56056
1.09661 2.80794
1.09661 3.07921
1.09661 3.37670
1.09661 3.70292
1.09661 4.06066
1.09661 4.45296
1.09661 4.88316
1.09661 5.35492
1.09661 5.87226
1.09661 6.43958
1.09661 7.06171
1.09661 7.74394
1.09661 8.49208
1.09661 9.31250
1.09661 10.21218
1.09661 11.19878
1.09661 12.28069
1.09661 13.46713
1.09661 14.76819
1.09661 16.19494
1.09661 17.75954
1.09661 19.47529
1.09661 21.35679
1.09661 23.42007
1.09661 25.68269
1.09661 28.16389
1.09661 30.88480
1.09661 33.86858
1.09661 37.14063
1.09661 40.72878
1.09661 44.66359
1.09661 48.97854
1.09661 53.71036
1.09661 58.89932
1.09661 64.58958
1.09661 70.82958
1.09661 77.67242
1.09661 85.17636
1.09661 93.40524
1.09661 102.42913
1.09661 112.32480
1.09661 123.17650
1.038035
1.14703
1.25600
1.36276
1.47859
1.60427
1.74063
1.88859
2.04912
2.22329
2.40116
2.59325
2.80071
3.02476
3.26675
3.52809
3.81033
4.11516
4.44437
4.79992
5.18391
5.59863
6.04652
1.13511 1.04315
1.12161 1.17001
1.11161 1.30059
1.10161 1.43274
1.10161 1.57832
1.10161 1.73870
1.10161 1.91537
1.10161 2.10999
1.10161 2.32438
1.10161 2.56056
1.09661 2.80794
1.09661 3.07921
1.09661 3.37670
1.09661 3.70292
1.09661 4.06066
1.09661 4.45296
1.09661 4.88316
1.09661 5.35492
1.09661 5.87226
1.09661 6.43958
1.09661 7.06171
1.09661 7.74394
1.09661 8.49208
1.09661 9.31250
1.09661 10.21218
1.09661 11.19878
1.09661 12.28069
1.09661 13.46713
1.09661 14.76819
1.09661 16.19494
1.09661 17.75954
1.09661 19.47529
1.09661 21.35679
1.09661 23.42007
1.09661 25.68269
1.09661 28.16389
1.09661 30.88480
1.09661 33.86858
1.09661 37.14063
1.09661 40.72878
1.09661 44.66359
1.09661 48.97854
1.09661 53.71036
1.09661 58.89932
1.09661 64.58958
1.09661 70.82958
1.09661 77.67242
1.09661 85.17636
1.09661 93.40524
1.09661 102.42913
1.09661 112.32480
1.09661 123.17650
1584
PV of Old loan Depreciation Discount rate cumulative Dep Tax Shiel Interest (CRE)Discount rate cumulative Int tax Shield Interest(DI) Discount rate cumulative Int Tax Shield
1.131805 1.04213 1.1185 1.038035 1.1285 1.04111936
1.118305 1.16542 1.105 1.14703 1.115 1.16085
1.108305 1.29165 1.095 1.25600 1.105 1.28274
110 0 1.098305 1.41862 0 269 1.085 1.36276 79 1.095 1.40460
101 25 1.098305 1.55808 6 512 1.085 1.47859 139 1.095 1.53803
94 88 1.098305 1.71125 21 512 1.085 1.60427 128 1.095 1.68415
86 142 1.098305 1.87947 30 512 1.085 1.74063 118 1.095 1.84414
79 148 1.098305 2.06423 29 512 1.085 1.88859 108 1.095 2.01933
199 155 1.098305 2.26715 27 430 1.085 2.04912 84 95 1.095 2.21117 17
146 159 1.098305 2.49003 26 367 1.085 2.22329 66 171 1.095 2.42123 28
123 161 1.093305 2.72236 24 288 1.08 2.40116 48 209 1.09 2.63914 32
81 164 1.093305 2.97637 22 251 1.08 2.59325 39 247 1.09 2.87667 34
72 174 1.09268 3.25222 21 213 1.08 2.80071 30 281 1.08875 3.13197 36
63 175 1.092055 3.55160 20 174 1.08 3.02476 23 314 1.0875 3.40602 37
36 179 1.09143 3.87633 18 155 1.08 3.26675 19 346 1.08625 3.69979 37
31 184 1.090805 4.22832 17 136 1.08 3.52809 15 343 1.085 4.01427 34
28 188 1.09018 4.60962 16 116 1.08 3.81033 12 343 1.08375 4.35046 32
24 193 1.089555 5.02244 15 97 1.08 4.11516 9 343 1.0825 4.70938 29
21 197 1.089555 5.47222 14 77 1.08 4.44437 7 343 1.0825 5.09790 27
18 201 1.089555 5.96229 13 58 1.08 4.79992 5 343 1.0825 5.51848 25
16 206 1.089555 6.49624 13 39 1.08 5.18391 3 343 1.0825 5.97375 23
14 210 1.089555 7.07801 12 19 1.08 5.59863 1 343 1.0825 6.46659 21
12 215 1.089555 7.71188 11 0 1.08 6.04652 0 343 1.0825 7.00008 20
219 1.089555 8.40252 10 343 1.0825 7.57759 18
232 1.089555 9.15501 10 343 1.0825 8.20274 17
244 1.089555 9.97489 10 330 1.0825 8.87946 15
257 1.089555 10.86819 9 317 1.0825 9.61202 13
269 1.089555 11.84149 9 305 1.0825 10.40501 12
282 1.089555 12.90195 9 292 1.0825 11.26342 10
295 1.089555 14.05739 8 279 1.0825 12.19266 9
307 1.089555 15.31630 8 266 1.0825 13.19855 8
320 1.089555 16.68795 8 254 1.0825 14.28743 7
332 1.089555 18.18244 7 241 1.0825 15.46614 6
345 1.089555 19.81076 7 228 1.0825 16.74210 5
388 1.089555 21.58492 7 216 1.0825 18.12332 5
431 1.089555 23.51795 7 203 1.0825 19.61850 4
475 1.089555 25.62411 7 190 1.0825 21.23702 4
518 1.089555 27.91887 7 178 1.0825 22.98908 3
561 1.089555 30.41915 7 165 1.0825 24.88568 3
604 1.089555 33.14333 7 152 1.0825 26.93875 2
647 1.089555 36.11148 7 139 1.0825 29.16119 2
691 1.089555 39.34545 7 127 1.0825 31.56699 2
734 1.089555 42.86903 7 114 1.0825 34.17127 1
777 1.089555 46.70817 7 101 1.0825 36.99040 1
862 1.089555 50.89112 7 89 1.0825 40.04211 1
948 1.089555 55.44867 7 76 1.0825 43.34558 1
1033 1.089555 60.41437 7 63 1.0825 46.92159 1
1118 1.089555 65.82478 7 50 1.0825 50.79262 0
1203 1.089555 71.71972 7 38 1.0825 54.98301 0
1289 1.089555 78.14258 7 25 1.0825 59.51911 0
1374 1.089555 85.14064 6 13 1.0825 64.42944 0
1459 1.089555 92.76541 6 0 1.0825 69.74487 0
578 933
)Summation
0
0
0
-350
222
241
264
221
76
154
173
204
163
175
197
192
187
181
174
168
161
154
147
151
145
139
132
125
119
112
106
100
95
89
90
90
89
88
86
84
82
79
76
73
72
71
69
67
65
63
60 Initial Invest -4821
57 PV of CF 5781
MV 349.44
5781 VC 960 VC 960
Credit Facil.
Interest rate Debt Inflow Princ. Repay Outstg. Bal. Intst. Repay
0.1185
0.105
0.095
0.085
0.085
0.085
0.085
0.085
0.085
0.085
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
1764
3323
4917
5823
6019
6019
6019
6019
5056
4316
3596
3135
2660
2180
1937
1694
1452
1210
968
726
484
242
0
Debt.Instrum.
Interest rate Debt Inflow Princ. Repay Outstg. Bal. Interest. payYear
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
1000
804
515
422
422
422
422
147
1000
1804
2319
2741
3163
3585
4007
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4000
3846
3692
3538
3384
3230
3076
2922
2768
2614
2460
2306
2152
1998
1844
1690
1536
1382
1228
1074
920
766
612
459
306
153
0
Summation
Interest Pay
0.095
0.095
0.09
0.09
0.08875
0.0875
0.08625
0.085
0.08375
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
Turnover Operating coal (1-T)*NOI Discount rate cumulative PV;(1-t)'NOI
GDP higher
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
409
798
875
954
1039
1140
1247
1352
1467
1588
1724
1898
2072
2248
2425
2604
2783
2964
3146
3329
3513
3805
4097
4389
4682
4974
5266
5558
5850
6142
6434
6898
7362
7826
8290
8754
9218
9682
10146
10610
11074
11711
12347
12984
13620
14257
14894
15530
16167
Capital expen discount rate cumulative
124
227
233
249
259
277
302
326
351
377
405
441
476
512
547
583
619
654
690
725
761
822
884
945
1006
1068
1129
1190
1251
1313
1374
1473
1572
1671
1770
1870
1969
2068
2167
2266
2365
2478
2592
2705
2818
2932
3045
3158
3498
PV of cap Old loan repay discount rate cumulative
1.1185
1.105
1.095
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
171
343
385
423
468
518
567
616
670
727
791
874
957
1042
1127
1213
1299
1386
1474
1562
1651
1790
1928
2066
2205
2344
2482
2621
2759
2898
3036
3255
3474
3693
3912
4131
4350
4569
4788
5006
5225
5540
5853
6167
6481
6795
7110
7423
7601
1.038035
1.14703
1.25600
1.36276
1.47859
1.60427
1.74063
1.88859
2.04912
2.22329
2.40116
2.59325
2.80071
3.02476
3.26675
3.52809
3.81033
4.11516
4.44437
4.79992
5.18391
5.59863
6.04652
1.13511 1.04315
1.12161 1.17001
1.11161 1.30059
1.10161 1.43274
1.10161 1.57832
1.10161 1.73870
1.10161 1.91537
1.10161 2.10999
1.10161 2.32438
1.10161 2.56056
1.09661 2.80794
1.09661 3.07921
1.09661 3.37670
1.09661 3.70292
1.09661 4.06066
1.09661 4.45296
1.09661 4.88316
1.09661 5.35492
1.09661 5.87226
1.09661 6.43958
1.09661 7.06171
1.09661 7.74394
1.09661 8.49208
1.09661 9.31250
1.09661 10.21218
1.09661 11.19878
1.09661 12.28069
1.09661 13.46713
1.09661 14.76819
1.09661 16.19494
1.09661 17.75954
1.09661 19.47529
1.09661 21.35679
1.09661 23.42007
1.09661 25.68269
1.09661 28.16389
1.09661 30.88480
1.09661 33.86858
1.09661 37.14063
1.09661 40.72878
1.09661 44.66359
1.09661 48.97854
1.09661 53.71036
1.09661 58.89932
1.09661 64.58958
1.09661 70.82958
1.09661 77.67242
1.09661 85.17636
1.09661 93.40524
1.09661 102.42913
1.09661 112.32480
1.09661 123.17650
119
217
222
221
222
223
221
219
217
215
214
215
215
213
210
206
202
196
190
184
177
175
172
168
164
159
153
148
142
136
130
127
123
120
115
111
107
102
98
93
89
86
83
79
76
73
69
66
62
7545
1.13511 1.04315
1.12161 1.17001
1.11161 1.30059
1.10161 1.43274
1.10161 1.57832
1.10161 1.73870
1.10161 1.91537
1.10161 2.10999
1.10161 2.32438
1.10161 2.56056
1.09661 2.80794
1.09661 3.07921
1.09661 3.37670
1.09661 3.70292
1.09661 4.06066
1.09661 4.45296
1.09661 4.88316
1.09661 5.35492
1.09661 5.87226
1.09661 6.43958
1.09661 7.06171
1.09661 7.74394
1.09661 8.49208
1.09661 9.31250
1.09661 10.21218
1.09661 11.19878
1.09661 12.28069
1.09661 13.46713
1.09661 14.76819
1.09661 16.19494
1.09661 17.75954
1.09661 19.47529
1.09661 21.35679
1.09661 23.42007
1.09661 25.68269
1.09661 28.16389
1.09661 30.88480
1.09661 33.86858
1.09661 37.14063
1.09661 40.72878
1.09661 44.66359
1.09661 48.97854
1.09661 53.71036
1.09661 58.89932
1.09661 64.58958
1.09661 70.82958
1.09661 77.67242
1.09661 85.17636
1.09661 93.40524
1.09661 102.42913
1.09661 112.32480
1.09661 123.17650
431
26
21
3
42
58
22
6
6
46
32
33
33
33
33
33
32
31
30
29
28
31
33
34
35
36
36
36
35
35
34
30
27
24
21
19
17
15
13
12
10
9
7
6
5
4
4
3
2
1584
PV of Old loan Depreciation Discount rate cumulative Dep Tax Shlel
1.131805
1.118305
1.108305
1.098305
1.098305
1.098305
1.098305
1.098305
1.098305
1.098305
1.093305
1.093305
1.09268
1.092055
1.09143
1.090805
1.09018
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.04213
1.16542
1.29165
1.41862
1.55808
1.71125
1.87947
2.06423
2.26715
2.49003
2.72236
2.97637
3.25222
3.55160
3.87633
4.22832
4.60962
5.02244
5.47222
5.96229
6.49624
7.07801
7.71188
8.40252
9.15501
9.97489
10.86819
11.84149
12.90195
14.05739
15.31630
16.68795
18.18244
19.81076
21.58492
23.51795
25.62411
27.91887
30.41915
33.14333
36.11148
39.34545
42.86903
46.70817
50.89112
55.44867
60.41437
65.82478
71.71972
78.14258
85.14064
92.76541
1.1185
1.105
1.095
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.038035
1.14703
1.25600
1.36276
1.47859
1.60427
1.74063
1.88859
2.04912
2.22329
2.40116
2.59325
2.80071
3.02476
3.26675
3.52809
3.81033
4.11516
4.44437
4.79992
5.18391
5.59863
6.04652
1.1285
1.115
1.105
1.095
1.095
1.095
1.095
1.095
1.095
1.095
1.09
1.09
1.08875
1.0875
1.08625
1.085
1.08375
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.04111936
1.16085
1.28274
1.40460
1.53803
1.68415
1.84414
2.01933
2.21117
2.42123
2.63914
2.87667
3.13197
3.40602
3.69979
4.01427
4.35046
4.70938
5.09790
5.51848
5.97375
6.46659
7.00008
7.57759
8.20274
8.87946
9.61202
10.40501
11.26342
12.19266
13.19855
14.28743
15.46614
16.74210
18.12332
19.61850
21.23702
22.98908
24.88568
26.93875
29.16119
31.56699
34.17127
36.99040
40.04211
43.34558
46.92159
50.79262
54.98301
59.51911
64.42944
69.74487
578 938
Interest(DI) Discount rate cumulative Int Tax ShieldInterest (CRE)Discount rate cumulative Int tax Shield
Summation
0
0
0
-338
235
255
279
238
94
173
193
225
185
198
221
217
212
207
201
194
188
181
173
177
171
164
156
149
142
135
128
121
115
108
109
108
107
105
102
100
97
93
90
86
85
83
81
78
75
73
70 InItial Invest -4821
66 PV of CF 6706
MV -575.56
6706 VC 1885 VC 1885
"" '---
Debt Inflow Princ. Repay Outstg. Bal. Intst. Repay
1559
1594
906
196
Credit Factl.
Interest rate
0.1185
0.105
0.095
0.085
0.085
0.085
0.085
0.085
0.085
0.085
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
Debt.lnstrum.
Interest rate Debt Inflow Princ. Repay Outstg. Bal. Interest. pay
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
1000
804
515
422
422
422
422
147
1764
3323
4917
5823
6019
6019
6019
6019
5056
4316
3596
3135
2660
2180
1937
1694
1452
1210
968
726
484
242
0
0.095
0.095
0.09
0.09
0.08875
0.0875
0.08625
0.085
0.08375
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
Summation
Interest Pay
512
512
1000
1804
2319
2741
3163
3585
4007
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4000
3846
3692
3538
3384
3230
3076
2922
2768
2614
2460
2306
2152
1998
1844
1690
1536
1382
1228
1074
920
766
612
459
306
153
0
Turnover Operating cost (1-T)*NOI Discount rate cumulative PV;(1-t)'NOI
GDP lower
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
Capital expen discount rate cumulative Old loan repay discount rate cumulative
369
713
771
831
894
968
1046
1121
1200
1284
1376
1499
1619
1738
1855
1970
2083
2195
2305
2412
2518
2728
2937
3146
3356
3565
3775
3984
4193
4403
4612
4945
5277
5610
5942
6275
6608
6940
7273
7605
7938
8394
8851
9307
9763
10220
10676
11132
11589
5281
PV of cap
124
227
233
249
259
277
302
326
351
377
405
441
476
512
547
583
619
654
690
725
761
822
884
945
1006
1068
1129
1190
1251
1313
1374
1473
1572
1671
1770
1870
1969
2068
2167
2266
2365
2478
2592
2705
2818
2932
3045
3158
3498
147
292
323
349
381
415
446
477
509
544
583
635
686
736
785
832
879
924
969
1012
1054
1143
1232
1321
1410
1499
1588
1676
1765
1854
1943
2083
2223
2363
2503
2643
2784
2923
3064
3203
3344
3549
3756
3961
4167
4373
4579
4784
4855
1.1185
1.105
1.095
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.13511 1.04315
1.12161 1.17001
1.11161 1.30059
1.10161 1.43274
1.10161 1.57832
1.10161 1.73870
1.10161 1.91537
1.10161 2.10999
1.10161 2.32438
1.10161 2.56056
1.09661 2.80794
1.09661 3.07921
1.09661 3.37670
1.09661 3.70292
1.09661 4.06066
1.09661 4.45296
1.09661 4.88316
1.09661 5.35492
1.09661 5.87226
1.09661 6.43958
1.09661 7.06171
1.09661 7.74394
1.09661 8.49208
1.09661 9.31250
1.09661 10.21218
1.09661 11.19878
1.09661 12.28069
1.09661 13.46713
1.09661 14.76819
1.09661 16.19494
1.09661 17.75954
1.09661 19.47529
1.09661 21.35679
1.09661 23.42007
1.09661 25.68269
1.09661 28.16389
1.09661 30.88480
1.09661 33.86858
1.09661 37.14063
1.09661 40.72878
1.09661 44.66359
1.09661 48.97854
1.09661 53.71036
1.09661 58.89932
1.09661 64.58958
1.09661 70.82958
1.09661 77.67242
1.09661 85.17636
1.09661 93.40524
1.09661 102.42913
1.09661 112.32480
1.09661 123.17650
1.038035
1.14703
1.25600
1.36276
1.47859
1.60427
1.74063
1.88859
2.04912
2.22329
2.40116
2.59325
2.80071
3.02476
3.26675
3.52809
3.81033
4.11516
4.44437
4.79992
5.18391
5.59863
6.04652
1.13511 1.04315
1.12161 1.17001
1.11161 1.30059
1.10161 1.43274
1.10161 1.57832
1.10161 1.73870
1.10161 1.91537
1.10161 2.10999
1.10161 2.32438
1.10161 2.56056
1.09661 2.80794
1.09661 3.07921
1.09661 3.37670
1.09661 3.70292
1.09661 4.06066
1.09661 4.45296
1.09661 4.88316
1.09661 5.35492
1.09661 5.87226
1.09661 6.43958
1.09661 7.06171
1.09661 7.74394
1.09661 8.49208
1.09661 9.31250
1.09661 10.21218
1.09661 11.19878
1.09661 12.28069
1.09661 13.46713
1.09661 14.76819
1.09661 16.19494
1.09661 17.75954
1.09661 19.47529
1.09661 21.35679
1.09661 23.42007
1.09661 25.68269
1.09661 28.16389
1.09661 30.88480
1.09661 33.86858
1.09661 37.14063
1.09661 40.72878
1.09661 44.66359
1.09661 48.97854
1.09661 53.71036
1.09661 58.89932
1.09661 64.58958
1.09661 70.82958
1.09661 77.67242
1.09661 85.17636
1.09661 93.40524
1.09661 102.42913
1.09661 112.32480
1.09661 123.17650
PV of Old loan Depreciation Discount rate cumulative Dep Tax Shiel
1.131805
1.118305
1.108305
1.098305
1.098305
1.098305
1.098305
1.098305
1.098305
1.098305
1.093305
1.093305
1.09268
1.092055
1.09143
1.090805
1.09018
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.089555
1.04213
1.16542
1.29165
1.41862
1.55808
1.71125
1.87947
2.06423
2.26715
2.49003
2.72236
2.97637
3.25222
3.55160
3.87633
4.22832
4.60962
5.02244
5.47222
5.96229
6.49624
7.07801
7.71188
8.40252
9.15501
9.97489
10.86819
11.84149
12.90195
14.05739
15.31630
16.68795
18.18244
19.81076
21.58492
23.51795
25.62411
27.91887
30.41915
33.14333
36.11148
39.34545
42.86903
46.70817
50.89112
55.44867
60.41437
65.82478
71.71972
78.14258
85.14064
92.76541
1.1185
1.105
1.095
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.038035
1.14703
1.25600
1.36276
1.47859
1.60427
1.74063
1.88859
2.04912
2.22329
2.40116
2.59325
2.80071
3.02476
3.26675
3.52809
3.81033
4.11516
4.44437
4.79992
5.18391
5.59863
6.04652
1.1285
1.115
1.105
1.095
1.095
1.095
1.095
1.095
1.095
1.095
1.09
1.09
1.08875
1.0875
1.08625
1.085
1.08375
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.04111936
1.16085
1.28274
1.40460
1.53803
1.68415
1.84414
2.01933
2.21117
2.42123
2.63914
2.87667
3.13197
3.40602
3.69979
4.01427
4.35048
4.70938
5.09790
5.51848
5.97375
6.46659
7.00008
7.57759
8.20274
8.87946
9.61202
10.40501
11.26342
12.19266
13.19855
14.28743
15.46614
16.74210
18.12332
19.61850
21.23702
22.98908
24.88568
26.93875
29.16119
31.56699
34.17127
36.99040
40.04211
43.34558
46.92159
50.79262
54.98301
59.51911
64.42944
69.74487
578 919
Interest (CRE)Discount rate cumulative Int tax Shield Interest(DI) Discount rate cumulative Int Tax Shield
Summation
0
0
0
-367
195
220
241
196
50
126
144
173
131
141
163
156
150
143
136
129
122
115
109
113
108
102
96
90
85
80
75
70
66
62
63
64
64
63
62
61
60
58
56
54
54
53
52
51
49
48
46 Initial Invest -4821
43 PV of CF 4423
MV 1707.44
4423 VC -398 VC -398
Debt Inflow Prlnc. Repay Outstg. Bal. Intst Repay
1559
1594
906
196
Credit Facil.
Interest rate
0.1185
0.105
0.095
0.085
0.085
0.085
0.085
0.085
0.085
0.085
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
512
Debt.lnstrum.
Interest rate Debt Inflow Princ. Repay Outstg. Bal. Interest. pay
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
1764
3323
4917
5823
6019
6019
6019
6019
5056
4316
3596
3135
2660
2180
1937
1694
1452
1210
968
726
484
242
0
0.095
0.095
0.09
0.09
0.08875
0.0875
0.08625
0.085
0.08375
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
1000
1804
2319
2741
3163
3585
4007
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4000
3846
3692
3538
3384
3230
3076
2922
2768
2614
2460
2306
2152
1998
1844
1690
1536
1382
1228
1074
920
766
612
459
306
153
0
Summation
Interest Pay
70
349
467
495
512
512
512
512
525
538
496
497
494
488
501
489
464
440
420
401
381
362
343
343
343
330
317
305
292
279
266
254
241
228
216
203
190
178
165
152
139
127
114
101
89
76
63
50
38
25
13
0
Turnover Operating cost (1-T)*NOI Discount rate cumulative PV;(1-t)'NOI
Altemative 6
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
393
764
833
904
980
1070
1165
1258
1358
1464
1582
1735
1887
2040
2193
2346
2498
2651
2804
2956
3109
3368
3626
3885
4143
4402
4660
4919
5177
5436
5694
6105
6515
6926
7336
7747
8158
8568
8979
9389
9800
10363
10927
11490
12054
12617
13180
13744
14307
124
227
233
249
259
277
302
326
351
377
405
441
476
512
547
583
619
654
690
725
761
822
884
945
1006
1068
1129
1190
1251
1313
1374
1473
1572
1671
1770
1870
1969
2068
2167
2266
2365
2478
2592
2705
2818
2932
3045
3158
3498
161
322
360
393
433
476
518
559
604
652
706
776
847
917
987
1058
1128
1198
1268
1339
1409
1527
1645
1764
1882
2000
2119
2237
2355
2474
2592
2779
2966
3153
3340
3527
3713
3900
4087
4274
4461
4731
5001
5271
5541
5811
6081
6351
6485
1.16347
1.14997
1.13997
1.12997
1.12997
1.12997
1.12997
1.12997
1.12997
1.12997
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.05176
1.20950
1.37879
1.55799
1.76048
1.98929
2.24784
2.54000
2.87012
3.24315
3.64844
4.10439
4.61732
5.19434
5.54348
6.57374
7.39526
8.31944
9.35912
10.52873
11.84451
13.32472
14.98991
16.86320
18.97059
21.34134
24.00837
27.00870
30.38398
34.18106
38.45267
43.25810
48.66406
54.74561
61.58717
69.28372
77.94211
87.68253
98.64022
110.96728
124.83487
140.43548
157.98570
177.72917
199.93999
224.92649
253.03555
284.65740
320.23104
360.25031
405.27080
455.91749
Capital expen discount rate cumulative
104
183
181
175
170
166
160
153
147
141
136
133
129
124
119
113
107
101
95
89
84
80
77
73
70
66
62
58
54
51
47
45
43
40
38
36
33
31
29
27
25
24
22
21
19
18
17
16
14
3948
1.16347
1.14997
1.13997
1.12997
1.12997
1.12997
1.12997
1.12997
1.12997
1.12997
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
1.12497
PV of cap Old loan repay discount rate cumulative
1.1185
1.105
1.095
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.05176
1.20950
1.37879
1.55799
1.76048
1.98929
2.24784
2.54000
2.87012
3.24315
3.64844
4.10439
4.61732
5.19434
5.84348
6.57374
7.39526
8.31944
9.35912
10.52873
11.84451
13.32472
14.98991
16.86320
18.97059
21.34134
24 00837
27.00870
30.38398
34.18106
38.45267
43.25810
48.66406
54.74561
61.58717
69.28372
77.94211
87.68253
98.64022
110.96728
124.83487
140.43548
157.98570
177.72917
199.93999
224.92649
253.03555
284.65740
320.23104
360.25031
405.27080
455.91749
1.038035
1.14703
1.25600
1.36276
1.47859
1.60427
1.74063
1.88859
2.04912
2.22329
2.40116
2.59325
2.80071
3.02476
3.26675
3.52809
3.81033
4.11516
4.44437
4.79992
5.18391
5.59863
8 04652
397
23
18
3
35
47
18
5
5
33
23
23
23
22
21
21
20
19
18
17
16
17
17
18
18
17
17
16
16
15
14
13
11
9
8
7
6
5
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1053
PV of Old loan Depreciation Discount rate cumulative Dep Tax Shiel
0
25
88
142
148
155
159
161
164
174
175
179
184
188
193
197
201
206
210
215
219
232
244
257
269
282
295
307
320
332
345
388
431
475
518
561
604
647
691
734
777
862
948
1033
1118
1203
1289
1374
1459
1.145985
1.132485
1.122485
1.112485
1.112485
1.112485
1.112485
1.112485
1.112485
1.112485
1.107485
1.107485
1.10686
1.106235
1.10561
1.104985
1.10436
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.103735
1.1185
1.105
1.095
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.04647
1.18511
1.33027
1.47990
1.64637
1.83156
2.03759
2.26678
2.52176
2.80542
3.10696
3.44092
3.80861
4.21322
4.65818
5.14722
5.68438
6.27405
6.92489
7.64324
8.43612
9.31124
10.27714
11.34324
12.51993
13.81868
15.25216
16.83435
18.58066
20.50812
22.63553
24.98363
27.57530
30.43583
33.59309
37.07787
40.92414
45.16940
49.85505
55.02677
60.73497
67.03531
73.98922
81.66449
90.13596
99.48621
109.80641
121.19718
133.76957
147.64616
162.96223
179.86712
1.038035
1.14703
1.25600
1.36276
1.47859
1.60427
1.74063
1.88859
2.04912
2.22329
2.40116
2.59325
2.80071
3.02476
3.26675
3.52809
3.81033
4.11516
4.44437
4.79992
5.18391
5.59863
6.04652
1.1285
1.115
1.105
1.095
1.095
1.095
1.095
1.095
1.095
1.095
1.09
1.09
1.08875
1.0875
1.08625
1.085
1.08375
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.0825
1.04111936
1.16085
1.28274
1,40460
1.53803
1.68415
1.84414
2.01933
2.21117
2.42123
2.63914
2.87667
3.13197
3.40602
3.69979
4.01427
4.35046
4.70938
5.09790
5.51848
5.97375
6.46659
7.00008
7.57759
8.20274
8.87946
9.61202
10.40501
11.26342
12.19266
13.19855
14.28743
15.46614
16.74210
18.12332
19.61850
21.23702
22.98908
24.88568
26.93875
29.16119
31.56699
34.17127
36.99040
40.04211
43.34558
46.92159
50.79262
54.98301
59.51911
64.42944
69.74487
445 933
Interest(DI) Discount rate cumulative Int Tax ShieldInterest (CRE)Discount rate cumulative Int tax Shield
1354
Summation
0
0
0
-324
203
216
231
191
45
113
126
154
120
126
146
139
131
124
117
109
102
95
89
94
82
76
70
65
60
55
51
47
43
42
41
39
38
36
34
32
30
28
27
26
24
23
22
21
20
18 Initial Invest -4821
17 PV of CF 3502
MV 2628.44
3502 VC -1319 VC -1319
----
Debt Inflow Princ. Repay Outstg. Bal. Intat Repay
1559
1594
906
196
Credit Facil.
Interest rate
0.1185
0.105
0.095
0.085
0.085
0.085
0.085
0.085
0.085
0.085
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
Debt.lnstrum.
Interest rate Debt Inflow Princ. Repay Outstg. Bal. Interest. pay
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
1764
3323
4917
5823
6019
6019
8019
6019
5056
4316
3596
3135
2660
2180
1937
1694
1452
1210
968
726
484
242
0
0.095
0.095
0.09
0.09
0.08875
0.0875
0.08625
0.085
0.08375
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
0.0825
Summation
Interest Pay
1000
1804
2319
2741
3163
3585
4007
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4000
3846
3692
3538
3384
3230
3076
2922
2768
2614
2460
2306
2152
1998
1844
1690
1536
1382
1228
1074
920
766
612
459
306
153
0
Real int. +1%
u--*
5448
ear Iurnover uperatng coa t(-T)Nul Dscount rate cumulative PV;(I-t)'NOI Capital expen discount rate cumulative PV of cap Old loan repay discount rate cumulative
1990 1.14511 1.04620 1.14511 1.04620 1.1285 1.04111936
1991 1.13161 1.18389 1.13161 1.18389 1.115 1.16085
1992 1.12161 1.32787 1.12161 1.32787 1.105 1.28274
1993 393 124 161 1.11161 1.47607 109 618 1.11161 1.47607 419 168 1.095 1.40460
1994 764 227 322 1.11161 1.64081 196 41 1.11161 1.64081 25 168 1.095 1.53803
1995 833 233 360 1.11161 1.82394 197 36 1.11161 1.82394 20 168 1.095 1.68415
1996 904 249 393 1.11161 2.02752 194 6 1.11161 2.02752 3 168 1.095 1.84414
1997 980 259 433 1.11161 2.25381 192 88 1.11161 2.25381 39 168 1.095 2.01933
1998 1070 277 476 1.11161 2.50535 190 135 1.11161 2.50535 54 423 1.095 2.21117
1999 1165 302 518 1.11161 2.78498 186 57 1.11161 2.78498 20 337 1.095 2.42123
2000 1258 326 559 1.10661 3.08188 181 18 1.10661 3.08188 6 306 1.09 2.63914
2001 1358 351 604 1.10661 3.41044 177 20 1.10661 3.41044 6 218 1.09 2.87667
2002 1464 377 652 1.10661 3.77403 173 154 1.10661 3.77403 41 209 1.09 3.13557
2003 1582 405 706 1.10661 4.17638 169 119 1.10661 4.17638 28 199 1.09 3.41777
2004 1735 441 776 1.10661 4.62162 168 134 1.10661 4.62162 29 122 1.09 3.72537
2005 1887 476 847 1.10661 5.11433 166 148 1.10661 5.11433 29 116 1.09 4.06065
2006 2040 512 917 1.10661 5.65957 162 163 1.10661 5.65957 29 109 1.09 4.42611
2007 2193 547 987 1.10661 6.26294 158 177 1.10661 6.26294 28 103 1.09 4.82446
2008 2346 583 1058 1.10661 6.93063 153 192 1.10661 6.93063 28 97 1.09 5.25866
2009 2498 619 1128 1.10661 7.66951 147 207 1.10661 7.66951 27 90 1,09 5.73194
2010 2651 654 1198 1.10661 8.48715 141 221 1.10661 8.48715 26 84 1.09 6.24781
2011 2804 690 1268 1.10661 9.39197 135 236 1.10661 9.39197 25 77 1.09 6.81012
2012 2956 725 1339 1.10661 10.39325 129 250 1.10661 10.39325 24 71 1.09 7.42303
2013 3109 761 1409 1.10661 11.50127 122 265 1.10661 11.50127 23
2014 3368 822 1527 1.10661 12.72742 120 318 1.10661 12.72742 25
2015 3626 884 1645 1.10661 14.08429 117 370 1.10661 14.08429 26
2016 3885 945 1764 1.10661 15.58582 113 423 1.10661 15.58582 27
2017 4143 1006 1882 1.10661 17.24742 109 476 1.10661 17.24742 28
2018 4402 1068 2000 1.10661 19.08617 105 529 1.10661 19.08617 28
2019 4660 1129 2119 1.10661 21.12094 100 581 1.10661 21.12094 28
2020 4919 1190 2237 1.10661 23.37265 96 634 1.10661 23.37265 27
2021 5177 1251 2355 1.10661 25.86440 91 687 1.10661 25.86440 27
2022 5436 1313 2474 1.10661 28.62181 86 739 1.10661 28.62181 26
2023 5694 1374 2592 1.10661 31.67318 82 792 1.10661 31.67318 25
2024 6105 1473 2779 1.10661 35.04986 79 774 1.10661 35.04986 22
2025 6515 1572 2966 1.10661 38.78652 76 755 1.10661 38.78652 19
2026 6926 1671 3153 1.10661 42.92155 73 737 1.10661 42.92155 17
2027 7336 1770 3340 1.10661 47.49742 70 718 1.10661 47.49742 15
2028 7747 1870 3527 1.10661 52.56112 67 700 1.10661 52.56112 13
2029 8158 1969 3713 1.10661 58.16466 64 682 1.10661 58.16466 12
2030 8568 2068 3900 1.10661 64.36560 61 663 1.10661 64.36560 10
2031 8979 2167 4087 1.10661 71.22761 57 645 1.10661 71.22761 9
2032 9389 2266 4274 1.10661 78.82119 54 626 1.10661 78.82119 8
2033 9800 2365 4461 1.10661 87.22432 51 608 1.10661 87.22432 7 (D
2034 10363 2478 4731 1.10661 96.52330 49 568 1.10661 96.52330 6
2035 10927 2592 5001 1.10661 106.81365 47 527 1.10661 106.81365 5
2036 11490 2705 5271 1.10661 118.20105 45 487 1.10661 118.20105 4
2037 12054 2818 5541 1.10661 130.80247 42 446 1.10661 130.80247 3
2038 12617 2932 5811 1.10661 144.74732 40 406 1.10661 144.74732 3
2039 13180 3045 6081 1.10661 160.17883 38 365 1.10661 160.17883 2
2040 13744 3158 6351 1.10661 177.25550 36 325 1.10661 177.25550 2
2041 14307 3498 6485 1.10661 196.15270 33 284 1.10661 196.15270 1
PV o Old loan Depreciation Discount rate cumulative Dep Tax Shlel Interest (CRE) Discount rate cumulative Int tax Shield Interest(DI) Discount rate cumulative Int Tax Shield
1.141805 1.04519 1.1285 1.04111936 1.1385 1.04418555
1.128305 1.17930 1.115 1.16085 1.125 1.17471
1.118305 1.31882 1.105 1.28274 1.115 1.30980
119 0 1.108305 1.46165 0 269 1.095 1.40460 77 1.105 1.44733
109 25 1.108305 1.61995 6 537 1.095 1.53803 140 1.105 1.59930
100 88 1.108305 1.79540 20 572 1.095 1.68415 136 1.105 1.76723
91 142 1.108305 1.98985 29 572 1.095 1.84414 124 1.105 1.95278
83 148 1.108305 2.20537 27 572 1.095 2.01933 113 1.105 2.15783
191 155 1.108305 2.44422 25 480 1.095 2.21117 87 105 1.105 2.38440 18
139 159 1.108305 2.70894 23 410 1.095 2.42123 68 189 1.105 2.63476 29
116 161 1.103305 2.98879 22 324 1.09 2.63914 49 232 1.1 2.89824 32
76 164 1.103305 3.29754 20 282 1.09 2.87667 39 274 1.1 3.18806 34
67 174 1.10268 3.63613 19 239 1.09 3.13557 30 312 1.09875 3.50288 36
58 175 1.102055 4.00722 17 196 1.09 3.41777 23 350 1.0975 3.84441 36
33 179 1.10143 4.41367 16 174 1.09 3.72537 19 386 1.09625 4.21444 37
29 184 1.100805 4.85859 15 152 1.09 4.06065 15 395 1.095 4.61481 34
25 188 1.10018 5.34533 14 131 1.09 4.42611 12 389 1.09375 5.04744 31
21 193 1.099555 5.87748 13 109 1.09 4.82446 9 384 1.0925 5.51433 28
18 197 1.099555 6.46261 12 87 1.09 5.25866 7 384 1.0925 6.02441 25
16 201 1.099555 7.10600 11 65 1.09 5.73194 5 384 1.0925 6.58167 23
13 206 1.099555 7.81343 11 44 1.09 6.24781 3 384 1.0925 7.19047 21
11 210 1.099555 8.59130 10 22 1.09 6.81012 1 384 1.0925 7.85559 20
10 215 1.099555 9.44661 9 0 1.09 7.42303 0 384 1.0925 8.58223 18
219 1.099555 10.38706 8 384 1.0925 9.37609 16
232 1.099555 11.42115 8 384 1.0925 10.24338 15
244 1.099555 12.55818 8 370 1.0925 11.19089 13
257 1.099555 13.80841 7 356 1.C0925 12.22605 12
269 1.099555 15.18311 7 342 1.')25 13.35696 10
282 1.099555 16.69466 7 327 1.0u25 14.59247 9
295 1.099555 18.35670 6 313 1.0925 15.94228 8
307 1.099555 20.18420 6 299 1.0925 17.41694 7
320 1.099555 22.19364 6 285 1.0925 19.02801 6
332 1.099555 24.40313 5 270 1.0925 20.78810 5
345 1.099555 26.83258 5 256 1.0925 22.71100 5
388 1.099555 29.50390 5 242 1.0925 24.81176 4
431 1.099555 32.44116 5 228 1.0925 27.10685 3
475 1.099555 35.67083 5 213 1.0925 29.61423 3
518 1.099555 39.22204 5 199 1.0925 32.35355 2
561 1.099555 43.12680 5 185 1.0925 35.34625 2
604 1.099555 47.42028 5 171 1.0925 38.61578 2
647 1.099555 52.14121 5 156 1.0925 42.18774 1
691 1.099555 57.33213 5 142 1.0925 46.09011 1
734 1.099555 63.03983 5 128 1.0925 50.35344 1
777 1.099555 69.31576 4 114 1.0925 55.01114 1
862 1.099555 76.21649 5 99 1.0925 60.09967 1
948 1.099555 83.80422 5 85 1.0925 65.65889 1
1033 1.099555 92.14735 4 71 1.0925 71.73233 0
1118 1.099555 101.32108 4 57 1.0925 78.36757 0
1203 1.099555 111.40810 4 42 1.0925 85.61658 0
1289 1.099555 122.49933 4 28 1.0925 93.53611 0
1374 1.099555 134.69475 4 14 1.0925 102.18820 0
1459 1.099555 148.10429 4 0 1.0925 111.64061 0
479 9561324
Summation
0
0
0
-352
208
233
252
210
75
146
162
189
151
159
178
172
165
158
151
144
136
129
122
124
118
112
105
99
93
87
82
76
71
66
66
66
64
63
61
59
57
54
52
49
48
47
45
44
42
40
38 Initial Invest -4821
36 PV of CF 4756
MV 1374.44
4756 VC -65 VC -65
Credit Facil.
Interest rate Debt Inflow Prlnc. Repay Outstg. Bal. Intst Repay
0.1285
0.115
0.105
0.095
0.095
0.095
0.095
0.095
0.095
0.095
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
1559
1594
906
196
1764
3323
4917
5823
6019
6019
6019
6019
5056
4316
3596
3135
2660
2180
1937
1694
1452
1210
968
726
484
242
0
Debt.lnstrum.
Interest rate Debt Inflow Princ. Repay Outstg. Bal. Interest. pay
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
1000
804
515
422
422
422
422
147
1000
1804
2319
2741
3163
3585
4007
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4000
3846
3692
3538
3384
3230
3076
2922
2768
2614
2460
2306
2152
1998
1844
1690
1536
1382
1228
1074
920
766
612
459
306
153
0
0.105
0.105
0.1
0.1
0.09875
0.0975
0.09625
0.095
0.09375
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
0.0925
Summation
Interest Pay
Turnover Operating coal (1-T)*NOI Discount rate cumulative PV;(1-t)*NOI
Real int. -1%
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
Capital expen discount rate cumulative Old loan repay discount rate cumulative
393
764
833
904
980
1070
1165
1258
1358
1464
1582
1735
1887
2040
2193
2346
2498
2651
2804
2956
3109
3368
3628
3885
4143
4402
4660
4919
5177
5436
5694
6105
6515
6926
7336
7747
8158
8568
8979
9389
9800
10363
10927
11490
12054
12617
13180
13744
14307
8182
PV of cap
124
227
233
249
259
277
302
326
351
377
405
441
476
512
547
583
619
654
690
725
761
822
884
945
1006
1068
1129
1190
1251
1313
1374
1473
1572
1671
1770
1870
1969
2068
2167
2266
2365
2478
2592
2705
2818
2932
3045
3158
3498
161
322
360
393
433
476
518
559
604
652
706
777
846
917
987
1058
1128
1198
1269
1338
1409
1527
1647
1764
1882
2001
2119
2237
2355
2474
2592
2779
2966
3153
3339
3527
3714
3900
4087
4274
4461
4731
5001
5271
5541
5811
6081
6352
6485
1.1085
1.095
1.085
1.075
1.075
1.075
1.075
1.075
1.075
1.075
1.07
1.07
1.07
1.07
1.07
1.07
1.07
1.07
1.07
1.07
1.07
1.07
1.07
1.12511 1.04008
1.11161 1.15616
1.10161 1.27364
1.09161 1.39031
1.09161 1.51768
1.09161 1.65672
1.09161 1.80849
1.09161 1.97416
1.09161 2.15502
1.09161 2.35244
1.08661 2.55618
1.08661 2.77757
1.08661 3.01814
1.08661 3.27954
1.08661 3.56358
1.08661 3.87222
1.08661 4.20759
1.08661 4.57201
1.08661 4.96799
1.08661 5.39827
1.08661 5.86582
1.08661 6.37386
1.08661 6.92590
1.08661 7.52575
1.08661 8.17755
1.08661 8.88581
1.08661 9.65541
1.08661 10.49166
1.08661 11.40035
1.08661 12.38773
1.08661 13.46063
1.08661 14.62646
1.08661 15.89326
1.08661 17.26977
1.08661 18.76551
1.08661 20.39079
1.08661 22.15683
1.08661 24.07584
1.08661 26.16104
1.08661 28.42685
1.08661 30.88890
1.08661 33.56419
1.08661 36.47118
1.08661 39.62995
1.08661 43.06230
1.08661 46.79193
1.08661 50.84458
1.08661 55.24823
1.08661 60.03328
1.08661 65.23276
1.08661 70.88257
1.08661 77.02171
1.0349322
1.13325
1.22958
1.32180
1.42093
1.52750
1.64206
1.76522
1.89761
2.03993
2.18272
2.33551
2.49900
2.67393
2.86111
3.06138
3.27568
3.50498
3.75033
4.01285
4.29375
4.59431
4.91591
1.12511 1.04008
1.11161 1.15616
1.10161 1.27364
1.09161 1.39031
1.09161 1.51768
1.09161 1.65672
1.09161 1.80849
1.09161 1.97416
1.09161 2.15502
1.09161 2.35244
1.08661 2.55618
1.08661 2.77757
1.08661 3.01814
1.08661 3.27954
1.08661 3.56358
1.08661 3.87222
1.08661 4.20759
1.08661 4.57201
1.08661 4.96799
1.08661 5.39827
1.08661 5.86582
1.08661 6.37386
1.08661 6.92590
1.08661 7.52575
1.08661 8.17755
1.08661 8.88581
1.08661 9.65541
1.08661 10.49166
1.08661 11.40035
1.08661 12.38773
1.08661 13.46063
1.08661 14.62646
1.08661 15.89326
1.08661 17.26977
1.08661 18.76551
1.08661 20.39079
1.08661 22.15683
1.08661 24.07584
1.08661 26.16104
1.08661 28.42685
1.08661 30.88890
1.08661 33.56419
1.08661 36.47118
1.08661 39.62995
1.08661 43.06230
1.08661 46.79193
1.08661 50.84458
1.08661 55.24823
1.08661 60.03328
1.08661 65.23276
1.08661 70.88257
1.08661 77.02171
1883
Depreciation Discount rate cumulative Dep Tax Shiel
0
25
88
142
148
155
159
161
164
174
175
179
184
188
193
197
201
206
210
215
219
232
244
257
269
282
295
307
320
332
345
388
431
475
518
561
604
647
691
734
777
862
948
1033
1118
1203
1289
1374
1459
1.121805
1.108305
1.098305
1.088305
1.088305
1.088305
1.088305
1.088305
1.088305
1.088305
1.083305
1.083305
1.08268
1.082055
1.08143
1.080805
1.08018
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.079555
1.1085
1.095
1.085
1.075
1.075
1.075
1.075
1.075
1.075
1.075
1.07
1.07
1.07
1.07
1.07
1.07
1.07
1.07
1.07
1.07
1.07
1.07
1.07
1.03906
1.15159
1.26480
1.37649
1.49804
1.63032
1.77429
1.93097
2.10148
2.28705
2.47757
2.68397
2.90588
3.14432
3.40036
3.67513
3.96980
4.28562
4.62656
4.99463
5.39197
5.82093
6.28402
6.78394
7.32364
7.90627
8.53525
9.21427
9.94731
10.73867
11.59299
12.51527
13.51092
14.58578
15.74615
16.99884
18.35118
19.81111
21.38718
23.08864
24.92546
26.90840
29.04910
31.36010
33.85495
36.54829
39.45588
42.59480
45.98343
49.64164
53.59088
57.85430
1.0349322
1.13325
1.22958
1.32180
1.42093
1.52750
1.64206
1.76522
1.89761
2.03993
2.18272
2.33551
2.49900
2.67393
2.86111
3.06138
3.27568
3.50498
3.75033
4.01285
4.29375
4.59431
4.91591
1.1185
1.105
1.095
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.085
1.08
1.08
1.07875
1.0775
1.07625
1.075
1.07375
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1. 721.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
1.0725
0 1.0725
1.038035
1.14703
1.25600
1.36276
1.47859
1.60427
1.74063
1.88859
2.04912
2.22329
2.40116
2.59325
2.79747
3.01427
3.24411
3.48742
3.74461
4.01610
4.30726
4.61954
4.95446
5.31366
5.69890
6.11207
6.55519
7.03044
7.54015
8.08681
8.67310
9.30190
9.97629
10.69957
11.47529
12.30725
13.19953
14.15649
15.18284
16.28359
17.46416
18.73031
20.08825
21.54465
23.10664
24.78187
26.57856
28.50550
30.57215
32.78863
35.16581
37.71533
40.44969
43.38229
709 892
Interest(DI) Discount rate cumulative Int Tax ShieldPV of Old loan Interest (CRE)Discount rate cumulative Int tax Shieldd
Summation
0
0
0
-347
226
249
275
233
77
162
184
221
177
192
219
216
212
207
202
196
190
184
177
185
179
172
166
159
152
146
139
133
126
120
122
124
124
123
122
120
118
115
112
109
108
107
105
103
101
98
95 Initial Invest -4821
91 PV of CF 7128
MV -997.56
7128 VC 2307 VC 2307T_
Debt Inflow Prlnc. Repay Outstg. Bal. Intat. Repay
1559
1594
906
196
Credit Facil.
Interest rate
0.1085
0.095
0.085
0.075
0.075
0.075
0.075
0.075
0.075
0.075
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
Debt.lnstrum.
Interest rate Debt Inflow Princ. Repay Outstg. Bal. Interest. pay
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
1000
804
515
422
422
422
422
147
1764
3323
4917
5823
6019
6019
6019
6019
5056
4316
3596
3135
2660
2180
1937
1694
1452
1210
968
726
484
242
0
Summation
Interest Pay
64
316
418
437
451
451
451
451
85 464
153 477
186 437
219 439
249 435
278 430
306 441
312 430
306 408
301 386
301 369
301 352
301 335
301 318
301 301
301 301
301 301
290 290
279 279
268 268
257 257
245 245
234 234
223 223
212 212
201 201
190 190
178 178
167 167
156 156
145 145
134 134
123 123
111 111
100 100
89 89
78 78
67 67
56 56
44 44
33 33
22 22
11 11
0 0
0.085
0.085
0.08
0.08
0.07875
0.0775
0.07625
0.075
0.07375
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
0.0725
1000
1804
2319
2741
3163
3585
4007
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4000
3848
3692
3538
3384
3230
3076
2922
2768
2614
2460
2306
2152
1998
1844
1690
1536
1382
1228
1074
920
766
612
459
306
153
0
Turnover Operating coast (1-T)NOI Discount rate cumulative PV;(1-t)*NOI
+ 10% cost
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
393
764
833
904
980
1070
1165
1258
1358
1464
1582
1735
1887
2040
2193
2346
2498
2651
2804
2956
3109
3368
3626
3885
4143
4402
4660
4919
5177
5436
5694
6105
6515
6926
7336
7747
8158
8568
8979
9389
9800
10363
10927
11490
12054
12617
13180
13744
14307
124
227
233
249
259
277
302
326
351
377
405
441
476
512
547
583
619
654
690
725
761
822
884
945
1006
1068
1129
1190
1251
1313
1374
1473
1572
1671
1770
1870
1969
2068
2167
2266
2365
2478
2592
2705
2818
2932
3045
3158
3498
161
322
360
393
433
476
518
559
604
652
706
776
847
917
987
1058
1128
1198
1268
1339
1409
1527
1645
1764
1882
2000
2119
2237
2355
2474
2592
2779
2966
3153
3340
3527
3713
3900
4087
4274
4461
4731
5001
5271
5541
5811
6081
6351
6485
1.13511
1.12161
1.11161
1.10161
1.10161
1.10161
1.10161
1.10161
1.10161
1.10161
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.04315
1.17001
1.30059
1.43274
1.57832
1.73870
1.91537
2.10999
2.32438
2.56056
2.80794
3.07921
3.37670
3.70292
4.06066
4.45296
4.88316
5.35492
5.87226
6.43958
7.06171
7.74394
8.49208
9.31250
10.21218
11.19878
12.28069
13.46713
14.76819
16.19494
17.75954
19.47529
21.35679
23.42007
25.68269
28.16389
30.88480
33.86858
37.14063
40.72878
44.66359
48.97854
53.71036
58.89932
64.58958
70.82958
77.67242
85.17636
93.40524
102.42913
112.32480
123.17650
Capital expen discount rate cumulative
113
204
207
205
205
205
202
199
196
193
191
191
190
188
184
180
175
170
164
158
151
150
147
144
140
135
131
126
121
116
111
108
105
102
99
95
91
87
83
80
76
73
71
68
65
62
59
57
53
6625
1.13511
1.12161
1.11161
1.10161
1.10161
1.10161
1.10161
1.10161
1.10161
1.10161
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
PV of cap Old loan repay discount rate cumulative
1.1185
1.105
1.09516
1.08514
1.08525
1.08525
1.08525
1.08525
1.08525
1.08525
1.08025
1.08025
1.08025
1.08025
1.08025
1.08025
1.08025
1.08025
1.08025
1.08025
1.08025
1.08025
1.08025
1.04315
1.17001
1.30059
1.43274
1.57832
1.73870
1.91537
2.10999
2.32438
2.56056
2.80794
3.07921
3.37670
3.70292
4.06066
4.45296
4.88316
5.35492
5.87226
6.43958
7.06171
7.74394
8.49208
9.31250
10.21218
11.19878
12.28069
13.46713
14.76819
16.19494
17.75954
19.47529
21.35679
23.42007
25.68269
28.16389
30.88480
33.86858
37.14063
40.72878
44.66359
48.97854
53.71036
58.89932
64.58958
70.82958
77.67242
85.17636
93.40524
102.42913
112.32480
123.17650
1.038035
1.14703
1.25618
1.36313
1.47934
1.60545
1.74232
1.89085
2.05204
2.22698
2.40570
2.59875
2.80730
3.03259
3.27595
3.53885
3.82284
4.12962
4.46103
4.81902
5.20575
5.62351
6.07480
431
26
21
3
42
58
22
6
6
46
32
33
33
33
33
33
32
31
30
29
28
31
33
34
35
36
36
36
35
35
34
30
27
24
21
19
17
15
13
12
10
9
7
6
5
4
4
3
2
1584
PV of Old loan Depredation Discount rate cumulative Dep Tax Shiel
1.131805
1.118305
1.108385
1.098375
1.09843
1.09843
1.09843
1.09843
1.09843
1.09843
1.09343
1.09343
1.092805
1.09218
1.091555
1.09093
1.090305
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.08968
1.1185
1.105
1.09516
1.08514
1.08525
1.08525
1.08525
1.08525
1.08525
1.08525
1.08025
1.08025
1.08025
1.08025
1.08025
1.08025
1.08025
1.08025
1.08025
1.08025
1.08025
1.08025
1.08025
1.04213
1.16542
1.29174
1.41881
1.55847
1.71187
1.88037
2.06545
2.26875
2.49207
2.72490
2.97949
3.25600
3.55614
3.88172
4.23468
4.61710
5.03116
5.48235
5.97401
6.50976
7.093586
7.72971
8.42291
9.17827
10.00138
10.89830
11.87566
12.94067
14.10119
15.36579
16.74379
18.24537
19.88162
21.66460
23.60749
25.72460
28.03159
30.54546
33.28478
36.26976
39.52243
43.06680
46.92903
51.13762
55.72365
60.72094
66.16640
72.10020
78.56614
85.61196
93.28964
1.038035
1.14703
1.25618
1.36313
1.47934
1.60545
1.74232
1.89085
2.05204
2.22698
2.40570
2.59875
2.80730
3.03259
3.27595
3.53885
3.82284
4.12962
4.46103
4.81902
5.20575
5.62351
6.07480
1.1285
1.115
1.10516
1.09514
1.09525
1.09525
1.09525
1.09525
1.09525
1.09525
1.09025
1.09025
1.089
1.08775
1.0865
1.08525
1.084
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.08275
1.04111936
1.16085
1.28292
1.40498
1.53880
1.68538
1.84591
2.02173
2.21430
2.42521
2.64409
2.88272
3.13928
3.41475
3.71013
4.02641
4.36463
4.72581
5.11687
5.54029
5.99875
6.49514
7.03262
7.61456
8.24467
8.92692
9.66562
10.46545
11.33146
12.26914
13.28441
14.38370
15.57395
16.86270
18.25808
19.76894
21.40482
23.17607
25.09389
27.17041
29.41876
31.85316
34.48901
37.34298
40.43311
43.77895
47.40165
51.32414
55.57121
60.16973
65.14878
70.53984
583576 941
Interest (CRE)Discount rate cumulative Int tax Shield Interest(DI) Discount rate cumulative Int Tax Shield
Summation
0
0
0
-350
228
241
264
221
76
154
173
204
163
175
197
193
187
181
175
168
161
154
147
151
145
138
132
125
119
112
106
100
95
89
90
90
89
88
86
84
82
79
76
73
72
71
69
67
65
63
60 Initial Invest -5303
57 PV of CF 5787
MV 825.44
VC 484 VC 484
Debt Inflow Princ. Repay Outstg. Bal. Intet Repay
19
1701
1701
1013
303
Credit Facil.
Interest rate
0.1185
0.105
0.09516
0.08514
0.08525
0.08525
0.08525
0.08525
0.08525
0.08525
0.08025
0.08025
0.08025
0.08025
0.08025
0.08025
0.08025
0.08025
0.08025
0.08025
0.08025
0.08025
0.08025
Debt.lnstrum.
Interest rate Debt Inflow Princ. Repay Outstg. Bal. Interest. pay
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
1764
3465
5166
6179
6482
6019
6019
6019
5056
4316
3596
3135
2660
2180
1937
1694
1452
1210
968
726
484
242
0
0.09525
0.09525
0.09025
0.09025
0.089
0.08775
0.0865
0.08525
0.084
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
0.08275
1000
1804
2319
2741
3163
3585
4007
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4000
3846
3692
3538
3384
3230
3076
2922
2768
2614
2460
2306
2152
1998
1844
1690
1536
1382
1228
1074
920
766
612
459
306
153
0
Summation
interest Pay
Turnover Operating coast (1-T)'NOI Discount rate cumulative PV;(1-t)*NOI
+ 20% cost
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
393
764
833
904
980
1070
1165
1258
1358
1464
1582
1735
1887
2040
2193
2346
2498
2651
2804
2956
3109
3368
3626
3885
4143
4402
4660
4919
5177
5436
5694
6105
6515
6926
7336
7747
8158
8568
8979
9389
9800
10363
10927
11490
12054
12617
13180
13744
14307
124
227
233
249
259
277
302
326
351
377
405
441
476
512
547
583
619
654
690
725
761
822
884
945
1006
1068
1129
1190
1251
1313
1374
1473
1572
1671
1770
1870
1969
2068
2167
2266
2365
2478
2592
2705
2818
2932
3045
3158
3498
161
322
360
393
433
476
518
559
604
652
706
776
847
917
987
1058
1128
1198
1268
1339
1409
1527
1645
1764
1882
2000
2119
2237
2355
2474
2592
2779
2966
3153
3340
3527
3713
3900
4087
4274
4461
4731
5001
5271
5541
5811
6081
6351
6485
1.13511
1.12161
1.11161
1.10161
1.10161
1.10161
1.10161
1.10161
1.10161
1.10161
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.04315
1.17001
1.30059
1.43274
1.57832
1.73870
1.91537
2.10999
2.32438
2.56056
2.80794
3.07921
3.37670
3.70292
4.06066
4.45296
4.88316
5.35492
5.87226
6.43958
7.06171
7.74394
8.49208
9.31250
10.21218
11.19878
12.28069
13.46713
14.76819
16.19494
17.75954
19.47529
21.35679
23.42007
25.68269
28.16389
30.88480
33.86858
37.14063
40.72878
44.66359
48.97854
53.71036
58.89932
64.58958
70.82958
77.67242
85.17636
93.40524
102.42913
112.32480
123.17650
Capital expen discount rate cumulative
113
204
207
205
205
205
202
199
196
193
191
191
190
188
184
180
175
170
164
158
151
150
147
144
140
135
131
126
121
116
111
108
105
102
99
95
91
87
83
80
76
73
71
68
65
62
59
57
53
6625
PV of cap Old loan repay discount rate cumulative
1.1185
1.105
1.09525
1.08552
1.08593
1.08593
1.08593
1.08593
1.08593
1.08593
1.08093
1.08093
1.08093
1.08093
1.08093
1.08093
1.08093
1.08093
1.08093
1.08093
1.08093
1.08093
1.08093
1.13511
1.12161
1.11161
1.10161
1.10161
1.10161
1.10161
1.10161
1.10161
1.10161
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.09661
1.038035
1.14703
1.25628
1.36372
1.48090
1.60816
1.74635
1.89641
2.05937
2.23633
2.41732
2.61295
2.82442
3.05300
3.30008
3.56715
3.85584
4.16790
4.50520
4.86981
5.26392
5.68993
6.15042
1.04315
1.17001
1.30059
1.43274
1.57832
1.73870
1.91537
2.10999
2.32438
2.56056
2.80794
3.07921
3.37670
3.70292
4.06066
4.45296
4.88316
5.35492
5.87226
6.43958
7.06171
7.74394
8.49208
9.31250
10.21218
11.19878
12.28069
13.46713
14.76819
16.19494
17.75954
19.47529
21.35679
23.42007
25.68269
28.16389
30.88480
33.86858
37.14063
40.72878
,4.66359
48.97854
53.71036
58.89932
64.58958
70.82958
77.67242
85.17636
93.40524
102.42913
112.32480
123.17650
PV of Old loan Depreciation Discount rate cumulative Dep Tax Shiel
0
25
88
142
148
155
159
161
164
174
175
179
184
188
193
197
201
206
210
215
219
232
244
257
269
282
295
307
320
332
345
388
431
475
518
561
604
647
691
734
777
862
948
1033
1118
1203
1289
1374
1459
1.131805
1.118305
1.10843
1.098565
1.09877
1.09877
1.09877
1.09877
1.09877
1.09877
1.09377
1.09377
1.093145
1.09252
1.091895
1.09127
1.090645
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.088895
1.1185
1.105
1.09525
1.08552
1.08593
1.08593
1.08593
1.08593
1.08593
1.08593
1.08093
1.08093
1.08093
1.08093
1.08093
1.08093
1.08093
1.08093
1.08093
1.08093
1.08093
1.08093
1.08093
1.04213
1.16542
1.29179
1.41912
1.55928
1.71329
1.88252
2.06845
2.27275
2.49723
2.73140
2.98752
3.26579
3.56794
3.89582
4.25139
4.63676
5.04894
5.49777
5.98650
6.51866
7.09814
7.72913
8.41621
9.16437
9.97904
10.86612
11.83207
12.88388
14.02919
15.27632
16.63431
18.11301
19.72317
21.47646
23.38561
25.46447
27.72814
30.19303
32.87704
35.79964
38.98205
42.44736
46.22072
50.32951
54.80355
59.67532
64.98015
70.75656
77.04647
83.89551
91.35341
1.038035
1.14703
1.25628
1.36372
1.48090
1.60816
1.74635
1.89641
2.05937
2.23633
2.41732
2.61295
2.82442
3.05300
3.30008
3.56715
3.85584
4.16790
4.50520
4.86981
5.26392
5.68993
6.15042
1.1285
1.115
1.10525
1.09552
1.09593
1.09593
1.09593
1.09593
1.09593
1.09593
1.09093
1.09093
1.08968
1.08843
1.08718
1.08593
1.08468
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.08118
1.04111936
1.16085
1.28303
1.40558
1.54042
1.68819
1.85014
2.02762
2.22213
2.43530
2.65675
2.89832
3.15825
3.43753
3.73721
4.05835
4.40201
4.75937
5.14573
5.56346
6.01511
6.50341
7.03136
7.60217
8.21931
8.88655
9.60796
10.38794
11.23123
12.14298
13.12875
14.19454
15.34685
16.59271
17.93971
19.39605
20.97062
22.67302
24.51362
26.50363
28.65519
30.98142
33.49650
36.21574
39.15574
42.33440
45.77110
49.48680
53.50414
57.84761
62.54368
67.62097
578 944
Interest (CRE)Dlscount rate cumulative Int tax Shield Interest(DI) Discount rate cumulative Int Tax Shield
Summation
0
0
0
-351
227
241
264
221
77
154
174
205
164
175
198
194
188
180
174
167
161
154
147
151
145
138
132
125
119
112
106
100
95
89
90
90
89
88
86
84
82
79
76
73
72
71
69
67
65
63
60 Initial Invest -5785
57 PV of CF 5787
MV 1307.44
5787 VC 2 VC 2
Debt Inflow Princ. Repay Outstg. Bal. Intst Repay
72
1808
1808
1120
410
Credit Facil.
Interest rate
0.1185
0.105
0.09525
0.08552
0.08593
0.08593
0.08593
0.08593
0.08593
0.08593
0.08093
0.08093
0.08093
0.08093
0.08093
0.08093
0.08093
0.08093
0.08093
0.08093
0.08093
0.08093
0.08093
Debt.lnstrum.
Interest rate Debt Inflow Princ. Repay Outstg. Bal. Interest. pay
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
1764
3572
5380
6500
6910
6019
6019
6019
5056
4316
3596
3135
2660
2180
1937
1694
1452
1210
968
726
484
242
0
0.09593
0.09593
0.09093
0.09093
0.08968
0.08843
0.08718
0.08593
0.08468
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
0.08118
1000
1804
2319
2741
3163
3585
4007
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4154
4000
3846
3692
3538
3384
3230
3076
2922
2768
2614
2460
2306
2152
1998
1844
1690
1536
1382
1228
1074
920
766
612
459
306
153
0
Summation
Interest Pay
